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Politics of Religious Diversity:  
toleration, religious freedom, and visibility of religion in public space 
Mariëtta D.C. van der Tol 
 
In France, Germany and the Netherlands, a mix of secularisation, privatisation of 
religion, and immigration concerns have increased social and political anxiety about 
the visibility of religion and religious diversity in public space. Visibility in public 
space is a measure of sociability: expressions of identity in public space attest to a 
public recognition as well as integration of this identity into cultural transcendences. 
This visibility is historically intertwined with genealogies of early modern toleration 
(ca 1500-1789). This thesis compares trajectories in the development of toleration and 
religious freedom in France, Germany, and the Netherlands, arguing that common 
frames of reference to toleration – truth, outward unity, public order, economic benefit 
and trust – have transformed into substrata of constitutionalism. Is it possible to fully 
disentangle toleration from the structures of constitutional law? 
 
Toleration emerged in conjugation with the political imaginary of the corpus 
christianum, which relegated minorities primarily to private spaces, based on the 
assumption that one could separate spaces and personae. This thesis contends that the 
political imaginary of the nation replaced the imaginary of the corpus christianum, and 
that constitutionalisation was part of a new political order which constructed a 
different yet similar oneness of territory, people, and teleology. This nexus creates new 
categories of othering inside and outside the nation based on religion, race, and origin, 
or combinations of those. 
 
These new categories of othering obscure that belonging is about more than 
integration and outward conformity alone, and that immigrants still face structural 
racism, even when they have fully “integrated”. Moreover, the identification of 
common space with a shared political identity renders minorities vulnerable to 
political interpretations of public order in the context of the law. Parliamentary 
documentation and court cases on the full face veil, the burkini, and the hijab, 
demonstrate this vulnerability, in particular where religious otherness intersects with 
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What does it mean to tolerate religious diversity in a post-Christian and post-secular 
state? In many European countries, political conflicts over religious diversity 
concentrate on the visibility of religion in public space. Sometimes these conflicts 
revolve around legacies of Christendom in public space, but more often, these concern 
the relationship between Muslim identities and the nation state. This thesis addresses 
the urgent need in the field of political and constitutional theory to better understand 
the complex relationship between toleration, constitutionalism, and concepts of 
belonging in the nation state. This thesis contends that the concept of toleration is 
incompatible with the project of the nation state; yet that sensibilities of toleration form 
substrata of constitutional law, and that therefore, constitutional law can be vulnerable 
to political intolerance.  
 The concept of toleration is primarily located in the early modern period (ca 
1500-1789), when social, religious, and political disintegration challenged the political 
imaginary of the one body of Christ, the corpus christianum. The political imaginary of 
the corpus christianum symbolized a sacred interconnectedness of territory, people, and 
teleology, or, the interconnectedness of political, social, and religious life in the body 
of Christ. Toleration emerged as a political concept and as a governmental technique 
that authorities employed to mediate burgeoning tensions between a political 
imaginary of oneness and its fracturing appearance, and almost exclusively dealt with 
expressions of otherness within a political community. Visibility of otherness in shared 
or public space became an indicator of higher levels of toleration, whereas restrictions 
of this public visibility marked waves of intolerance. These histories of toleration are 
extremely complex and defy narratives of progression. This thesis identifies common 
frames of reference to toleration and examines them in the context of constitutionalism. A 
better understanding of the complex relationship between toleration and 




of religious otherness in public space is again contested today under the influences of 
secularisation, privatisation of religion, and anxiety over non-Western immigration. 
The analysis and arguments of this thesis primarily concern France, Germany, 
and the Netherlands. The juxtaposition of these states is appropriate because of their 
varying social, political, and constitutional structures which have emerged in the era 
of constitutionalisation and their formation as nation states. Their processes of 
constitutionalisation are intertwined with revolutionary concerns over liberty, 
equality, as well as legal certainty. Yet they are also interwoven with long histories of 
toleration and disentangling of the social and political implications of the corpus 
christianum. Germany, for example, is often understood as relatively open to 
cooperation between the state and religious institutions and accommodative of 
individual religious commitments,1 whereas laïcité in France would intrinsically 
discourage institutional cooperation, yet vigorously defends freedom of religion in the 
private space as well as in the context of public worship.2 The Netherlands exhibits a 
spirit of relative openness to religious diversity – and although some public funds are 
available for Catholic, Protestant, Islamic, Jewish, and other institutions, the 
manifestation of religion in public space is not habitual. For example, the law explicitly 
regulated Roman Catholic processions until 1983 and, similar to France, expressions 
 
1 See Christian Roßkopf, ‘Staat und Kirche des 19. Und 20. Jahrhunderts im Spiegel 
verfassungsrechtlichter Zeugnisse’, in: Wolfgang Eger, Kirche und Staat im 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert, 
Neustadt an der Aisch: Verlag Degener and Co 1968; Reinhold Zippelius and Thomas Würtemberger, 
Deutsches Staatsrecht, 32e edition, München: Beck 2008; Reinhold Zippelius, Staat und Kirche. Eine 
Geschichte von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, München: Beck 1997. 
2 Henry Peña-Ruiz, Qu’est-ce que la laïcité ?, Paris: Gallimard 2003; Jean Baubérot, La laïcité 1905-2005 
entre passion et raison, Paris: Seuil 1990; Claude Langlois, ‘La révolution française: un processus de 
laïcisation?’, in Hubert Bost (ed.), Genèse et enjeux de la laïcité, Montpellier: Labor et fides 1990; Jean 
Baubérot, Histoire de la laïcité en France, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 2000; Louis Châtellier, 
Claude Langlois & Jean-Paul Willaime (eds.), Lumières, Religions et Laïcité, Paris: Riveneuve 2009; Erik 
Sengers and Thijl Sunier (eds.), Religious newcomers and the nation state. Political culture and organised 
religion in France and the Netherlands, Delft: Eburon 2010. 
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of Muslim identity in public space figure prominently in debates over immigration 
and integration.3  
This thesis examines the transformation of the political imaginary of oneness as 
well as the common frames of reference to toleration in the context of 
constitutionalisation in order to explain and critique expressions of toleration in 
political debates about religious diversity today. Through a comparison of these three 
different contexts, this thesis complicates the narrative that post-Enlightenment 
constitutionalisation reckoned with the divisions and inequalities of early modernity, 
and, contributes to a more historically informed theorization of the relationship 
between religious diversity, nationhood, and the meaning of public space.4 This thesis 
critiques narratives of progression and illustrates recent lapses into sensibilities of 
toleration with regards to expressions of religious symbols, and especially Islamic 
attire, in public space. Such lapses are not only about political rhetoric, they find 
expression in constitutional law, especially through the mediation of the concept of 
public order. A better understanding of how toleration is implicated in law could 
strengthen critiques of uses of public order from the perspective of political and 
constitutional theory. 
 
1.1 Early modern toleration and its common frames of reference 
The early modern concept of toleration concerns state action or inaction with regard to 
religious “others” within a political community.5 Toleration is distinct from tolerance, 
which pertains to popular attitudes to religious otherness and which might be a virtue 
of any religious, or indeed non-religious, individual or community. Toleration is part 
 
3 Hannah van Ooijen, Religious Symbols in Public Functions, Cambridge: Intersentia 2012. 
4 Claudia E. Haupt, Religion-State relations in the United States and Germany, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2012, pp. 28-30. 
5 István P. Bejczy, ‘Tolerantia: a medieval concept’, Journal of the History of Ideas (1997), Vol. 91, No. 4, 
pp. 365-384, pp. 368-369; William H. Huseman, ‘The expression of the idea of toleration in French 





of a family of words which signify permission, forbearing, longsuffering, licensing, 
and impunity.6 In early modern Dutch and German, toleration was expressed in the 
language of ‘verdragen’ and ‘dulden’.7 It could be understood as a disposition or une 
direction de la volonté, a direction of the will.8 The theological concept of toleration is 
rooted in the Augustinian hermeneutic of the parable of the wheat and the chaff, which 
is found in Matthew 13.  
A crucial aspect to this toleration is the relative acceptance of otherness within 
the framework of unity. Augustine applied this primarily to the unity of the church, 
arguing that the church should be tolerant of minor errors in order to maintain its unity 
and peace, and only exert intolerance to the obstinate (meaning, the Donatists).9 
Medieval canonists extended this narrative to the political imaginary of the corpus 
christianum, in which state and church had different yet complementary vocations in 
protecting public order and peace and promoting the common good. In canonical law, 
the possibility of toleration is indicated through phrases like tolerare potest, which 
signals a discretionary restraint of state coercion.10 This restraint of coercion is 
 
6 Huseman, ‘The expression of the idea of toleration in French during the sixteenth century’, pp. 299-
301. 
7 Jesse Sponholz, The Tactics of Toleration. A Refugee Community in the Age of Religious Wars, Newark: 
University of Delaware Press 2010, p. 13.  
8 François Olivier-Martin, Le regime des cultes en France du Concordat de 1516 au Concordat de 1801, Paris: 
Loysel Editions 1988, p. 401. 
9 Edward L. Smither, ‘Persuasion or coercion: Augustine on the state’s role in dealing with other 
religions and heresies’ (2006), Faculty Publications and Presentations. Paper 14, online available 
http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lts_fac_pubs/14 (consulted 31 October 2017), pp. 25, 34; Adam 
Ployd, Augustine, the Trinity, and the Church. A reading of the anti-Donatist sermons, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2015, p. 53. 
10 María J. Roca, ‘El concepto de tolerancia en el derecho canónico’, Ius Canonicum (2001), Vol. 41, No. 
82, pp. 455-473, pp. 460, 465, 472-473; R. Scott Appleby cites David Little in The Ambivalence of the 
Sacred: religion, violence, and reconciliation, New York: Rowman & Littlefield 2000, p. 14; Comp. 
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mirrored by the phrase dissimulare poteris. Dissimulation is a concealing of actual 
identity and might occur both as a result of state pressure or a personal sense of 
unsafety; for example, offensive and defensive dissimulation.11  
Chapter Two develops common frames of reference to toleration which inform 
practical decisions about the restraint of force. This chapter identifies five particular 
dimensions: 1) the role of truth in discerning goods and evil, as well as the proximity 
and transience of perceived evils; 2) the notion of the common good; 3) outward unity 
in relation to public order and peace; 4) economic considerations; and 5) trust, 
mediated through the categories of loyalty and trustworthiness. This analysis 
integrates perspectives on medieval toleration from István Bejczy’s ‘Tolerantia: a 
medieval concept’, Enzo Solari’s ‘Contornos de la tolerancia medieval’, and Maria J. 
Roca’s ‘El concepto de tolerancia en el derecho canónico’, and Julia Costa Lopez’ 
‘Beyond Eurocentrism and Orientalism: revisiting the othering of Jews and Muslims 
through medieval canon law’.12 These perspectives shape my understanding of the 
early modern period, particularly through Benjamin Kaplan’s magisterial work 
Divided by Faith; Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe, 
which describes practices of toleration as negotiations of visibility.13  
 
Elizabeth Shakman Hurd discussing David Scott in ‘The political authority of secularism in 
International Relations’, (2004), European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 235-262. 
11 Stefania Tutino, ‘Between Nicodemism and “honest” dissimulation: the Society of Jesus in England’, 
(2006), Historical Research, Vol. 79, No. 206, pp. 534-553, p. 535; Alexandra Walsham, Charitable Hatred: 
tolerance and intolerance in England 1500-1700, Manchester: Manchester University Press 2006. 
12 Bejczy, ‘Tolerantia: A Medieval Concept’; Enzo Solari, ‘Contornos de la tolerancia medieval’, (2013). 
Ideas y Valores, Vol. 72, No. 153, pp. 73-97; María J. Roca, ‘El concepto de tolerancia en el derecho 
canónico’; Julia Costa Lopez, ‘Beyond Eurocentrism and Orientalism: Revisiting the Othering of Jews 
and Muslims through medieval canon law’, (2016), Review of International Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 
450-470. 
13 Benjamin J. Kaplan, Divided by faith. Religious conflict and the practice of toleration in early modern 




In the context of toleration, the distinction between public and private comes to 
signify a distinction between accepted and unaccepted religion, whilst the visibility of 
the othered religion in public space becomes the litmus test of toleration. These 
distinctions imply a that one religion normatively determines the identity of a political 
community and that only this religion is, in principle, professed publicly. This chapter 
illustrates the significance of toleration in the early modern context through three 
famous “toleration treaties”: for the Low Countries, the Union of Utrecht (1579); for 
France, the Edict of Nantes (1598); and for the Holy Roman Empire, the Westphalian 
Treaties (1648). The capstone of this illustration is the specific referral to the notion of 
unum corpus in the original Latin text of the Westphalian Treaty of Osnabrück, which 
conceptually bridges the notion of the corpus christianum with the modern state.  
Chapter Three engages formations of toleration and religious freedom in 
classical (and lesser known) early modern philosophy in order to illustrate that these 
philosophies largely operated with the common frames of reference to toleration as 
identified in Chapter Two. Chapter Three refers to early modern philosophy in an 
attempt to circumvent the classical dichotomy of pre- and post-Enlightenment 
philosophy, understanding philosophical formations of toleration and religious 
freedom as a continuum. This chapter can of course not address early modern 
philosophies on toleration comprehensively. Rather, it identifies particular themes that 
are relevant to the notion of the corpus christianum and the common frames of reference 
to toleration: the articulation of a new political imaginary in the face of the ailing corpus 
christianum; critiques of the relationship between outward unity and the notion of 
public order; vigorous disagreement about epistemology and the function of truth in 
toleration; and lastly, emerging conceptual distinctions between covenant and 
contract. This chapter concludes that the change from toleration to constitutional 
religious freedom is begrudgingly located in philosophy and that this change 




1.2 Constitutionalism and the formation of religious freedom 
Constitutionalisation is crucial to the formation of religious freedom because it anchors 
religious freedom in the sovereignty of a political community as a whole. This 
anchoring rests in a narrative of “the people” that conceptually contained religious, 
social and political fragmentation. This meant that those who were previously only 
“tolerated”, or indeed cast out on account of their heresy, non-Christian religion, or 
atheist inclinations, would be assured of their membership of the political community.  
This inclusion implied a severing of political normativity from specific religious or 
ecclesiastical normativity, and as such is an iteration of secularisation.14 The 
constitutionalisation of religious freedom is therefore more than an extension of a 
privilege, it co-constitutes the inclusive nature of the political community as both a 
prerequisite and a normatively necessary consequence. For this reason, discrimination 
of religious (and non-religious) minorities is not only a denial of this inclusive 
narrative of the people, it also normatively others them.  
This constitutionalisation of religious freedom is embodied in the French and 
Dutch constitutions, as well as the German Basic Law, which include the right to 
religious freedom, the manifestation of religion in public, as well as several related 
rights pertaining to the freedom of association, the freedom of conscience, and the 
protection of family life and freedom of education. These states have also committed 
themselves to various European and international human rights documents as well as 
declarations, such as the Declaration on the elimination of all forms of intolerance and 
of discrimination based on religion or belief.15 These legal iterations of religious 
freedom norm state action insofar as they intervene with religious freedom. A state 
must justify an intervention by: a) justifying a specific societal need, such as public 
health or public order, and explaining how its action meets this need; b) justifying that 
action is necessary and that no other methods are available which have a lesser impact 
 
14 Comp. Shakman Hurd, ‘The political authority of secularism in International Relations’, p. 238. 
15 Artt 18, 21, 22 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Artt. 18-20 Universal Declaration 




its action serves (this is the principle of subsidiarity); and c) motivating that the 
proposed action balances the interests of all who are affected (this is the principle of 
proportionality). This legal theoretical framework contrasts sharply with toleration, 
which assumes that the state grants the othered a “privilege” rather than a “right”, and 
instead makes the state responsible for the equal protection of rights of all members of 
the political community. 
Chapter Four complicates the relationship between constitutionalism and the 
protection of religious minorities during the formation of nation states in the 
nineteenth century. This chapter argues that processes of constitutionalisation were 
incredibly complex and entangled in discourses over belonging and outward unity, as 
well as the relationship between public order and shared social norms. Napoleonic 
Concordats with the churches and its Decrees about Jewish members of the 
community show more signs of toleration (and anticlericalism) than of religious 
freedom, and remain a far cry from constitutionalism. The dominance of a particular 
church in social and political life did not necessarily abate in the Netherlands or in the 
German lands, whilst these states also navigated a narrative of the people with regards 
to relatively pronounced regional and local differentiations. Not only did toleration 
resurface in the constitutional order, the rise of the imaginary of the nation 
appropriated the interconnection of territory, people, and teleology that had until then 
characterized the corpus christianum.  
This re-incarnation of the corpus christianum implied a priority of nationhood 
over religious affiliation. Whilst states needed to engineer a sense of belonging, 
religious communities faced all kinds of state regulations that intervened with their 
freedom of worship and their freedom to manifest their religion in public space. This 
is especially demonstrated by conflicts over Roman Catholic processions, the use of 
churches and the use of burial space, which all but affirmed the unity of the nation. 
Over time, France, the Netherlands, and Germany developed distinct approaches to 
religion in public space, with varying levels of inclusivity to regional as well as 
religious otherness. Their approaches were not only the result of constitutionalisation, 
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but were also shaped by cultural responses, such as religious revival, the organisation 
of public manifestations, and the rise of religious political activism in the nineteenth 
century. 
Hence, the inclusion of religious freedom in constitutions did not guarantee 
religious freedom or even peaceful coexistence. In practice, the attitude of those who 
acted on behalf of the state, such as Prime Ministers, Members of Parliament, and local 
majors, determined the actual protection provided to the members of the political 
community. This is not to suggest that political attitudes outweighed the constitution; 
rather, that constitutions left space structurally for the expression of intolerant 
attitudes in law. The legal language intersected with social and political conflicts over 
the character of national identity. This chapter therefore raises the following questions: 
did common frames of toleration become substrata of constitutional law? And does 
this vary between France, Germany, and the Netherlands? What are the implications 
of this relationship between toleration and religious freedom for contemporary 
tensions about religion in politics and law? 
Integral to the concept of religious freedom is a contrast between two schools of 
thought regarding the relationship between religion, state, and society: one that 
emphasises that the law should distinguish some basic complexities of religion that 
warrant protection through different legal categories, and one that emphasizes the 
connection between legal protection of religious freedom in relation to religious life as 
a whole. For example, on the one hand, Cécile Laborde suggests to disaggregate the 
notion of religion and distinguish between religion as a conception of the good, a 
conscientious obligation, a key feature of identity, and a mode of human association.16 
On the other hand, Paul Bou-Habib argues that religion needs to be understood as a 
matter of integrity and that the law should facilitate an ‘equal opportunity for 
wellbeing’ by respecting the importance of religious duty to some members of the 
 
16 Cécile Laborde, ‘Religion in the law: the disaggregation approach’, (2015), Law and Philosophy, Vol. 




political community.17 This thesis does not attempt to define religion as an aggregated 
or disaggregated concept, but questions the legitimacy of the state in defining what 
expressions of religious identity are, constructing their significance in public space, 
and, in issuing generalised restrictions on the expressions of religious identity in 
public space.  
 
1.3 Oneness, unity, and the visibility of religion in public space 
Chapter Five turns to political and social theory in order to examine legacies of 
toleration with specific reference to a political imaginary of the nation and the 
expression of its oneness in public space. In the context of religious diversity, this is 
about the classical dialectic of commonality and particularity; but it is about much 
more than that. Considering that the concept of naturalisation stems from the idea that 
the nation is “natural” and that  others enter this natural body, religious intolerance 
must also be understood against the background of race and origin. Engaging with the 
work of Wael Hallaq, José Casanova, Patrick Weil, and Ayelet Shachar, this chapter 
suggests that the category of the nation creates new forms of othering along the lines 
of territory, people, and teleology. This othering may depend on religion, but often 
intersects with other issues, such as racism and racialisation, concerns over 
immigration and integration, presumed loyalty to a foreign religious or political 
authority, as well as the presumption of conflicting values. This chapter understands 
othering on a continuum and asserts that the othering of Catholic, Protestants, Jews, 
and Muslims cannot be understood as identical iterations of othering. Not every 
minority is equally or similarly vulnerable on this continuum. This continuum implies 
that integration – as in outward conformity to shared values and dissimulation of 
religious identity – does not facilitate belonging insofar as the idea of the nation is 
structurally racist and xenophobic.   
 
17 Paul Bou-Habib, ‘A theory of religious accommodation’, (2006), Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 23, 
No. 1, pp. 109-126, pp. 122-124.  
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 The chapter then theorises how this continuum in othering relates to political 
conflict over the visibility of religious otherness in public space, with reference to the 
scholarship of Luckmann, Modood, Wilson, Shakman Hurd, Asad, and Taylor on 
secularisation and the classical public-private divide. This chapter argues that 
secularisation and privatisation of religion are incompatible with the idea that there is 
a right to be free from involuntary encounter with material or immaterial religion in 
public space.18 Instead, it contends that dimensions of religion which are visible and 
tangible in the public domain touch upon the heart of coexistence.19 Amiraux and 
Jonker write that ‘Public space was, first of all, the space in which social actors played 
a public role and presented themselves to others’, and this ‘sensorial, perceptive 
dimension of public space (…) gives all participants the opportunity to consider 
otherness and confront it in physical space’. This physical space, they argue, is 
simultaneously a non-material space where actors negotiate common values.20 
However, as Queré and Goffman put it, copresence, as in physical participation in 
public space is not per se conducive to peaceful living in diversity. They rightly point 
out that copresence might also increase tensions among citizens and may even lead to 
alienation.21 The question is, however, when do such tensions amount to a concrete 
 
18 Comp. Kim Knott, ‘Iconic religion in urban space’, (2012), Material Religion , Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 123-
136, pp. 132-134; Comp. Irene Becci, Marian Burchardt & Mariachiara Giorda, ‘Religious super-
diversity and spatial strategies in two European cities’, (2017) Current sociology, Vol. 65, No. 1, pp. 73-
91, p. 74; Nederlandse Bisschoppenconferentie, De Rooms-Katholieke Kerk in Nederland aan het 
begin van een nieuw millenium. Rapport ten dienste van het Ad-Liminabezoek van Nederlandse 
bisschoppen van 7-13 maart 2004, Utrecht, 27 January 2004, §1.2.1-1.2.3. 
19 Comp. Becci, Burchardt & Giorda, ‘Religious super-diversity and spatial strategies in two European 
cities’, p. 74. 
20 Valérie Amiraux & Gerdien Jonker, ‘Introduction: talking about visibility- actors, politics, forms of 
engagement’ in Amiraux & Jonker (eds.) Politics of visibility: young Muslims in European public spaces, 
Bielefeld: Transcript 2006, pp. 13-14; Comp. Armando Salvatore, The Public Sphere. Liberal Modernity, 
Catholicism, Islam, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2007, p. 49. 
21 Louis Quéré, ‘l’Espace public: de la théorie politique à la métathéorie sociologique’, (1992), Quaderni, 




problem in the context of public order? And when can the state legitimately intervene 
with religious freedom?  
While the visibility of religion could be treated as an aspect to the public 
manifestation of religion, it is a normative assumption to say that religious dimensions 
can be severed from one’s public identity.22 This normative assumption is inherent to 
the early modern conceptual dichotomy of public and private spaces, which favoured 
one group over the other, but which also facilitated an “oppositional process” in which 
groups created narratives of identity and built secure boundaries around those 
identities.23 Luria writes: ‘To question such distinctions puts their identities and sense 
of self to risk’.24 This chapter argues that the identification of common space with a 
shared political identity subverts the purpose of religious freedom, and fundamentally 
is a misappropriation of the sovereignty of a political community. This 
misappropriation renders religious minorities vulnerable to normative iterations of 
Luckmann’s understanding of secularisation as privatisation of religion.25  
Furthermore, this dichotomy defies regional identities as well as processes of 
internationalisation, and is blind to different levels of social and political association.26 
One way to acknowledge the complexity of public space is Jürgen Habermas’ 
 
22 Erin Wilson, After Secularism. Rethinking Religion in Global Politics, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 
2012. 
23 Keith P. Luria, Sacred Boundaries. Religious Coexistence and Conflict in Early-Modern France, 
Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press 2005, p. xxiv. 
24 Ibidem, p. xxiv.  
25 Thomas Luckmann, The Invisible Religion: the problem of religion in modern society, New York: 
Macmillan 1967; Wilson, After Secularism, p. 111. 
26 Will Kymlicka, ‘The Internationalisation of Minority Rights’, (2007), International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 1-32, Conclusion; Will Kymlicka, ‘Universal minority rights?’, 
(2001), Ethnicities, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 21-23; Noé Cornago, Plural Diplomacies. Normative predicatments and 
functional imperatives, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 2013. 
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distinction between the public sphere and the political public sphere.27 While he argues 
for a particular type of political language within this political public sphere, he also 
insists that, in the context of the political public sphere, the institutional separation of 
church and state should not engender a demand of citizens to adhere to “neutral” 
arguments.28 Rawls, on the other hand, pondered extending the scope of the 
institutional separation of church and state to a demarcation of religion and the 
political order. He suggested ordering the political process through his notion of 
public reason, which refers to certain procedural norms which form the basis of public 
debate as well as rational consensus.29 This thesis aligns neither with Rawls nor with 
Habermas; instead, it calls for the protection of individual integrity through the 
recognition of complex spaces and formations of intersecting individual and 
communal identities. 
 
1.4 Public order, state neutrality, and striving after the common good 
Chapter Six reflects on the meaning of public order and its relationship with social 
norms, state neutrality, and the concept of the common good. Based on a discussion of 
the scholarship of Jan Brouwer, János Weiss and Marie-Caroline Vincent-Legoux, this 
chapter argues that the legal concept of public order necessitates three distinctions for 
the protection of religious minorities within the liberal constitutional state: 1) the 
distinction between legal norms and social norms; 2) structural and individual 
dimensions to public order; and 3) legitimate and illegitimate appeals to public order. 
These distinctions are important because of the weight that the notion of public order 
carries in the legal structures surrounding religious freedom. One might even say that 
 
27 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, Cambridge MA: MIT Press 1998; Jürgen Habermas, 
Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, München: Luchterhand Verlag 1962. 
28 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Religion in the public sphere’, (2006), European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 14, No. 
3, pp. 1-25. 
29 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press 1971; John Rawls, 
Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press 1993; John Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason 




the meaning of religious freedom depends on the meaning of public order.  This 
chapter also engages the theoretical tension between a political reliance on social 
norms and the imperative of state neutrality. The notion of neutrality is relatively 
young and is perhaps most clearly articulated by Ronald Dworkin, who said that 
‘government must be neutral on what might be called the question of the good life’.30 
This chapter argues that the question of neutrality hinges on two principles; neutrality 
regarding truth claims and impartiality between competing interests.  
 The question of neutrality is intrinsically connected to the question of public 
morality or normativity. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde rightly points out that the state 
itself is void of such normativity yet gains ethical content through political mediation 
of ethics in the constitution, as well as in legislation, and state action.31 Similarly, Rawls 
argued that neutrality does not consist in the absence of morality but that a community 
needs to substantiate its political morality in order to attribute ethical content to the 
state.32 H.L.A. Hart believed that such properties of morality must be laid down in 
positive law, arguing that morality is only relevant to the state insofar as properties of 
morality are legally recognised.33 Dworkin criticized Hart for his view on the initial 
moral indifference of law, stressing the role of principles to nourish a certain morality 
in law, following the German tradition of suspicion of a morally emptied state.34 Legal 
philosopher Lon Fuller, in his turn, distinguished between a morality of duty and a 
 
30 Andrew M.M. Koppelman, ‘Ronald Dworkin, Religion, and Neutrality’, (2014), Boston University 
Law Review, Vol. 94, No. 4, pp. 1241-1253, p. 1241.  
31 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, State, society, and liberty: Studies in political theory and constitutional law, 
Oxford: Berg Publishers 1991. 
32 Ibidem. 
33 Herbert L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1961; Herbert L.A. Hart, Law, 
Liberty and Morality, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1963. 
34 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1977; Ronald 
Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1985; Ronald Dworkin, 
Law’s Empire, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1986; Ronald Dworkin, Religion without God, 
Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 2013. 
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morality of aspiration, which have different justifications, but are not necessarily 
separate. He notes that the bottom line for the functioning of law entails a procedural 
and institutional variety of natural law, thus presupposing a morality that pre-exists 
positive law.35  
These different positions result from the question of whether there is an ante-
institutional morality and whether there are timeless principles of natural law. Though 
this question about natural morality was urgent in a post-war context, this question 
was not so different from early modern philosophical debates over truth, as shown in 
Chapter Three. Early modern Christianity relied on the knowledge of truths that could 
be known, with certainty, to articulate a morality to which everyone in the corpus 
would submit. Deconstruction of truth thus provoked unsettling questions about the 
status of morality; its source, its legitimacy, its content, and even its possibility. These 
questions did not fade away in the context of the modern state. Likewise, Wendy 
Brown notes that tolerance is always coupled with a level of normativity and that this 
is no different in modern debates over equality today.36 The idea that secularity can 
satisfy the requirements of neutrality is therefore inherent to the othering of religion 
in the context of the state and the idea that religious partisanship can somehow be 
overcome through secularity.  
Recognising the importance that the law should not disadvantage religious 
minorities, Lorenzo Zucca suggests a religion-friendly moderation of secularity. He 
suggests that a “tolerant” secularity could be based on a political morality which 
would not moralise minorities and would distance itself from the question of truth.37 
This idea of a toleration secularity acknowledges the complex relationship between 
the notion of truth and political morality, yet inherently minoritizes parts of the 
 
35 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, New Haven: Yale University Press 1964. 
36 Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion. Tolerance in the age of identity and empire, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 2006, p. 14. 
37 Lorenzo Zucca, A Secular Europe: Law and Religion in the European Constitutional Landscape, Oxford: 




people. Even so, Zucca treats the question of truth in the context of ideas and does not 
necessarily include the role of social-legal practice, placing his contribution in the 
realm of neutrality to truth claims, rather than impartiality to competing interests. 
Gavin d’Costa would take issue with this narrower approach to secularity, arguing 
that one always has a ‘tradition-specific starting point’ and, with Wendy Brown, 
suggests that the content of neutrality is subject to power-dynamics.38  
Considering these power-dynamics, Habermas later acknowledged that 
neutrality does not guarantee equality to minorities who depend on the political 
benevolence of the majority with whom they live.39 Similarly, Jocelyn Maclure and 
Charles Taylor associate the notion of modern tolerance and neutrality with 
marginalisation, even as they regard the protection of the freedom of conscience and 
religion as central to secularism.40 They are concerned about the conflation of political 
and social secularity, e.g. public morality and social norms, warning that unequal 
burdens may be placed on citizens.41 Talal Asad looks at this same issue through the 
lens of conformity, arguing that procedural neutrality demands that religion conform 
to an imposed national standard if it wants to participate in the public sphere.42 Will 
Kymlicka argued, by means of his theory of “benign neglect”, that it is ‘near-
impossible’ to separate religion and politics completely and called instead for restraint 
of political interference with religious minorities.43 He calls for a reconsideration of 
 
38 Gavin d’Costa, ‘Whose objectivity, which neutrality? The doomed quest for a neutral vantage point 
from which to judge religions’, (1993), Religious Studies, Vol. 29, No. 11, pp. 79-95; Brown, Regulating 
Aversion, p. 178. 
39 Habermas, ‘Religion in the public sphere’. 
40 Jocelyn Maclure & Charles Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press 2011, pp. 4-5. 
41 Ibidem, pp. 16, 21.  
42 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press 2003. 
43 Geoffrey Levey, ‘Secularism and religion in a multicultural age’, in Levey & Modood (eds.), 
Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship, p. 8. 
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how liberalism promotes the ‘liberalisation of societal cultures’, which is akin to Ran 
Hirschl’s concern about the secularising role of liberal constitutional law.44 Some are 
even more outspoken. According to sociologist Armando Salvatore, liberalism creates 
new inequalities, particularly with reference to Catholicism and Islam.45 
The connection between secularism and neutrality thus seems notoriously  
suspect within several disciplines. This thesis understands liberal secularism as a 
normative philosophical framework which undergirds social norms which may have 
gained political and constitutional traction in liberal democratic contexts, and as such 
may disadvantage (religious) minorities. This thesis shares the concern over the 
effective protection of minorities against the universalising character of secularism, as 
in the work of Henry Peña-Ruiz, Casanova, Wendy Brown, and Shakman Hurd.46 
However, this thesis does not align with the idea that liberal secularity is an orthodoxy, 
as Jean Baubérot, Martha Nussbaum, and Olivier Roy have suggested, because 
orthodoxy entails more than a philosophical framework.47 This distinction between a 
normative philosophical framework and an orthodoxy acknowledges that none of the 
three states – France, Germany, or the Netherlands – have actually adopted secularism. 
The idea that liberal secularity in and of itself functions as an established religion is 
 
44 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 1995, p. 172; Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Theocracy, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 
2010. 
45 Salvatore, The Public Sphere, pp. 2, 258. 
46 Maclure & Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience, p. 25; José Casanova, ‘Immigration and the 
new religious pluralism: a European Union-United States comparison’, in: Geoffrey Levey and Tariq 
Modood (eds.), Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 2009, p. 147; Brown, Regulating Aversion, Chapter 7. Shakman Hurd, ‘The Political Authority of 
Secularism in International Relations’, p. 237. 
47 Steven D. Smith, ‘Religious freedom in America: three stories’, in: Stephen M. Feldman, Law and 
Religion. A critical anthology, New York: New York University Press 2000; Olivier Roy, Secularism 
confronts Islam, New York: Columbia University Press 2009; Martha C. Nussbaum, The new religious 
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unhelpful for the purposes of this thesis. Rather, where liberal secularity encompasses 
social norms for the purposes of law, such uses must be critiqued where they 
disadvantage religious and other minorities. 
Chapter Six closes with the observation that the concept of state neutrality not 
only relies on a normativity that it seeks to avoid, it also depends on a separation of 
spaces and personae that is inherent to the logic of toleration. This is contrary to the 
protection of individual members of society which lies at the heart of 
constitutionalism, or, the concept of state neutrality may actually hinder the effective 
protection of minorities. This chapter contends that the notion of the common good as 
well as the notion of public space need to accommodate social complexity beyond their 
narrative of oneness. This is perhaps a conceptual equivalent to Van Bijsterveld’s 
observation that tensions between ‘functional’ and ‘integrated’ policy-making, micro-
and macro-justice, and centralised and decentralised ethics contribute to a 
decentralisation of the common good.48 She argues that the notion of the common good 
exists in a vacuum and that ‘the natural orientation towards the common good has lost 
both its obviousness and its visibility’.49 This thesis suggests that this may be a 
necessary consequence of an ethicised notion of the common good, and, that the 
development of a more complex notion of the common good needs to be inherently 
relational. 
 
1.5 Law, politics, and religious symbols in public space 
Chapter Seven illustrates the relevance of toleration in contemporary political and 
legal conflicts over the visibility of religion in public space, drawing on case law and 
parliamentary documents from France, Germany and the Netherlands in the 2010s. 
This chapter discusses three particular expressions of Muslim identity: 1) prohibitions 
 
48 Sophie van Bijsterveld, The Empty Throne. Democracy and the rule of law in transition, Utrecht: Lemma 
2002, pp. 326-329. 
49 Van Bijsterveld, The Empty Throne, p. 352.  
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of the full-face veil in France and the Netherlands, as well as a partial prohibition on 
the full face veil in Germany; 2) the conflicts about the jilbab or “burkini” in French 
cities and towns in 2016;50 and 3) the adjudication of the hijab and other religious 
symbols in French, German, Dutch, and European courts. These cases demonstrate 
that the law has become a significant mediator of religious diversity, and, the 
motivations for political decisions do not always satisfy the legal requirements of the 
substantiation of a legitimate aim, much less so the concepts of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.  
 These issues could be considered to be technical shortcomings, but the reason 
these cases are included in this thesis is that the misalignment between political 
motivations and legal requirements illustrates the conceptual arguments in this thesis. 
Namely, that the operationalisation of the concept of public order tends to rest on a 
combination of unwritten norms and insufficiently substantiated security arguments 
(Chapter Six); that the othering of Muslims correlates with the exclusionary character 
of nationhood, and, speaks to origin as well as racial and religious otherness that the 
concept of the nation implies (Chapter Five); that this othering on account of 
nationhood mirrors the othering nature of the corpus christianum and the common 
frames of reference to toleration (Chapter Four); and therefore, that histories of 
toleration are crucial to an understanding of contemporary conflicts about religious 
diversity in law (Chapter Two, Three). However, none of these cases show the 
conceptual trajectory that this thesis advances, it is only through comparison that the 
complex relationships between toleration, constitutionalism, and narratives of 
belonging in the nation state emerge.  
In closing, I hope that this uncovering of the layering of toleration in 
contemporary political and legal debates will not only make an analytical contribution 
to the field of political and constitutional theory, but also, that it will raise awareness 
 
50 A case study based on these materials has been published, Mariëtta D.C. van der Tol, ‘Intolerance 




among practitioners of the impact that common frames of reference to toleration have 
on political decisions that affect religious minorities.  
 
 
2. Early modern formations of the theological-political 
concept of toleration 
 
It is perhaps hard to imagine that religious freedom evolved from the vacillating 
sensibilities of early modern toleration (ca 1500-1789). For many scholars, these notions 
represent incommensurable visions of reality that are separated by exigent memories 
of intolerance and religious aggression. As Europe’s house divided, many a room 
featured memories of a martyr’s faith, whose remembrance almost inevitably loaded 
its indicted others with suspicion. Toleration had much to do with a sense of 
righteousness, grounded in a disposition of religious superiority, and sanctioned by 
the Divine. Toleration was a discretionary grace to be extended to deemed wrongs of 
sorts and sizes that could coexist with the vision of a common identity; whereas issues 
of greater gravity could warrant dissimulation, exile, or punishment by death.1 
Toleration was the practical consequence of a social, political, and religious imaginary 
shaped by the body of Christ, one and indivisible in the saeculum and in the saecula 
saeculorum. While this unity would not imply absolute uniformity, toleration and 
dissimulation determined the outward appearance of the body of Christ and thus 
provided an important conceptual frame of identity and belonging.2 
 The era of Reformations brought about a marring of the body of Christ, known 
as the corpus christianum, which represented a oneness of space, people, and common 
 
1 Julia Costa Lopez, ‘Beyond Eurocentrism and Orientalism: Revisiting the Othering of Jews and 
Muslims through medieval canon law’, (2016), Review of International Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 450-
470. 
2 Keith P. Luria, Sacred Boundaries. Religious Coexistence and Conflict in Early-Modern France, Washington 




destiny.3 Inspired by humanist reformations, driven forward by new modes of 
communication, and shared through popular hymnody, the body of Christ became the 
concern of every man, fragmented into small and vulnerable communities of faith. 
Diarmaid MacCulloch diagnoses the problem of intolerance as one of Latin 
Christianity, whose record on coexistence would ‘kindly be termed unimpressive’.4 A 
political notion of toleration first emerged in late medieval Scholasticism, even if this 
toleration was largely theoretical.5 István Bejczy, María Roca, and Enzo Solari 
emphasise the centrality of (in)visibility of difference to coexistence; effected through 
practices of toleration and dissimulation. Contention of the meaning of communal 
space as well as the subject of visibility make a compelling reappearance in Divided by 
Faith by Benjamin Kaplan who describes different levels of visibility in conjunction 
with levels of early modern toleration. 
 This chapter discusses the kinship between concepts of toleration and 
dissimulation in medieval canonical law in relationship to early modern practices of 
toleration in the Low Countries, France, and the Holy Roman Empire. This chapter 
contends that the principle of toleration emerged as a governmental technique for 
engaging with a begrudged diversity, and that certain conceptual frames of reference 
to toleration informed the fate of marginalised religious minorities. These include a 
firm commitment to: truth; a unified idea of the common good; outward unity in relation 
to public peace and order; economic benefit; and loyalty. These conceptual frames of 
reference emerge from the comparison of literature in the history of ideas in 
conversation with three pivotal treaties of toleration from the Low Countries, France, 
and the Holy Roman Empire: the Union of Utrecht (1579); the Edict of Nantes (1598); and 
 
3 Compare the double ordering in late medieval theological and political thought, see Walter Ullmann, 
Law and Politics in the Middle Ages. An introduction to the sources of medieval political ideas, Ithaca N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press 1975, p. 271. 
4 Diarmaid MacCulloch, Reformation. Europe’s House Divided 1490-1700,  London: Penguin 2004, p. 676. 




the Westphalian Treaties (1648).6 These conceptual frames of reference do not provide a 
blueprint of early modern toleration; rather, they attest to a conceptual and practical 
logic to toleration which finds specific and complex expressions in practice.  
 
2.1 Toleration as a theological-political concept 
Toleration presupposes a level of diversity or non-conformity that challenges the 
normative foundation of society. This normative foundation rests in the figure of 
Christ and biblical truths as revealed in divine law and the prophets. The relationship 
between normativity and metaphysical truths was not a mere matter of faith, for the 
church maintained that faith and reason operated on the basis of non-contradiction.7 
Theological perspectives on justice held together righteousness and sinfulness in the 
postlapsarian condition of creation (after the Fall of Adam and Eve), whilst 
maintaining a sense of oneness.8 Pursuing and defending truth was therefore no lofty 
affair; it touched on the capacity of a community and individual believer to grow in 
righteousness and to shrug off the curse of sin in the saeculum. While the church could 
regard minor offences as temporary lapses, the questioning of fundamental truths or 
 
6 Union of Utrecht (1579), https://www.law.kuleuven.be/personal/mstorme/unievanutrecht.html, 
(consulted 7 April 2017); l’Édit de Nantes en faveur de ceux de la religion prétendu reformée of 13 
April 1598, electronic edition by N. Dufounaud, 30 July 2003, 
http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/henri_iv/Edit_de_nantes_1598/edit_de_nantes.html, (consulted 20 
September 2017); Die Westfälischen Friendensverträge vom 24 October 1648. Texte und 
Übersetzungen, (Acta Pacis Westphaliae, Supplementa Electronica 1), http://www.pax-westphalica.de, 
(consulted 5 May 2017). 
7 Enzo Solari, ‘Contornos de la tolerancia medieval’, Ideas y Valores (2013), Vol. 72, No. 153, pp. 73-97, 
p. 80. 
8 Compare St Augustine’s exegesis of Matthew 13 on the parable of the wheat and the chaff, Edward 
L. Smither, ‘Persuasion or coercion: Augustine on the state’s role in dealing with other religions and 
heresies’, (2006), Faculty Publications and Presentations. Paper 14, online available 
http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lts_fac_pubs/14 (consulted 31 October 2017), pp. 25, 34; Adam 
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the expression of less than godly behaviour undermined not only the peace and unity 
in the church, but threatened the very order of being: these wrongs embodied evils 
and a direct opposition to righteousness, truth, and justice. 
 Medieval canonists developed toleration as an ecclesiastical and, later, a 
political principle on which decisions about minor and major offences were grounded, 
demarcated through the phrases tolerare potest and dissimulare poteris.9 The phrasing 
potest indicates a discretionary competence which is at once a norm of discernment 
and of action.10 Roca emphasises that neither toleration nor dissimulation implied 
normative endorsement, but instead were the outcome of prudential decision-
making.11 Toleration involved restraint and godly moderation of the use of the sword.12 
Importantly, toleration also implied a measure of visibility, and thus contrasts with the 
concept of dissimulation. Dissimulation was equally condemned by Purists as a 
manifestation of insincerity. Where toleration is established, dissimulation ceased to 
be as important.  Bejczy argues that toleration existed at differing degrees, varying 
from the restraint of interference to the active fostering of a particular evil.13 Roca and 
Tagliaferry identify dissimulation as a provisional practice concerning the 
concealment of real beliefs through outward conformity; regarded by some as feigning 
or lying and by others as culturally imposed conformity or expressions of invisible 
dissent.14 
 
9 María J. Roca, ‘El concepto de tolerancia en el derecho canónico’, Ius Canonicum (2001), Vol. 41, No. 
82, pp. 455-473, pp, 460, 465. 
10 Klaus Schreiner, ‘Toleranz’, in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, Band 6, pp. 524-605, p. 596; Roca, ‘El 
concepto de tolerancia en el derecho canónico’, p. 459. 
11 Roca, ‘El concepto de tolerancia en el derecho canónico’, 458. 
12 Ibidem, 472-473. 
13 István P. Bejczy, ‘Tolerantia: a medieval concept’, Journal of the History of Ideas (1997), Vol. 91, No. 4, 
pp. 365-384, p. 375. 
14 Roca, ‘El concepto de tolerancia en el derecho canónico’, p. 466. Filomena Viviana Tagliaferri, 
Tolerance re-shaped in the early-modern Mediterranean borderlands. Travellers, missionaries and proto-




Toleration and dissimulation presupposed that the implied evils were 
redeemable, judged by the measures of gravity, proximity, and transience. On the 
contrary, irredeemable evils such as denial of the Trinity or the divinity of Christ, as 
well as behaviour such as prostitution and homosexuality, were theoretically ineligible 
for either toleration or dissimulation.15 These latter issues pertained to divine values; 
by contrast, confessional and conscientious values could be subject to rational debate, 
thus pre-empting early modern philosophical debates on fundamental and indifferent 
matters (adiaphora).16 Bejczy argues that the classification of evils further depended on 
proximity and transience: a closer proximity to the body of Christ, including Judaism, 
rendered non-conformity more problematic compared to non-Christian otherness,17 
since the latter might freely convert upon peaceful encounter with the truth.18 The 
matter of proximity was intertwined with transience, since brief lapses and temporary 
shortfalls in behaviour were more likely to be tolerated because of the expectation that 
faith and reason would eventually restrain it. Thus, travelling merchants with non-
Christian convictions attracted less interest than permanent members of a community 
who abandoned their faith or cultivated heresy.19 The latter’s sustained dissidence 
endangered peace and unity, and therefore attracted fiercer persecution.20 
 
Nicodemism and “honest” dissimulation: the Society of Jesus in England’, (2006), Historical Research, 
Vol. 79, No. 206, pp. 534-553. 
15 Bejczy, ‘Tolerantia: a medieval concept’, p. 375, Solari, ‘Contornos de la tolerancia medieval’, p. 87. 
16 Roca, ‘El concepto de tolerancia en el derecho canónico’, pp. 455-456; Solari, ‘Contornos de la 
tolerancia medieval’, p. 94. 
17 Bejczy, ‘Tolerantia: a medieval concept’, 375; Julia Costa Lopez, ‘Beyond Eurocentrism and 
Orientalism: Revisiting the Othering of Jews and Muslims through medieval canon law’, Review of 
International Studies (2016), Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 450-470, p. 462. 
18 Bejczy, ‘Tolerantia: a medieval concept’, p. 369, 375. 
19 Costa Lopez, ‘Beyond Eurocentrism and Orientalism: Revisiting the Othering of Jews and Muslims 
through medieval canon law’, p. 455; Solari, ‘Contornos de la tolerancia medieval’, p. 81. 




Balancing of evils could involve both religious and mundane concerns, such as 
public order and economic benefits.21 Toleration was usually dependent on the 
condition of non-disturbance of public order.22 Simultaneously, repression needed to 
be proportionate in its administration, since violent repression could itself become a 
problem of public order.23 Economic benefits could outweigh the imperative of unity 
as an instance of the common good.24 For example, Christian regions which were 
economically dependent on amicable commercial relationships with Muslims fostered 
a greater toleration towards Muslims.25 Similarly, the Dutch East India Company and 
West India Company, though led by Reformed merchants, was more lenient to Jewish 
merchants for commercial interests. In the late seventeenth century, the French King 
issued letters of naturalisation to some non-Catholic merchant foreigners whilst 
maintaining an overall narrative, perhaps even a fiction, of Catholicity.26 Through 
naturalisation, the King removed ‘the “vice” of their alien birth’.27 It shows that 
territoriality and faith already co-conditioned belonging and, even though Catholicity 
was not a formal condition, many applicants included stories about their converstion 
 
21 Bejczy, ‘Tolerantia: a medieval concept’, p. 369; Costa Lopez, ‘Beyond Eurocentrism and 
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to the truth of Catholicism.28 However, Jews remained ineligible for naturalisation into 
the eighteenth century and remained reliant on the King’s incidental protection.29  
Thus, toleration instructed authorities to forbear that which it explicitly or 
implicitly regarded as false or evil, yet which did not fundamentally threaten the order 
of being in Christ. Practices of toleration entailed a spectrum of rejection and 
incorporation through marginalisation.30 Only when intermediated by dissimulation 
could intolerance spiral into violent elimination. Canonical law made careful 
distinctions between others of kinds on the basis of their potential to be implanted in 
the corpus, whilst discipline might cause the errant to admit their mistake and return 
into good standing. In this way, the prudent balancing of wrongs as well as their 
proximity and transience gave rise to different levels of the visibility of otherness 
within the one body of Christ. That the narrative of oneness was hardly ever 
meticulously or strictly enforced signals a relative bandwidth of difference within the 
narrative of oneness. This prudent balancing included economic stability and public 
order, through which Muslims and Jews could also be tolerated, even if out of self-
interest. 
 
2.2 Early modern diversity, political toleration, visibility of the other 
This late medieval tradition of toleration became particularly relevant when European 
Christendom disintegrated rapidly under the influences of early modernity. Despite 
the emergence of a new order, which challenged the fundaments of the corpus 
christianum, smaller communities embraced its imaginary, each claiming to restore 
‘original Christianity’.31 They seem to function as corpora christiana: the appropriation 
of oneness and its emphasis on unity and outward conformity as the elements of 
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belonging to the Christian order in smaller political entities. Often these different 
bodies of Christ only gradually adopted different conceptions of truth and the 
common good, and they stand in the shadow of much greater diversity that would 
arise in the next half millennium.32 Nevertheless, early modern communities faced an 
unprecedented, if not traumatic, level of religious, social, and political disintegration.  
In response to these transformations, numerous pockets of uniformity emerged 
across Europe while patchy and volatile regimes of toleration waxed and waned.33 
Interestingly, where early modern authorities tried to engineer uniformity, this 
uniformity tended to be stronger than in the imaginary of the corpus christianum in its 
medieval contexts.34 Salvatore writes that the medieval church never established 
‘uniformity of practice; on the contrary, its authoritative discourse was always 
concerned to specify differences, gradations, exceptions’.35 Moreover, medieval 
Catholicism represented only one ‘trajectory’ that emerged from early Christianity.36 
Nicholas Terpstra understands early modern upsurge in religious violence as a social 
dimension of the late medieval Misericordia devotion, in which the image of the Virgin 
provided an image for protection. Terpstra notes that in the fifteenth century, this 
devotion acquired social connotation, leading to a focus ‘purgation of the body 
social’.37 What is so interesting about his observation is that purity is not simply an 
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outcome of religious doctrine, but is also a witness to the sense of danger and 
insecurity that beset late medieval Christianity.  
It is in this context that existing, emerging, and exacerbating religious 
differences comes to signify danger and ill-health in the corpus christianum. The nature 
of toleration changed accordingly. Kaplan interprets early modern toleration as 
practices of peaceful coexistence of those living in ‘religiously mixed communities’, 
where peace entailed not the absence of conflict, but rather the ability of a community 
to contain conflict.38 This conceptual shift from absence of irregularity to containment 
of fundamental conflict makes early modern re-appropriations of toleration an 
invaluable resource for understanding its values and weaknesses. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, persisting diversity challenged the unity of spatialities and 
temporalities. Jeffrey Collins notes Nederman’s argument that toleration was a 
negotiation over the visibility or ‘manifestation of difference’, and was not about the 
incongruity of  specific beliefs itself.39 Moreover, while awaiting the much anticipated 
return of Christ, and thus final judgment over evil, the matter of otherness (e.g. 
unholiness in space and time) became more pertinent in early modern contexts than in 
the medieval period. 
 Truth, outward unity, public peace and order, and economic security shaped 
toleration profoundly. ‘Truth and falsehood, good and evil’ remained sharply 
demarcated in the early modern period and breeds of otherness multiplied along the 
lines of heresy and infidelity.40 The notion of truth was no less absolute, even though 
the distinction between fundamental and adiaphoral matters stretched the realm of 
opinion and thus, potentially, of toleration. This process was in large part driven by 
intellectuals, whose careful deconstruction of truth into confessional minimalism 
underpinned toleration with new philosophical foundations (see Chapter Three). 
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Interestingly, rivalry among Christian communities made the issue of heresy once 
again central to the dynamics of belonging and othering. The dangers of heresy 
outweighed those of unbelief and its punishment was an instrument of defence.41 
Much of this had to do with the ever imminent threat of Catholic invasions or 
Protestant revolts, which raised the question of loyalty and trustworthiness. Hans 
Guggisberg writes that the question of whether a subject with a different religious 
could be a loyal subject was a typically sixteenth century question.42 
It seems that severe threats to unity arose from rivalry among Christian 
communities rather than from Jewish and Muslim minorities.43 Perhaps closer 
theological as well as geographical proximity explains this, as the triumph of one over 
the other could lead to permanent social and political change. For example, Muslim 
mercantile presence was believed to be temporary or transient; therefore, its threat to 
the Christian community was perceived as minimal. Similarly, the existence of 
beneficial trade relationships made the travelling Muslim and ghettoised Jew more or 
less acceptable within the Christian framework of unity. These economic 
considerations stand in contrast with the persecution of Spanish Arabs, Hungarians, 
and Normans who, on grounds of their foreign status, were labelled as traitors.44 
Demarcation of space and belonging thus reinforced the imaginary of oneness. For 
Jews and others, dissimulation, such as crypto-Judaism and Nicodemism were other 
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strategies to survive.45 However, countless Jewish communities faced forced 
segregation, sudden expulsion, and violent persecution. Jews often did not have legal 
standing and their position frequently depended on the strength of the (financial) 
relationship with a politically powerful protector.46 Lastly, atheists “forfeited” the 
privilege of toleration altogether because of their rejection of God, and by implication, 
their rejection of natural justice and morality.47 However, despite local and regional 
attempts at establishing a relative unity, most communities settled for some form of 
toleration in order to deal with lasting internal differences. 
Kaplan and Luria convincingly demonstrate that toleration was intrinsically 
connected with the concept of visibility and uses of space. Their studies, which 
carefully contextualise experiences of local toleration, show that concerns over unity 
and purity fundamentally framed renegotiations of identity, belonging, and visibility. 
Luria also shows that this concern over purity occupied majority and minority 
religions alike.48 Evenhuis writes that seventeenth century Amsterdam was a 
Reformed city in appearance only: a large group of others resided there, including 
‘Jews, Roman-Catholics, Anabaptists, Lutherans, Brownists, and various “heretics” 
(…)’ who initially even ‘formed a great majority’.49 This shows that minority status was 
not necessarily grounded numerically, but based on power-dynamics in the city 
council. Outward manifestation of otherness, ranging from deemed proselytization to 
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publicly disturbing behaviour, might threaten public order.50 However, the 
relationship between the visibility of otherness and outward conformity existed on a 
spectrum: greater levels of visibility concurred with less outward conformity and vice 
versa. 
Kaplan distinguishes four modes of toleration, each representing a layer of 
(increasing) visibility: comprehension, private religion, Auslauf, and parity. These are 
all instances of toleration on the level of theoretically more or less separated 
communities that acquire visible presence in shared space. First, minor differences 
could be accommodated through comprehension within the ambit of one church; 
Kaplan calls these “ecumenical experiments”.51 He argues that comprehension was a 
viable middle way, or modus vivendi, in the mid-sixteenth century, particularly since 
non-conformists had not yet crystallised and confessionalised dogmatic differences as 
crucial to ‘true Christianity’.52 Comprehension demanded a level of conformity on 
behalf of the tolerated, but also maintained the possibility of Christian unity in the 
longer run. Historian Ethan Shagan argues that English toleration was dressed in the 
cultural value of moderation, but that this moderation also warranted violence.53 It is 
not unthinkable that comprehension may have been practised alongside 
dissimulation, allowing for the possibility of compartmentalisation of dissent. Because 
of the condition of outward conformity, the locus of control was outward behaviour, 
which could be held together with dissenting beliefs as well as practices in the context 
of the home.  
Kaplan identifies Auslauf, or walking out, as the second mode of toleration, 
which allowed dissenters to worship in neighbouring towns. Groups of dissenters 
made their way through the streets and through the city gate: walking out was of 
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course quite visible, and the larger the group grew, the more problematic an “exodus” 
would be. Moreover, journeying out of town and returning made visible to all which 
families or individuals dissented. This means that a basic sense of personal safety must 
have accompanied the occurrence of Auslauf. This mode of toleration occurred in areas 
where adjacent towns adhered to different confessions. This policy largely maintained 
the narrative of unity of public worship within one town, although inter-town mobility 
was obviously visible.54 Specifically, where the visibility of inter-town mobility became 
significant, a third mode of toleration was developed: hidden presence.55  
This third mode of toleration allowed dissenters to worship in relatively hidden 
places in town. Examples are synagogues and churches that were built in houses, 
attics, and barns, or within a surrounding band of houses.56 This worship could be 
tolerated because of the lesser visibility of dissent compared to Auslauf and the 
maintenance of a degree of outward unity. Remonstrants, Catholics, and Sephardic 
Jews maintained places such as these in Amsterdam during the seventeenth century 
and, in times of internal conflict, even appealed to the city council.57 Conflict could 
arise over similar hours of worship, which forced people to pass each other on the way 
to different churches, as well as the display of religious books, the visibility of home 
shrines from the street, and interestingly, the audibility of prayer, congregational song, 
and organ playing from the hidden places of worship.58 Such complaints were not 
unique to Amsterdam and graphically underwrite the that encounter with the othered 
was a social and political problem. Such complaints about the encounter of otherness 
might be claims of “freedom from religion” avant la garde, yet on behalf of the 
privileged religion.  
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The fourth, and perhaps the most open practice of toleration, was parity. This 
latter policy allowed the presence of one or more different sub-communities which 
had its proper institutions, sometimes used the same church building (simultaneum), 
and which sometimes shared a measure of power within a town.59 Sharing space came 
with a measure of mutual non-interference.60 A crucial dimension of this parity is a 
more or less equal citizenship and the use of an oath which was not denomination-
specific. An example of this fourth type of toleration is the one commercial law that 
applied to all merchants, again in Amsterdam, which included Jewish merchants.61 
The mercantile inclinations of the city council of Amsterdam tended to inspire more 
leniency than Reformed clergy were prepared to consider; this led to significant protest 
from Amsterdam and beyond. Similarly, Jews and Christian others lived with greater 
privileges in the Dutch colonies, which were governed by the West Indies Company 
and, by geographical implication, were removed from immediate control by the 
Reformed Church.62 Though the clergy had de facto lost a measure of its grip on the city 
governance, Amsterdam hardly represented an altruistic or principled form of 
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toleration. Its toleration appears to revolve around utility, even as its policies appeared 
relatively more open than elsewhere around the North Sea.63  
From a conceptual perspective, the relationship between toleration and 
visibility is significant: coexistence went hand in hand with the embodiment of 
difference in shared space. Conversely, less tolerant inclinations accompanied 
complaints about visibility and other confrontations with otherness – even when this 
encounter was more indirect, such as seeing an icon through a window or hearing 
congregational song from a hidden church. The locus of toleration appears to be the 
common space. However, Kaplan also highlights the importance of friendship and 
intermarriage to co-existence.64 His argument about intermarriage appears to be 
particularly compelling because intermarriage implies a union of differences that may 
arise from origin, race, as well as religion. “Mixed” progeny makes this union 
irreversible and thus challenges relative homogeneity. Jesse Sponholz makes a similar 
observation in his study of the city of Wesel, arguing that individual choices could lead 
to de facto accommodation of ‘confessional difference and Christian unity’.65  
 
2.3 Toleration treaties: a norm for discernment in action 
The concept of toleration found explicit expression in toleration-treaties, which are an 
invaluable source for the theorisation of toleration, precisely because they embodied 
the outcome of negotiations, as well as providing the starting point for inevitably 
variable practices. The next few sections investigate the notion of toleration in three 
key treaties: the Union of Utrecht (1579), the Edict of Nantes (1598), and the Westphalian 
treaties (1648). These treaties emerged from cycles of violent repression and war in the 
Low Countries, France, and the Holy Roman Empire, respectively, as well their allies 
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and enemies. It appears that each of the treaties strikes different tones of toleration, 
weighing the dimensions to toleration of truth, public peace and order, economic 
benefit, loyalty, and outward unity in ways that are not always predictable. It serves 
as a reminder that toleration cannot be interpreted as a monolithic idea. Rather, the 
concept of toleration gives rise to quite different outcomes, based on these dimensions 
to toleration. 
 
2.3.1 The Low Countries: The Union of Utrecht 
The Union of Utrecht (1579) was undoubtedly formative for the Low Countries and the 
later Republic and Kingdom of the Netherlands. This charter of cooperation and 
mutual support was signed by the seven northern provinces and a number of cities in 
the South of the Low Countries in an attempt to create a stronger opposition to the 
military aggression by the Catholic King Philip II of Spain. The Union entailed a 
confederation in which the states remained independent yet supported each other 
against foreign threats. The treaty plainly addressed trade, tolls, security, prosperity 
and, only secondarily, toleration. It stipulated procedures and practical aspects of the 
union such as free movement, trade, and monetary exchange. It exempted the two 
richest provinces, Holland and Zeeland from the obligation to tolerate Catholics. In 
the years leading up to the treaty, the anticipated leader of the confederation, William 
of Orange, expressed his frustration about the “hateful” attitude of these two 
provinces to foreigners in general, and to Catholics in particular.66 It was no secret that 
he favoured greater toleration of Roman-Catholics and that he aspired to unify 
northern and southern provinces on the basis of religious peace.67 His autograph 
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remained notoriously absent from the Union of Utrecht: he never formally signed it, 
although he begrudgingly declared his acceptance sometime later that year.68  
  A host of other interests jostled the matter of toleration, unapologetically 
pertaining to elite influence, trade, and security. Only after a list of mundane interests 
did Article 13 address religion. Article 13 obliged the states to regulate dissenting 
religion in accordance with the Pacification of Gent (1576), meaning that states must 
grant a measure of toleration for reasons of public order and economic security.69 The 
Union of Utrecht explicitly recalled this settlement in the interests of peace, prosperity, 
the safety of property and legal certainty.70 The Union of Utrecht required freedom of 
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private worship and prohibited personal interrogation or investigation for religious 
reasons.71 Article 17 further stipulated that law and justice be administered equally for 
citizens and foreigners, which indicates a major shift towards administrative 
toleration. The two most powerful states, Holland and Zeeland, retained the right to 
deal with religion at their own discretion.72 Their elites were officially Calvinistic and 
sought to limit the influence of Catholicism. Though the Union of Utrecht would 
improve the situation of dissenters across the country, it failed to provide the same 
security to Catholics in Holland and Zeeland.  
 The Union of Utrecht must be understood against the backdrop of the eighty-
years’ war with Spain (1568-1648). During the Alteratie in 1578, the Catholic city board 
of Amsterdam had been ousted in favour of Protestant elites. The liquidation of Willem 
of Orange in 1584 caused a setback to Catholic worship and Amsterdam prohibited 
Catholic worship altogether. The city expelled many Catholics until 1600, though some 
could ward off their punishments through bribery.73 The Union of Utrecht thus captures 
a significant moment in the history of the Low Countries, intending to improve 
toleration of Catholics, even if only on a private level. Economic security clearly 
overshadowed the matter of toleration and the war with the Catholic Philip II did not 
alleviate the pressure on a large proportion of Catholics. 
 
2.3.2 France: The Edict of Nantes 
The Edict of Nantes (1598) was signed by King Henry IV (1553-1610) and intended to 
end a spiral of chaos and destruction in France as a result of Catholic-Huguenot 
conflict. Though numerous local communities coexisted relatively peacefully, and 
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according to Luria ‘found grounds on which to cooperate and negotiate local 
reconciliation’, upsurges of violence made the restoration of public order the 
determining consideration in this settlement.74 The Edict was the result of long 
negotiations and aimed at the restoration of public order and peace, as well as the 
restoration of Catholic worship.75 It legally acknowledged that Catholic worship might 
not be universally restored and it arranged for limited toleration of reformed worship 
where this would serve the interest of public order and peace.76 For similar reasons, it 
also granted a level of influence to reformed nobility, some of whom could even advise 
the King. For this reason, the Edict was perhaps more of a modus vivendi which 
represented a begrudging compromise for both Catholics and Reformed citizens. 
 The Edict enshrined the dominant position of the Catholic Church and recalled 
its standing in the tradition of the church fathers, thus claiming exclusive historical 
legitimacy. The Edict labels the religious factions la religion catholique, apostolique et 
romaine versus la religion prétendue réformée.77 The religions were certainly not treated 
equally, although it granted some freedoms to Reformed minorities. The Edict entailed 
a traditional toleration in the sense that the state conceded to forbear that which it 
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explicitly designated to be “false”. The desire for outward unity is articulated in 
several provisions that substantiate a limited toleration. Several provisions make 
distinctions between public and private bodies and places.78 Generally, Reformed 
worship needed to be exercised in private or outside the towns that were the powerful 
Catholic Lords lived. Liberty of public worship was only allowed in specific places: a 
secret second brevet licensed about 150 cities and villages as places de sûreté, which 
could even have proper armies under the King’s authority to protect themselves.79 
According to historian Nicola Sutherland, this evidences some ambivalence between 
the strong condemnations and local practices of accommodation.80  
For reasons of public order and peace, public speech against the established 
faith was prohibited, as was printing or selling of reformed literature.81 The edict 
ordered everyone to respect Catholic holidays and no one was permitted to make 
noise, to work, or to advertise products on the streets on those days.82 Nevertheless, 
individual citizens gained some privileges. Similarly to the Union of Utrecht, the Edict 
proclaimed individual citizens equal before the law.83 Intervention with the freedom 
of conscience was prohibited in order to prevent further unrest.84 Interestingly, the 
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Edict forbade the abduction of Reformed children in order to be catholicised, yet the 
monopoly of the Catholic Church on legal marriage left Reformed children vulnerable 
in terms of citizenship and inheritance.85  
 These specific provisions of the Edict of Nantes show the importance of outward 
unity, public order and peace, and the common good in shaping the nature of 
toleration. This settlement is considerably more religiously inclined than the Union of 
Utrecht. The Edict is explicit about its support for the Catholic Church and its sole and 
unquestionable assertion of truth. This different emphasis might be explained by the 
French theology of the monarchical authority and a stronger inclination to unity 
resembling the idea of the corpus christianum in its search for religious and political 
oneness. However, the Edict shows that realities of diversity and religious violence 
necessitated concessions of these loftier ideals. In other words, the need to 
accommodate non-conformity for the sake of public peace and order outweighed the 
imperative of absolute religious unity. In this context it is worth mentioning the great 
impact of upsurges of violence for the perception of religious conflict, foremost in the 
massacres of Michelade (1567) and St. Bartholomew’s Day (1572). Violence indeed 
returned following the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in the Edict of Fontainebleau 
in 1685. 
 
2.3.3 The Holy Roman Empire: The Peace Treaties of Westphalia 
The Peace of Westphalia is another landmark in the history of toleration. The Peace of 
Westphalia consisted of three treaties: the Treaty of Osnabrück (IPO) between the Holy 
Roman Empire and Sweden (24 October 1648); the Treaty of Münster (IPM) between 
France and the Holy Roman Empire, as well as their allies (24 October 1648); and 
another Treaty of Münster between the United Provinces of the Netherlands and Spain 
 
recherchés dans les maisons et lieux où ils voudront habiter, en se comportant au reste selon qu'il est 
contenu en notre présent Édit’. 




(30 January 1648).86 The IPO and IPM treaties feature toleration on the basis of several 
dimensions of toleration: truth in relation to the recognised religion; public unity with 
regard to public worship; the common good and public peace regarding the peace and 
tranquility of the Empire; and pragmatic economic provisions regarding property, toll, 
and commerce. The two treaties re-established the Peace of Augsburg of 1555, which 
had been rescinded by Emperor Ferdinand II in the Edict of Restitution in 1629.87  
The Peace of Augsburg had previously introduced the famous cuius regio eius 
religio principle, which allowed Catholic and Lutheran princes to alter the religion of 
their land whilst offering basic security to others.88 Wayne Te Brake writes that the text 
of the Peace of Augsburg ‘offers eloquent testimony to the sense of weariness and 
resignation’ with which religious difference was accepted by German princes as the 
‘necessary foundation for their political future’.89 The IPO and IPM extended this 
principle to Reformed princes and minorities, with the exception of the Habsburg 
hereditary lands.90 Somewhat speculatively, this later inclusion of the Reformed 
confession might speak to the importance of the potential to share space to the 
feasibility of toleration, particularly considering the divergent attitudes to sacred 
 
86 The texts and article numbering are derived from Die Westfälischen Friendensverträge vom 24 
October 1648. Texte und Übersetzungen, (Acta Pacis Westphaliae, Supplementa Electronica 1), 
http://www.pax-westphalica.de, (consulted 5 May 2017). 
87 Article 5.1 IPO, Article 47 IPM.  
88 Territories which had affirmed he Augsburg Confession of 1530, the main Lutheran doctrinal 
statement; Articles 15 and 16 Peace of Augsburg. 
89 Te Brake, Religious War and Religious Peace in Early Modern Europe, p. 58. 
90 Article 47 IPM: ‘Cum etiam ad maiorem Imperii tranquillitatem stabiliendam de controversiis circa 
bonaecclesiastica et libertatem exercitii religionis his ipsis de pace universali congressibus 
certaquaedam compositio inter Caesarem, electores, principes et status Imperii inita atque 
instrumento pacis cum plenipotentiariis reginae et coronae Sueciae erecto inserta fuerit, placuit 
eandem compositionem ut et illam, de qua inter eosdem ratione eorum, qui reformati vocantur, 
convenit, praesenti quoque tractatu firmare et stabilire eo plane modo, ac si de verbo ad verbum huic 




space.91 Between these three confessions, no hierarchy was assumed; however, other 
religions or sects were not to be tolerated in the Holy Roman Empire at all.92 The 
Augsburg settlement established parity in the free Imperial Cities in the interest of 
merchandise and international trade.93 The treaty also ordered non-interference on 
behalf of other territories, including a provision for the non-protection of foreign 
subjects (§23 PA).  
The treaties facilitate three levels of religious toleration related to the principle 
of visibility. The motivation provided for the new order of toleration pertained to 
liberty of conscience, the prohibition of the abuse of power, and peace and tranquillity 
in the Empire. The first level of toleration is that the recognised church had a right to 
public worship within a delineated territory, including the right to build churches in 
the public space. This being the rule, the treaties made an additional provision for 
those who enjoyed toleration in the year 1624: they retained their rights to practise 
their religion publicly in churches, but only at set hours.94 They also fell under the 
regime of freedom to private worship, which comprised the second level of toleration. 
This right to private worship was conferred to all recognised minorities, regardless 
their status in 1624, and allowed them to meet in small groups in homes.95 Depending 
 
91 See David M. Luebke, Hometown Religion. Regimes of Coexistence in Early Modern Westphalia, 
Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press 2016, pp. 130-131. 
92 Article 7.2 IPO, Article 47 IPM. 
93 Article 27 Peace of Augsburg. 
94 The treaties take the situation of the year 1624 as the standard year and order restitution where 
possible. 
95 Article 27 IPM: ‘Augustanae confessionis consortibus, qui in possessione templorum fuerant, 
interque eos civibus et incolis Oppenheimensibus, servetur status ecclesiasticus anni 1624, caeterisque 
id desideraturis Augustanae confessionis exercitium tam publice in templis ad statas horas quam 
privatim in aedibus propriis aut alienis ei rei destinatis per suos aut vicinos verbi divini ministros 
peragere liberum esto’. Vgl. Article 4.19 IPO: ‘Augustanae confessionis consortibus, qui in possessione 
templorum fuerant, interque eos civibus et incolis Oppenheimensibus, servetur status ecclesiasticus 
anni millesimi sexcentesimi vigesimi quarti [1624], caeterisque id desideraturis Augustanae 




on the territory, such minorities could be given freedom to occasional public worship. 
The third level of toleration concerned domestic worship, such as private instruction 
and private prayer.96 Men from minorities could send their children to foreign schools 
for religious education or have them instructed privately. Such freedoms were, 
however, conditional upon behaviour that caused no disturbance of public order. 
Interference with private and domestic worship was strictly forbidden.  
Those who changed their religion after the settlement had lesser rights. 
Mirroring the Peace of Augsburg, the Treaty of Osnabrück prescribes a right to 
migrate, which is known as the ius emigrandi. This right allowed men to leave with 
their wives and children upon payment of the customary recompense for granting 
freedom from servility.97 The term for transition was longer. The treaty prescribes a 
minimum of five years for those who remain adherents of a minority religion and three 
years for those who change their religion after 1648. Thereafter, they would be 
dependent on the benevolence of princes. The settlement also restricted multiple 
changes of a region’s religion. After the Westphalian settlement, no right remained for 
a prince to alter the religion of his territory again, unless a community explicitly 
demanded it.98 If the nobility would again change their confession, they simply had a 
right to migrate themselves whilst maintaining free entry rights in the interest of 
curating their property, or alternatively, they could decide to stay under the condition 
that they would only worship in private.99  
 
alienis ei rei destinatis per suos aut vicinos verbi divini ministros peragere liberum esto’; Article 5.28 
IPO. 
96 In practice, their likely has been a fourth layer of clandestine worship of the religions that were 
technically ruled out from the settlement. 
97 Article 24 Peace of Augsburg. 
98 Article 7 IPO. 




The latter freedom was conditional upon the requirement not to ‘disturb the 
public peace and tranquillity’.100 These provisions are significant insofar as the 
authorities usually set the boundaries for toleration; some of them become subjects of 
toleration themselves. The levels of toleration speak to the importance of the notion of 
outward unity. The treaties established different layers of toleration for specific 
minorities depending on the circumstances in a given territory, but other religious 
groups were completely excluded from toleration. The layers of toleration resonate 
with Kaplan’s levels of visibility, from almost invisible private and domestic worship, 
to the ius emigrandi. Unrecognised churches remained less visible, especially as 
domestic meetings were allowed in small groups only and migration was offered as a 
long term solution. The concern over unity is perhaps most strikingly expressed in 
Article 5.43 IPO, which calls for parity in those rare communities which could not be 
considered unum corpus, or ‘one body’.101  
This language is of utmost significance, for it presupposes that the treaty 
understood all other communities as instances of ‘one body’. This is an explicit 
reference to the notion of the corpus christianum and its allusions to unity of space and 
time. The ‘one body’ language can be understood as a legal affirmation of the division 
of the corpus christianum in multiple corpora christiana. Moreover, it shows that the 
concept of toleration had not yet crystallised a new understanding of shared space or 
indeed of minority “privilege” in the treaty which has been heralded as the foundation 
of the modern state. Hence, where Daniel Philpott understands the significance of 
Westphalia in the affirmation of a system of ‘sovereign states’, I would be inclined to 
understand this significance in the legitimacy that the treaties conferred upon political 
communities as interdependent yet independent corpora christiana.102 
 
100 Article 5.30 IPO. 
101 Article 5.43 IPO. 
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These narratives of toleration provide windows into the common conceptual frames 
of reference to toleration: truth (secondarily informed by proximity and transience of 
evil), public peace and order, outward unity, economic benefit, and loyalty. These 
dimensions appear in the analysis of canonical toleration and they also feature 
explicitly in the Union of Utrecht, the Edict of Nantes, and the Westphalian treaties, which, 
for better or for worse, are known as toleration-treaties. This chapter identified 
common conceptual frames of reference to toleration, but is equally careful to not 
present these as a template of toleration. With Alexandra Walsham, I am careful to 
avoid connotations of progress, because histories of toleration are fraught with 
intolerances.103 Rather, these frames of reference to toleration evidence that early 
modern toleration was underpinned by conceptual and practical logic. This logic finds 
specific and complex expressions in practice through local applications, variations, or 
less methodical deviation. The three treaties show that common conceptual frames of 
reference to toleration may function like a conceptual kaleidoscope: producing 
different, adaptable outcomes depending on differing contexts of times and spaces. 
This flexibility extends to local and regional contexts as well.  
 The concept of toleration is historically and conceptually intertwined with the 
imaginary of oneness of a corpus, yet provides tools to contain religious, social, and 
political disintegration. Although princes, city councils and kings went to great lengths 
to maintain some level of unity in common space, it seems that an increase in toleration 
translated into visibility and tangibility of this very space. With reference to 
discussions about the visibility of religion in public space in chapter five and six, two 
matters stand out. Firstly, though private freedom of religion technically falls within 
 
103 Alexandra Walsham, Charitable Hatred: tolerance and intolerance in England 1500-1700, Manchester: 
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the scope of toleration, it represents the least permissive expression of toleration. 
Secondly, dissimulation went hand-in-hand with lower levels of toleration. Gaining 
standing in public space relieved some minorities from the duty to conform and the 
social necessity to hide their real identity from others. On a personal level, one must 
have had some confidence that toleration would endure before one would lay off the 
veil of dissimulation. Thus, however begrudging and tainted, early modern toleration 
joined the canonical tradition of toleration with a concern over visibility and common 
space. While many hoped that the body of Christ would yet reunite in the saeculum, 
the violent eruptions of intolerance perhaps engraved diversity in a manner that 
would become both inescapable and permanent. 
Toleration and public space are concepts that are shaped by the conceptual 
frames of reference to toleration; the use of these dimensions by authorities depends 
on the conception of shared space as well as an imaginary of a common identity. In the 
face of particular issues and controversies about the visibility of religion in shared 
space, every decision by the state presents as a possibility to commit, not only to the 
















3. From covenant to contract: philosophical critiques and 
reimagination of political order 
 
Recent deconstructions of toleration as an “Enlightenment”-virtue have complicated 
the picture of toleration and religious freedom.1 Yet if religious freedom cannot be 
unequivocally located in the Enlightenment, where does toleration end and where 
does religious freedom begin? The previous chapter has shown that practices of 
toleration did not unreservedly engender religious freedom, and, as this chapter 
contends, neither did many early modern philosophers. Preoccupation with truth, 
knowledge, and delineations of permissible and impermissible errors fills page after 
page. The imaginary of the body of Christ as the basis for social and political order 
persisted, even though the religious, social, and political disintegration of the corpus 
christianum necessitated the reimagination of the foundation of social and political life. 
As Gary Remer puts it, many philosophers ‘refused to recognize the permanent 
fragmentation of Christian unity’.2 This was an urgent problem; Walter Ullman writes 
that ‘there was above all an intellectual restlessness which was clearly prompted by 
the crumbling of the foundations upon which European society was built. And the 
new landmarks were not yet discernible’.3  
 
1 Some scholars prefer to refer to ‘Enlightenments’ rather than ‘the Enlightenment’. I will refer to the 
Enlightenment as inclusive of Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish Enlightenments, see further: James E. 
Bradley & Dale K. Van Kley, Religion and politics in Enlightenment Europe, Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press 2001, p. 2; Jonathan I. Israel, ‘Enlightenment! Which Enlightenment?’, (2006), Journal 
of the History of Ideas, Vol. 67, No. 3, pp. 523-545, p. 528. 
2 Gary Remer, Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration, State College: The Pennsylvania State University 
Press 1996, p. 7. 
3 Walter Ullmann, Law and Politics in the Middle Ages. An introduction to the sources of medieval political 




This chapter explores the common frames of reference to toleration – truth, 
common good, outward unity and public peace, economic interest, and loyalty – in 
early modern philosophical discourses (ca. 1500-1789). Drawing on writings on 
toleration by philosophers from the Low Countries, France, and the Holy Roman 
Empire who represent different political priorities, as well as secondary literature in 
the history of ideas, this chapter marks four particular aspects of philosophical 
discourses on toleration: First, that epistemic reformations facilitated a greater latitude 
regarding certainty about truth; second, that the relationship between outward unity 
and conformity hinged on the interest of public order; third, that ongoing religious 
and political fragmentation gave rise to the distinction between religious and political 
unity; fourth, that religious freedom did not necessarily emerge from the advancement 
of social contract over divine covenant. The scope of this chapter is limited to the 
discussion of toleration as initiated in chapter two. This chapter cannot address the 
philosophical history of toleration comprehensively, nor suggest a particular canon on 
the development of religious freedom. Instead, based on the primary and secondary 
materials, it argues that philosophical discourse about toleration may not in and of 
itself account for a development from toleration to religious freedom.  
Rather, this chapter concludes with the suggestion that the change from 
toleration to religious freedom needed to reside where toleration had been located: in 
law and in state action. Legacies of the corpus christianum could perhaps only be 
contained by a legal re-orientation from divine covenant to social contract. This is 
perhaps where philosophical contributions to a reimagination of belonging lasted 
beyond specific iterations of toleration: the articulation of law as an expression of a 
social contract diminishes the language of the corpus christianum and its reliance on 
toleration. For example, the recognition of human beings as being born “free” implies 
that law does not operate on the basis of permissions or licenses. Instead, it is the state 
that now has to justify interventions with natural freedoms. This paradigmatic shift 
did not, however, necessarily bury the body of Christ in early modern history. Rather, 




nineteenth-century constitutionalism, and as this thesis argues, still form substrata of 
contemporary political discourses on diversity, pluralism, and religious freedom. 
 
3.1 Epistemological reformation, truth and toleration 
Most early modern philosophers, including those associated with the Enlightenment, 
operated within religious frameworks and assumed their world to be Christian. They 
generally aspired to contribute to a greater maturity of religious and political life and, 
in doing so, attempted to reconcile the many social contradictions resulting from 
religious as well as social-political disintegration.4 This context of disintegration 
cannot be overlooked, and in particular, specific arguments about toleration must be 
understood in relation to personal theological convictions as well as ecclesiastical 
(dis)loyalties. Engagement with churches’ understandings of truth and theological-
philosophical deconstruction of itemised core beliefs warranted a compartmentalised 
toleration: sufferance of perceived falsehood or evil in society ‘for prudential reasons’ 
and accommodation of certain heresies within the church.5 Many philosophers 
believed that toleration could strengthen ecclesiastical and social unity in the longer 
term, so that the idea of the Christian community would continue to undergird social 
and political order.6 
 Distinctions between fundamental and less fundamental beliefs were perhaps 
anticipated in canonical law, the distinguishing of specific core and adiaphoral beliefs 
burgeoned as a result of epistemic and methodological reformations associated with 
Renaissance humanism. In the wake of the Renaissance, Acontius (1492-1566) and 
Erasmus (1466-1536) were among the first who used a division between core 
knowledge and adiaphoral conviction. Core knowledge entailed knowledge that was 
fundamental, certain, and necessary for salvation; by contrast, ‘adiaphoral’ knowledge 
 
4 Erin Wilson, After Secularism, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 50. 
5 Remer, Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration, p. 5. 




was either inferred to be inessential to salvation or which was not sufficiently 
objectifiable. What philosophers like Acontius and Erasmus questioned was perhaps 
not so much the idea of absolute ontological truth, but rather the degree to which 
humans could grasp unto it: the sinful dispositions of humans rendered their 
understanding of divine revelation in Scripture fallible. Thorough occupation with the 
nature of knowledge, sources of knowledge, and the reconfiguration of 
methodological perspectives allowed scrutinization of widely held truths. The 
potential consequences of this severing of knowledge could be dramatic: it would 
emphasise the distance between creation and its Creator, despite the presumed 
participation of the body of Christ in the divine. It also provoked questions about the 
nature of church and society and particularly obscured moral frames of action. It is 
against this background that Spanish philosophers developed what is known as ‘early 
modern probabilism’, as Stefania Tutino has impressively documented.7 
 Hence, the stakes of truth concerned no less than the sustainability of Christian 
unity and the protection of the social and public order. Various cities, regions and 
princedoms upheld religion and ecclesiastical association as a condition to citizenship 
and oathtaking. Consolidation of religious dissent was reflected in social and economic 
structures and thus put practical pressure on restrictive approaches to toleration. 
However, growing diversity within (Latin) Christianity did not necessarily prompt 
philosophers to sunder the notion of the corpus christianum itself. They often assumed 
a Christian truth, even if increasingly narrowly defined, to be the basis of social and 
political order. Yet they sought to civically accommodate diversity within Christianity. 
Toleration hardly ever covered all grounds of dissent and excluded atheists and 
sometimes Christian factions on the basis of public order. As long as dissent was 
understood to be outside the remit of order, these minorities could be subject to 
(violent) repression and expulsion, even unto death.  
 
7 See Stefania Tutino, Uncertainty in Post-Reformation Catholicism. A History of Probabilism, Oxford: 




The precise content of the adiaphora was highly controversial in both nature and 
scope among early modern philosophers. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the vigour of the 
debate on adiaphora equalled the debate on core aspects of faith. The stakes were high: 
whichever element of knowledge was no longer understood to entail uncontested, 
undoubtable truth, it would thereby lose its spiritual normativity for common life. 
Erasmus and Acontius, as mentioned above, took the meaning of adiaphora in different 
political directions, the first to emphasise concord or harmony, the latter to downplay 
differences between factions. Both espoused several specific concerns, such as the need 
for greater latitude to accommodate disagreement and debate, the necessity of debate 
in pursuit of greater knowledge of truth, and a separation of ecclesiastical and political 
functions to maintain peace in church and society. Perhaps because of their strong 
emphasis on the knowledge of truth, their theories of toleration might not appear fully-
fledged.8 
Erasmus, a Dutch Catholic theologian and philosopher, distinguished between 
core and adiaphora regarding beliefs, as well as religious practices stemming from these 
beliefs, and he argued for open philosophical debate and voluntary worship.9 Erasmus 
certainly was no unbridled sceptic; he was committed to the doctrine of divine 
revelation in the Scriptures and believed that all adiaphoral matters could be debated 
on the basis of inclusivity and probability.10 Erasmus never envisioned such debates to 
undermine the Christian truth, but rather imagined such deliberation to lead 
 
8 István P. Bejczy, ‘Tolerantia: a medieval concept’, Journal of the History of Ideas (1997), Vol. 91, No. 4, 
pp. 365-384, p. 376, Comp. Rainer Forst, Toleration in Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2013, p. 107; Gregory D. Dodds, ‘”Betwixt Heaven and Hell”: Religious Toleration and the reception of 
Erasmus in England’, in Karl A.E. Enenkel, The reception of Erasmus in the early modern period, Leiden: 
Brill 2013. 
9 Gary Remer, Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration, pp. 48-50. 
10 Erika Rummel, ‘Desiderius Erasmus’, in Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London: 




inevitably towards truth, and only on that condition was worship voluntary.11 
Similarly to canonical philosophy, Erasmus regarded error as a transient or temporary 
flaw which needed temporary accommodation in church and society. He believed 
error to be somewhat conducive to the pursuit of truth, yet its acceptability depended 
on a (prudential) balance of greater and lesser evils.12 Only error stemming from 
religious immaturity or as a product of a fallible - yet free - will would be considered 
eligible for toleration. And while the church could choose to excommunicate someone 
who persisted in error, only the secular authority would be competent to legitimately 
execute a heretic, should their heresy indeed threaten public order.13  
This legitimation of violence renders his language of ‘flexibility and charity’ 
and ‘Christian necessity of peace and concord’, and ‘concordia’ rather than ‘tolerantia’, 
somewhat ambivalent. He did not give up the notion of the ‘single body of Christ’ 
and his emphasis on concord supposes that harmony is dependent on eventual 
agreement.14 Erasmian coexistence thus occupied itself the ideal of Christian unity: 
one that was somewhat flexible as well as aimed at conversion.15 Erasmus seemed to 
have been more interested in the future of the church than in immediate conflicts,; 
and he understood the role of secular authority as more or less auxiliary to this 
future reconcilliation. This shows from Erasmus’ perspective on other religions such 
as Judaism and Islam, none of whom recognised the authority of Christ: both secular 
and religious authorities must treat them with love (even as he expressed himself 
dismissively about them), so that the unbeliever and the errant might convert and be 
 
11 Remer, Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration, pp. 48-50. 
12 Bejczy, ‘Tolerantia: a medieval concept’, p. 376. 
13 Remer, Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration, pp. 80, 81-85; Dodds, ‘Betwixt Heaven and Hell’, pp. 
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united to the Christian community.16 Erasmus was still inclined to exclude a range of 
marginalised sects, further limiting the exact scope of toleration on account of public 
order, all of which concerns were informed by a fairly specific Christian morality.17  
The matters of unity, trust, and the fate of the kingdom of Christ were also 
invoked by the more radical Acontius, who was an Italian expatriate in London. Rather 
unconventionally, he suggested excluding the Eucharist and the doctrine of 
predestination from the core beliefs. The Eucharist and predestination embody visible 
signs of the spiritual demarcation of the body of Christ.18 Roman-Catholic, Lutheran, 
and Reformed communities fiercely contested these doctrines.19 This move speaks 
volumes about his concern over Christian unity. It might show that Acontius took the 
fallible nature of human knowledge seriously, to the extent that he thought even core 
beliefs could be misguided in spite of divine revelation; yet, his leniency to scepticism 
regarding fundamental or essential knowledge still upheld an uncompromising sense 
of truth.20 He thought that scepticism would resolve into truth through the guidance 
of the Holy Spirit – an expectation he shared with Erasmus.21  
The idea of Christian truth remained no less central in Acontius compared with 
Erasmus, even as Acontius appeared more lenient. Acontius’ concern about 
reconciliation and unity are characterised by explicit eschatological concerns. He 
regarded Christian unity and peace and unity as instrumental to the destruction of 
Satan’s power and the advancement of God’s kingdom, which he considered the 
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supreme common good over other temporal concerns.22 Similarly to Erasmus, he 
perceived theological error to be an ecclesiastical affair and accorded secular 
authorities competence to punish apostates only in rare circumstances; for example, in 
the interest of public order.23 He advocated toleration of the errant in adiaphoral 
matters, called for temporary toleration of those denying the fundamentals of 
knowledge, and only demanded ‘excommunication and avoidance’ of those persisting 
in their error.24 Though more lenient within Christianity, he was more restrictive 
towards Christianity’s others. Excluded from toleration was anyone who rejected 
trinitarian theology, denied Jesus as the Son of God, or dismissed the principles of Sola 
Scriptura and Sola Fide.25 
 These two examples show that truth was intrinsically connected to toleration 
and that even more radical philosophers like Acontius did not suggest alternative 
foundations for toleration – and thereby maintained the binary of the one Christian 
body and the others. Christian truth remained the foundation of social and political 
order, even when it was impossible to ignore the presence of others, like Jews and 
Muslims. Truth did not hinge, therefore, on the more general aspects of the Christian 
faith, but specifically on the notion of the body of Christ, the person of Christ, and the 
Kingdom of Christ in this world and the world to come. It shows that, indeed, these 
philosophers could not make peace with the permanent fragmentation of the corpus 
christianum, as Remer points out. Dissidence thus remained a matter of non-conformity 
to Christianity whose chief concern in the saeculum was outward unity and public 
order. The question remains to what extent should one’s behaviour be coerced into 
conformity, or which levels of disturbance warrant which gradations of violence, 
particularly in the face of wars that are apparently inspired by religion. 
 
22 Voogt, Constraint on trial, p. 64. 
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3.2 Outward unity, conformity and the emerging dominance of the public order argument 
In places where differences erupted into egregious violence, the dimension of public 
peace and order became increasingly important. Not so much because division itself 
would automatically generate disorder, but because Christian truth, as well as 
religious and political unity, had undergirded social order and morality. These 
presuppositions rendered dissent and non-conformity dangerous, not division in and 
of itself. Dissent was not merely a matter of disagreement that could be civically 
resolved, but was a matter that put enormous pressure on the political imagination of 
theologically divided communities. This section features philosophers and theologians 
whom engaged the public order particularly in relation to toleration, including Jean 
Bodin (1530-1596), Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Johannes Althusius (1563-1638), and 
Baruch de Spinoza (1632-1677). Despite the fact that they all took the dimension of 
public order very seriously, their conclusions pointed into completely different 
directions. This perhaps demonstrates the potential of relative volatility within the 
concept of public order. Moreover, these examples show how difficult it was to 
disentangle truth and unity from public order and that, eventually, the ideal of 
Christian unity as the basis for order became untenable. 
French philosopher and jurist Bodin, who is usually known from his theory on 
sovereignty, showed a particular interest in truth and unity in the context of toleration. 
Of particular interest is his openness to non-Christian religions in the conversation in 
this common journey to truth – he called for conversation and toleration of non-
Christians.26 Perhaps tangentially, practices of Muslim-Christian dialogue had 
occurred in Baghdad as early as in the Abbasid era (8th-13th century) and similarly 
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served the search for truth yet within the understanding of superiority of Islam.27 
Despite Bodin’s commitment to the superiority of Christian truth, he thought that all 
religions embodied ‘parts of more complex truth’ as an expression of the grace of 
God.28 It is in this context that he was confident that a measure of justified error within 
and outside the church could be allowed, even if that meant that worship itself should 
not be coerced.29  
He did not advise open-ended dialogue and conversation and he considered 
that conversational openness could potentially be dangerous for public peace.30 His Six 
livres de la République (1576) and his later work Politiques take stability and public order 
to be guiding principles to toleration or, indeed, the refusal of toleration.31 Such 
decisions fell to secular authorities, which would tolerate or persecute sects for 
prudential reasons only. However, he intended his ideas for communities which had 
already become more diverse. In places where religious unity existed, he was 
comfortable with coercion of uniformity on behalf of secular authority. This might 
seem to contradict the principle of non-coercion, but it shows that toleration 
conceptually severed belief and action, and that action could be coerced. Where 
difference existed, he recommended fostering dialogue and conversation towards the 
protection of harmony and peace, again assuming that universal natural religion as 
represented in the Decalogue upheld political order.32 Harmony and peace amidst 
disagreement could make a community ‘seem to be one’ (italics added).33 What is 
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particularly striking is that this appearance of unity as a mediator of the existent and 
the imagined; this of course entails an explicit reference to the corpus christianum. 
Dutch jurist and Arminian theologian Grotius is of course famous for his 
writings on natural law. He poses the universal and common character of natural law 
as a foundation for public order and peace in the absence of theological consensus.34 
This focus on a shared framework of natural law seems capable of nuancing the binary 
between the church and the world, as well as strengthening the premise of the 
universality of a narrowed conceptualisation of the Christian truth. He certainly 
affirmed the idea of Christian unity and peace as a divine command, but he believed 
that this needed stewarding in practice through good ecclesiastical leadership, and it 
could only secondarily be reinforced through secular leadership.35 Recognising the 
reality of difference and, perhaps as a dissenter himself (from the Dutch Gomarian-
leaning authorities), he argued that religion pertained to free will and conviction.36 
Unlike many others, he pleaded to tolerate heretics as well as Jews in the Low 
Countries, though like Bodin and others, he thought that toleration would eventually 
lead to acknowledgement of error, and thus, conversion to the Christian faith.37  
In a somewhat similar spirit, German Calvinist political philosopher Althusius 
developed a predominantly rational framework of toleration in his work Politica 
Methodice Digesta, Atque Exemplis Sacris et Profanis Illustrata (1614). Given the 
fragmentation in the Holy Roman Empire, it perhaps is not a surprise that he regarded 
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religious unity and uniformity as unrealistic. He condemned religious violence and 
persecution as a means towards unity quite strongly.38 As a proponent of the free 
conscience, he argued that violence and coercion were not only ineffective but could 
possibly cause a greater disruption of public order than the indicted behaviour: ‘lest 
the entire realm (…) be overthrown’.39 He considered that the regulation of 
interpersonal contact among church members with infidels, atheists, impious men, 
and others was a matter for theologians and not a matter to be governed by secular 
authorities.40 Nevertheless, he seemed sympathetic to the idea that the state supported 
one religion as well as defended this religion from ‘enemies, persecutors, and 
disturbers’.41 
Such defence would primarily aim at external forces, but also carried 
imperatives for the magistrate towards internal affairs. Heretics erring in minor things 
should be tolerated as long as their persuasion remained on the horizon. Gerhard 
Besier underscores this distinction between minor and major errors as resting in the 
severity of the threat they pose to the very basis of faith.42 Despite guarantees for their 
physical safety, heretics would not actually be free to worship and engage in public 
debate on their own initiative. He proposed that heretical books should not be 
imported nor be allowed to be sold, and that heretics and atheists should be barred 
from offices in the context of church and school.43 Interestingly, and remarkable for his 
time, he argued that Catholics who were born in the state as well as Jews should be 
able to remain and have a level of economic freedom – though he did support the 
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ghettoization of Jews.44 Additionally neither Catholics nor Jews would acquire the 
privilege of worshipping in public.45 Thus, although opening the possibility of 
toleration for the errant and some significant “second class others”, such as Catholics 
and Jews, this toleration would not extend far into the common space. He also based 
the limits of toleration on the dimension of public order. The magistrates punish 
heretics in the interest of ‘public peace and tranquillity’.46 Furthermore the ‘obstinate 
and incurable’ should be expelled, imprisoned, or put to death (e.g. atheists, ‘impious’ 
and those who erred fundamentally and manifestly).47 Such punishments were not to 
be undertaken lightly and Althusius insisted that the status of the “hopeless” implored 
orderly and evidence-based adjudication.48 
 The argument of public peace and order features perhaps the least restrictively 
in the toleration proposed by the Jewish philosopher Spinoza. Acknowledging the 
enduring realities of religious difference, Spinoza moved away from the corpus 
christianum as the basis of political unity. As a naturalistic pantheist and sceptic, and 
an outsider to both Jewish and Christian scholars, he advanced a more radical freedom 
of belief, judgment, and philosophical speculation based on common reason and the 
principle of persuasion.49 He thought that coercion of outward conformity would 
cause ‘disharmony’ and dishonest dissimulation.50 Implicit in his toleration is that 
difference is ‘inevitable’ and therefore intolerant attitudes in society might need 
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governmental restraint – in particular, of adamant clergy.51 He believed that 
intolerance was caused by ambition to force a perception of the good on others.52 
According to Justin Steinberg’s account of Spinoza’s suspicion about moral legislation, 
‘outlawing certain expressions of belief will only further alienate offenders and deepen 
existing schisms’.53 Rather, a public order that would be stripped of truth claims would 
allow for stability and peace, although dissenters who posed a threat to public order 
or ‘the core function of the state’ should be met with intolerance.54  
 
3.3 Distinctions of religious and political unity 
Even though most of the above philosophers proposed a greater intellectual openness 
and suggested some initial functional separations of church and state, they eventually 
envisioned toleration as the means towards conversion and restoration of religious 
and political unity. Yet because of the radical religious and political fragmentation, it 
became more difficult to define the contents of a shared natural law to which everyone 
could agree. Moreover, a structure of political and religious unity as somehow based 
on divine covenant became increasingly problematic. Fragmentation led later 
philosophers to generate new ideas beyond the corpus christianum. As they articulated 
a non-denominational basis for political order, sectarian theological concerns lost their 
immediate significance for the understanding of political order. Philosophers who 
contributed to this change include Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), Samuel von Pufendorff 
(1632-1694), John Locke (1632-1704), Voltaire (1694-1778), Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
(1712-1778), and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). The next sections discuss different ways 
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in which these philosophers articulated the basis of political order as distinct from 
religious unity and divine covenant.  
French reformed theologian and philosopher Bayle, for example, relinquished 
any aspiration to a ‘single-faith’ and rejected the ‘irenic vision of “comprehension”’ in 
favour of a greater toleration in his anonymous work Commentaire philosophique 
(1686).55 He framed religious dissension as primarily an ecclesiastical problem, in 
particular clerical hypocrisy, and called for political toleration. He did not think unity 
could be restored through coercion nor persuasion.56 Political toleration could be 
justified with epistemological uncertainty as well as the affirmation of the freedom of 
conscience, which he believed to be guided by the ‘voice and law of God’.57 He believed 
that toleration would generate peace, while intolerance would engender confusion 
and conflict, and would hinder the search for truth.58 Restriction of political toleration 
would be based on political arguments: a threat of secession and war, the argument of 
peace and respect for the fundamental laws of the state.59 Within this framework, even 
atheists would be tolerated and treated ‘justly’ as a civilian; however, Catholics 
remained excluded as potentially disloyal.60 
A most remarkable dismissal of religious uniformity or indeed unity was 
articulated by the German jurist, historian, and philosopher Von Pufendorff.61 Based 
on a fairly detailed exegesis of Old and New Testament themes on kingship and 
 
55 Sally L. Jenkinson, ‘Two concepts of tolerance: or why Bayle is not Locke’, (1996), The Journal of 
Political Philosophy, Vol. 4, Nol. 4, pp. 302-321, p. 320. 
56 Perez Zagorin, How the Idea of Religious Toleration came to the West, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press 2003, p. 274. 
57 Ibidem, pp. 276-277. 
58 Ibidem, p. 277; Jenkinson, ‘Two concepts of tolerance: or why Bayle is not Locke’, p. 321. 
59 Rainer Forst, ‘Pierre Bayle’s reflexive theory of toleration’, (2008), Nomos, Vol. 48, pp. 78-113, pp. 103-
104. 
60 Ibidem, p. 103; Jenkinson, ‘Two concepts of tolerance: or why Bayle is not Locke’, p. 319. 
61 Von Pufendorff, On the nature and qualification of religion in reference to civil society (1687), translated 




nationhood, he rejected Christian appropriations of covenantal exclusivity and purity 
in the context of the state.62 This entailed an explicit dismissal of the language of the 
corpus christianum. Perhaps he sought to counter papal aspirations to religious unity, 
but the political implications of his argument were more radical than that. The New 
Testament stated no need for the kingdom of Christ to be associated with any temporal 
sovereign or state.63 The church might function in the context of a state and under 
governmental authority, but it did not need the state, nor any coerced uniformity.64 
Von Pufendorff insisted on a functional separation of ecclesiastical and governmental 
offices, in addition to a measure of religious freedom – even before Locke published 
his major works on toleration. Following Augustine’s exegesis of the parable of the 
weeds (Matthew 13), Von Pufendorff affirmed difference as a potential positive and 
reckoned the individual responsible for their conscience and search for truth.65 
Similarly to Althusius, Von Pufendorff argued that dissention never justified unruly 
behaviour and that intolerance could be justified on the basis of public order.66 That he 
still understood his world to be essentially Christian flows from his exclusion of 
atheists to toleration, as would Locke, though both seemed to have been less lenient 
than Bayle.  
Locke, an English philosopher and physician, famously argued for a separation 
of ecclesiastical and political functions. Locke still perceived his context as inherently 
Christian, which is perhaps why the toleration of atheists remained out of the question. 
Though the substance of this Christianity remained relatively narrow, his work The 
Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered in the Scriptures (1695) breathes radical creedal 
minimalism on the basis of epistemic humility. Man could know the necessary matters 
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of religion through revelation and reason.67 Yet he did not only distinguish between 
necessary and indifferent matters, he also argued that it would be heretical for a church 
to teach any adiaphoral matter as part of the necessary religious dogmas.68 One simply 
needed to suspend definite judgement on adiaphoral matters as he regarded God as 
the sole judge of truth – as he famously observed: ‘every Church is Orthodox to itself; 
to others Erroneous or Heretical’.69 No church would be obligated to tolerate obstinate 
deviance, but he proposed political toleration on the basis of creedal minimalism, as 
well as freedom regarding the adiaphora. 
Locke was not impressed with the practice of moderation and comprehension 
in his home country as a way to engineer unity. He believed that these had failed to 
provide stability and peace. He did not just call for religious liberty and voluntary 
church membership, nor even for public morality to be based on reason rather than 
confession, he departed from the corpus christianum in two particular ways.70 He 
rejected the religious and political unity in the state and, like Von Pufendorff, he 
believed that political order was not grounded in any divine covenant. First, Locke 
framed churches as free and voluntary associations within a political context – this 
entailed a radical departure from prevailing ecclesiology.71 Second, he understood 
political citizenship as a matter of individual freedom and consent, and as John 
Simmons points out, Locke grounded this freedom normatively rather than 
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historically.72 This functional separation could facilitate peace as long as the state 
focused on temporal concerns over common good and public peace.73 However, the 
social make up was understood to be Christian, and rejection of a narrow creed still 
put atheists beyond the bounds of toleration. Similarly to Bayle, and other 
philosophers operating in non-Catholic majoritarian contexts, Locke distrusted Roman 
Catholics because their loyalty to the Pope allegedly threatened the very basis of 
independent character of the state.  
Someone who was more impressed with English toleration than Locke is the  
French historian and philosopher François-Marie Arouet, more often known as 
Voltaire, who thought of England as an example of toleration for France.74 Voltaire 
believed it should be possible to provide a level of safety and certainty concerning the 
law, marriage, children, inheritance, and even public worship, and thought society 
should peacefully develop towards more liberty.75 He grounded toleration in a need 
to imitate Christ’s mildness and patience and the need to live in accordance with God’s 
care for the nations (as in the book of Malachi).76 Furthermore, as a deist and rationalist, 
he thought that religion should not be coerced, but that the individual should follow 
the dictates of reason.77 More practically, he thought that intolerance provoked 
dishonest dissimulation and rebellion, and that neither was conducive to sincere faith, 
peace, and public order.78  
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Considering the culture of moderation in England, it might be less surprising 
that Voltaire proposed a moderated toleration that is limited in its provision for an 
array of religious “fanatics”. Yet, despite his call for an appreciation for some diversity 
in France, he believed that intolerance would be lawful in specific circumstances.79 For 
error was not to warrant crime or to cause any risk to public order: this rationale would 
justify intolerance to a long list of Jesuits, Franciscans, Lutherans, Calvinists, some 
Danish sects, and Jews.80 Voltaire objected to Catholic violence towards the Jews; 
however, he seemed uninterested in the future of the Jews in France.81 Intolerance, 
however, would not be the right of the magistrate, and Voltaire argued that arguments 
concerning public order should be based on rational considerations only. He was 
uncomfortable with reliance on untrue or disputable legends, such as in the case of 
wrongly accused Calvinist Jean Calas, which was the immediate cause towards his 
argument for toleration.82 
Rousseau, a contemporary of Voltaire’s and a protestant exile to Geneva, is 
often regarded as a totalitarian thinker with regard to the state. Yet his thought on 
toleration was more nuanced than is often thought as he advanced toleration as a 
political strategy. Similarly to Voltaire, Rousseau believed that political unity could be 
‘compatible with a good measure of confessional disagreement’.83 This unity would be 
based on creedal minimalism, which included belief in a benevolent deity, life after 
death, a state of rewards and punishments, as well as due respect for law and the 
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rejection of intolerance.84 This narrow creed, also known as his basis for ‘civil religion’, 
should no longer revolve around many truths and falsehoods, but rather practically 
serve to uphold order in society.85 Many religious minorities, including Jews, could 
benefit from this toleration though atheists would remain ineligible to toleration, as 
well as any sect that would threaten public order because of their own intolerance.86 
He believed that private belief always was beyond the power of the civil authority; 
however, the civil authority could punish any distortion of public order as a breach of 
the social contract.87 Toleration - and the restriction thereof - thus functioned 
instrumentally towards the social contract, and its aspirations to truth would thus lose 
their immediate bearing on social and political order.88 
Although philosophical discourses distinguished between church membership 
and political citizenship, this distinction was quite sharply pronounced by Immanuel 
Kant, Prussian pietist and professor at the University of Königsberg. In his work Die 
Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (1793), he argued that no one should 
be held liable civically for theological errors that stemmed from the free will of man, 
because such was one’s freedom.89 Religious belief could not - and therefore should 
not - be coerced or prescribed by the magistrate. Instead, Kant suggested that a prince 
or the state should affirm complete freedom of religion and, advantageously, free 
deliberation would bring man closer to the truth.90 He thus transformed somewhat 
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current principles of restraint into a negative freedom in the realm of the state.91 
Crucially, Kant regarded toleration as opposed to true freedom and his language of 
freedom is intentionally different from toleration.92 Furthermore, he dismissed such 
governmental techniques as ‘presumptuous’ (hochmütig). This dismissal 
notwithstanding, freedom would, in practice, be limited by Kant’s notion of shared 
moral duty.93 This language of freedom and shared morality still is curiously informed 
by notions of truth and self-restraint, which are not unrelated to toleration. 
The limits in Kant’s suggestion of toleration are based on the notion of a shared 
moral duty, which is a version of moral unity within the reality of religious 
disagreement. Political scientist Juan Pablo Dominguez classifies this moral unity as 
‘moral uniformity’, recognising some universalising tendencies.94 Kant did not 
compromise in his belief in ontological truth, even as he was epistemically agnostic.95 
Indeed Kant believed that ‘one (true) religion’ (sic!) found moral expression in multiple 
Christian and non-Christian faiths, which loosely resembles Spinoza’s understanding 
of common morality.96 Crucially for Kant’s argument, ethical content that was 
sufficient for the purposes of coexistence would stem from this ontological truth.97 
Knowledge of this ethical content could be attained through both religion and reason. 
Kant argued that state should rely on non-faith-specific resources in the articulation of 
this morality.98 This appears as a version of common grace, and it nevertheless 
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understands the world from the perspective of a predominantly Christian 
environment. As Kant considered this duty natural and not exclusively inherently 
religious, no one could argue for exemption from these duties. He would demand 
‘absolute obedience’ of citizens regarding their actions in office and also in general; 
failure to comply would make any citizen unacceptable.99  
Kant’s radical distinction of religious and political unity perhaps epitomises 
earlier rejections of the corpus christianum and represents a new teleology of the state 
as the protector of peace and stability as well as indifference over denomination-
specific claims to truth. However, the notion of a shared morality as derived from truth 
harbours a semblance of the language of toleration. For this shared morality appears 
to be morally heavily laden, as well as absolute, because of its natural character and 
normativity. If this shared morality is employed as political truth, even if just 
functionally, in what way is it structurally different from toleration? Furthermore, how 
do the dynamics in the discovery of ethical content account for political stability? 
Additionally, how realistic and practical is this understanding of shared morality 
beyond an already relatively homogenous community? What is the freedom granted 
to those to act and behave in accordance with perhaps deviant thoughts and beliefs, 
particularly in a context of continuing religious fragmentation? Or to put it more 
provocatively, might his philosophy not be liable to appear as a limited and strictly 
political appropriation of toleration that we know from the corpus christianum? Chapter 
Five will return to some of these questions.  
 
3.4 From toleration to religious freedom? 
It might be tempting to understand philosophical discourse on toleration and religious 
freedom as a somewhat linear development towards triumph of freedom over 
toleration. This, however, would not do justice to the context of changing 
epistemology, ecclesiology, as well as the specific historical contingencies in the Low 
Countries, France, and the Holy Roman Empire. The intellectual restlessness of the 
 




avowed fathers of toleration gives the impression that the permanent fragmentation 
of religious and political unity was a profoundly distressing process. Discourses of 
toleration were deeply entangled in both theological and political frameworks of 
reference, which makes it impossible to separate secular and religious political 
thought. Depending on context, religious conviction, and ecclesiastical and political 
loyalties, many of the above intellectuals argued to stretch or limit toleration based on 
their estimations of the weight of truth, unity, public order, expediency, and trust. 
 It cannot be underestimated how strongly epistemic reformations impacted on 
understandings of the kingdom of God in this world. One could not force onto another 
that which is improbable or uncertain. Much of the corpus christianum hinged on a level 
of conformity that was demanded from strangers within the kingdom of God on earth. 
The demise of relative religious unity, therefore, gave rise to a reconsideration of the 
foundations of society, as much as theological reflections of the Old Testament and of 
the New Testament church were questioned. Some, like Von Pufendorff and Locke, 
believed that the state could not possibly reflect or be in a direct covenant relationship 
with God. Others, like Erasmus and Althusius, held on to the idea that the kingdom of 
God had territorial dimensions into which strangers to the church ought to fit 
eventually. Revisiting the foundation of political order was therefore crucial to the 
question of toleration: who belongs within your gates and who is the stranger? 
Separation of ecclesiastical and political functions could technically fit with both 
conceptualisations. Separation of church and state, therefore, does not only facilitate 
freedom: for example, many churches maintained, even in their confession, that 
political authority was called to be the church’s auxiliary even though its function was 
distinct. This is why the very foundations of political order needed to be reframed.  
 The previous chapter argued that the division of the corpus christianum entailed 
an endurance of many of its political and religious principles within corpora christiana. 
Demand of conformity and language of purity became stronger in these smaller 
communities when compared with medieval structures of toleration. This chapter 




early modern philosophy, but also, that philosophy did not necessarily clear the way 
for religious freedom. It seems that the question of where the change from toleration 
to freedom resides is almost impossible to answer. Kaleidoscopes of practical and 
philosophical toleration did not just develop towards freedom. Cycles of progression 
and regression, both in practice as well as in philosophy, show how difficult it was to 
achieve a new balance of order. Religious freedom, in contrast to toleration, needed to 
be enshrined in a new understanding of political order. 
 
3.5 The constitution: covenant without God? 
This new understanding of political order is first embodied in the law and particularly 
in the moment of constitutionalisation as a ‘form of social power’.100 Insofar as a 
constitution embodies a social contract, it offers a tangible alternative for the old order 
and for toleration, which were founded on the idea of a divine covenant. Despite the 
fact that many constitutions invoke religious language, a constitution embodies a 
recognition that the peace and order are not self-evident, and that parties with different 
convictions and interests need to coexist within impartial frameworks of 
accountability. This constitutional framework of coexistence does not, of course, 
replace the normative connotation of a divine covenant. The constitution is perhaps 
part of a functional as well as a normative double order. Functionally, a constitution is 
an heir to the divine covenant, yet provides the foundation of a new political order. 
Normatively, the constitution is an expression of an immanent covenant that 
constitutes one political body which binds its members yet which may coexist in 
tension with certain religious or non-religious commitments. This functional and 
normative double order means that tensions between constitutional and religious 
commitments need to be moderated with due respect to both public order and 
personal interests. The moment of constitutionalisation thus offered an opportunity to 
 
100 Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in sovereignty. How ideas shaped modern international relations, Princeton: 




facilitate religious freedom, without religious freedom being the necessary 
consequence of constitutionalisation. 
Given that religious diversity and the foundation of political order were deeply 
connected in the question of toleration, constitutionalisation of religious freedom and 
protection of minorities was vital to the project of the modern state. However, the state 
did not yet own an imaginary that provided a sufficient conceptual basis for religious 
freedom other than the budding yet contested idea of nationhood. Thus, the position 
of religious minorities remained dependent on law more than on a specific sense of 
identity – this is further illustrated in the next chapter. From the perspective of 
constitutional theory, constitutionalisation of religious freedom brought about a 
theoretical diametric change in the institutionalisation of toleration, particularly 
through the language of religious freedom. This change of language is crucial from the 
perspective of political theory: the dissenter is no longer responsible to justify their 
deviancy (as in toleration), but that the state is required to justify regulation that 
intervenes with the freedom of its citizens (as in constitutional freedom). In a 
constitutional framework, this question is not only about the subject “being free 
unless” or “not being free unless”. The protection of individual freedom legitimises 
the very nature and purpose of the state.  Although religious freedom is of course not 
unlimited, any limitation must be rationally and constitutionally justified.  
Constitutionalised religious freedom adds a positive layer to the language of 
restraint.101 While the negative freedom is often understood as the meaning of 
‘freedom from’ and governmental restraint from interference with formally recognised 
freedoms, its positive aspect entails an obligation to protect and nurture the freedom 
of citizens to develop their religious commitments within the context of the political 
community that the state represents. Neither are absolute, and religious freedom may 
still be legitimately restricted under specific conditions. Legal safeguards against 
unjustified intervention, however, aim to protect the interests of minorities. 
 




Constitutions and international human rights treaties typically require that a 
restriction is laid down in law, serves a particular set of legitimate aims, and meets the 
demands of subsidiarity and proportionality. Contrary to toleration as a begrudging 
incorporation of categories of others (not necessarily implying visibility in the public 
space), religious freedom in a constitutional democracy knows no prima facie outsiders 
on the basis of (religious) conviction. All citizens are part of the one and same political 
body.  
Realising that toleration has historically been bound up with levels of visibility 
of non-conformity in public space, restrictions to the manifestation of belief in public 
space cannot be proclaimed lightly within a constitutional framework. Visibility in the 
public space, which perhaps is the logical locus of encounter, remains crucial in the 
context of constitutional religious freedom. Moreover, the nature of public space was 
intrinsically connected to the consolidation of the modern state as well as the idea of 
nationhood, and contention about the meaning of this public space would shape the 
position of religious communities within the framework of the nation state. The next 
chapter illustrates how ongoing tensions and sensitivities around religious or non-
religious diversity and visibility in public space led to new cycles of dissimulation and 
discrimination. Even as the moment of constitutionalisation provided a locus for a 
change in political order as well as the constitutional instatement of religious freedom, 
peaceful coexistence still remained a trajectory above and beyond the law.  
 
 
4. Engineering belonging: substrata of early modern 
toleration in emerging constitutionalism 
 
The turn from early modern toleration towards the constitutional protection of 
religious freedom is legally and conceptually located in the era of constitutionalism 
and the rise of nation states; the late eighteenth century in France, and the nineteenth 
and twentieth century in the Netherlands and Germany. The idea that a liberal 
constitution may protect the people against arbitrary power, whether or not this power 
is located in a monarchy, runs deeply through French, Dutch, and German 
constitutionalism. This common thread only veils the fact that each of their histories 
of constitutionalisation have their own integrity. The dissolution of the French 
monarchy and the maxim liberté, égalité, fraternité swept far beyond France, yet its 
resolute breaking with the ancient regime was in many ways unique and specific to 
France.1 Its concerns about the protection of life and goods, civil and political rights, 
and legal certainty might have been shared more widely; France reacted strongly 
against absolutism.2 Once the revolutionary winds subsided, each of the states 
developed a constitutionalism of their own in which they sought to reckon with the 
social, political, and religious contentions of the past.  
The idea that the state mediated social and political oneness featured strongly 
in French and Dutch revolutionary documents, invoking the oneness previously 
ascribed to the corpus christianum. The French constitution of 1793 declared the French 
Republic ‘one and indivisible’.3 The exact same phrase appears repeatedly in the 
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constitution (Staatsregeling) of the Batavian Republic of 1798 (now the Netherlands).4 
Resembling the language of one people of the French Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme, 
these documents vested Rousseauian sovereignty in the nation, the people, and 
declared the law to be the expression of the will of ‘the whole civil Body’.5 In Germany, 
on the other hand, the idea of one nation did not really feature save in the context of 
national-socialism and, for most of its history, the idea of the German nation assumed 
regional differentiation. After World War II, it took almost half a century before the 
idea of the nation became normalised.6 Nevertheless, Germany, France and the 
Netherlands have in common that they negotiated the religious fragmentation from 
the past thought the language and imaginary of the nation; reaffirming a connection 
between territory, people, and common destiny. This imaginary of the nation came 
with significant strains of racism, anti-Semitism, as well as religious intolerances. 
Neither inclusion in the nation nor the enjoyment of rights was self-evident for Jews, 
Arabs, and travellers, besides non-whites, women, and children, whilst young nation 
states also struggled to affirm religious diversity. These lingering flaws actually 
obstructed the effectiveness with which the idea of nationhood could provide an 
overarching narrative. 
Dutch historians Knippenberg and De Pater argue that the association of state 
and nation only grew in the course of the nineteenth century as a result of the 
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increasing ‘mutual permeation of state and society’.7 This mutual permeation is what 
lays the foundation for the various connections between territory, people, and 
common destiny that were peculiar to the corpus christianum, especially where it starts 
mimicking concerns about relative unity and purity. Churches, which for centuries 
operated either on the margins or in association with secular power, needed to adapt 
to the new political order, and navigated vigorous debates both in and outside the 
Church about the potential and desirability of the idea of the “Christian nation”.8 
Conflicts over religion transformed within emerging constitutional frameworks and 
reinvigorated questions over identity and the cultural future of local, regional, and 
national communities. Historian Wolfram Kaiser argues that these questions touched 
upon concerns about European identity and perhaps even the future of Christianity in 
Europe.9 
 This chapter analyses constitutions and laws that fundamentally transformed 
the position of religious minorities during the early formation of France, the 
Netherlands and Germany as nation states. This chapter compares constitutional and 
legal texts, parliamentary discourse, as well as secondary interpretations of either in 
order to demonstrate how problematic the idea of religious diversity remained in the 
context of these nation states. This chapter contends that common frames of reference 
reappeared in the context of constitutionalism, even to the extent that some of its 
dimensions became substrata of constitutionalism. This reappearance is intertwined 
with the understanding of religious diversity within the concept of the nation, as well 
as contention over the visibility of religious identity in public space. Issues of 
contention included restrictions on “political” Catholic processions in public space, 
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divisions of burial ground, the use of places of worship, and not least, the nature of 
primary public education.  
 
4.1 Towards laïcité: France 
The emergence of the French constitutional state was complicated by post-
revolutionary political and regional differentiation, while rapidly changing 
governments approached the question of religion in society differently. The French 
Revolution – rather than a collective turn towards a rearticulated common good 
perhaps expressed in liberté, égalité, fraternité – was profoundly divisive.10 Even though 
some may associate revolution with guillotines, terror, and extreme secularity,11 no 
clear principle of secularity actually consolidated throughout the nineteenth century. 
France perhaps witnessed the most virulent cycles of animosity between radical 
republicans and ‘ultramontane’ Catholics in the hundred years following the 
Revolution.12 The forging of identity intertwined with the moderation of religious 
identity, particularly in public space, invigorated significant shifts in understandings 
of publicness. Structural approaches to religion and society started to take root in the 
Third Republic through policies of ‘frenchification’ and the juridification of the notion 
of laïcité  in the 1905 Separation Act.13  
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It was really Napoleon Bonaparte who would configure the place of religion in 
nineteenth century France. Napoleon deliberately sourced local religion towards 
public morality, yet firmly in submission to the state and embedded in policies of 
cultural centralisation.14 The main documents on Christianity in France are the 1801 
Concordat (Catholics) and the 1801 Les articles organiques (Catholic, Lutheran, 
Reformed) as affirmed in the Loi relative à l’organisation des Cultes of 1802.15 Although 
this entailed a restoration of religion and religious freedom to a limited extent, it also 
weakened ecclesiastical autonomy. Extensive regulations provided a qualified 
religious freedom, determined by political interpretations of public order and peace. 
Moreover, the regulations showed a deep concern over frenchness. The laws 
centralised power over religious identities in order to govern divisions within France 
as well as to limit foreign influence within all denominations.  
Napoleon’s Concordat of 1801 with Pope Pius VII regulated the position of the 
Catholic hierarchy in France and remained in place until the Separation Act of 1905. 
The Concordat recognised in the Preambule that the Catholic religion is ‘the religion 
of the great majority of the French citizens’. Article 1 stated that Catholic worship was 
free, although all rights and privileges were conditional upon considerations of public 
order and peace. The state monitored ecclesiastical hierarchy and formal teachings, 
while it subsidised bishops and curates.16 For example, the First Consul nominated all 
bishops, the government approved appointments of lower ecclesiastical hierarchy, 
and it imposed on all clergy an oath of loyalty to the state.17 Further, it prescribed one 
liturgy and one catechism for all French churches, which shaped the liturgy and 
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culture of the French faithful.18 Napoleon’s unilateral Articles Organiques towards the 
Catholic church further prohibited the declaration of new festive holidays and the 
publication of new confessional or educational documents without governmental pre-
authorisation, and restricted foreign influence.19  
Napoleon issued similar Articles Organiques towards Reformed churches and 
the churches of the ‘Augsburg confession’.20 These also focus on frenchness through 
the prescribed organisation of French churches and the limitation of foreign influence. 
For example, foreigners could not exercise liturgical functions and relationships with 
foreign authorities were prohibited.21 These laws imposed sizable limitations on these 
churches, particularly in view of close relationships with Swiss and German churches 
and seminaries. The laws stipulated that ministers of the Augsburg confession must 
have studied in France and reformed ministers must have studied in Geneva.22 
Similarly to the Catholic church, confessional and educational documents needed 
governmental pre-authorisation.23 Lastly, the churches of the Augsburg confession 
were inspected annually, perhaps because of their geographical situation and 
relationships with churches in the German lands.24 
The Concordat and Articles Organiques moderated the public visibility of 
worship, even if ambivalently. Its designation of Catholic worship as public (Article 1) 
referred to the performance of the liturgy within church buildings, which were 
typically owned by the state and put at the disposal of bishops.25 Religious buildings 
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were the centre of public worship and could facilitate ‘one religion’.26 The Concordat 
recognised the public character of limited outside worship, such as processions. 
According to historian Paul d’Hollander, publicness involved both the space inside 
and outside a church building and designated the street as a ‘temporary place of 
worship’ to allow for some festive processions.27 The law scripted the precise number 
of processions and allowed further restrictions on the basis of public order and the 
mere presence of another denomination in a town.28 Outside space could have more 
than one designation and was explicitly engineered by the state, while the meaning of 
outside public space was contingent on social unity. In other words: existing diversity 
would warrant lesser public visibility. 
The designation of space for religious practice and the prescribed separation of 
spaces explicitly departs from toleration practices of parity as described by Kaplan. 
Parity included the use of one building by rivalling confessions, making the space of a 
church flexible and less dependent on denomination. Napoleon’s focus on unity of 
space extended even over the dead, setting French society up for conflict over funeral 
practices long into the nineteenth century.29 Historian Thomas Kselman describes the 
building of separate cemeteries in diverse local communities, or if impossible, division 
of space with clear demarcations and separate entrances.30 This division of space also 
occurred in early modern France in towns where confessional differences were more 
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pronounced; however, strict separation of the dead was practised almost nowhere.31 
Funerals therefore became a trigger of ecclesiastical-political conflict, fuelling existing 
unease over religious symbolism, rituals, space, and the division of labour and 
authority between clergy and civil authorities.32 It is rather poignant that individual 
and deeply personal interests were deeply compromised in this institution-based 
conflict.33 
In 1808, Napoleon issued three Decrees concerning Jewish communities, 
following consultation with an Assembly of Jewish Notables and the Great 
Sanhedrin.34 Modelled after the Articles Organiques, it set Jewish communities back in 
comparison with the citizenship and civil equality granted in 1791, restricting their 
religious, social, and economic freedoms.35 A wider interpretation of the decrees 
allowed Jewish elites limited power to govern Jewish communities in matters of 
education, poverty relief, and discipline.36 Underlying concerns pertained to 
acculturation and assimilation of Jews, which inherently aimed at the relaxation of a 
transnational Jewish narrative and consolidation in France.37 Echoing Stanislas 
Clermont-Tonnerre’s words from 1789, Napoleon famously denounced collective 
Jewish identity as a ‘nation within a nation’.38 However, it does not seem to be the case 
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that Napoleon sought to fully integrate Jews as being French. Napoleon’s dealings 
with Jews on the margins of French identity show a concern over a ‘pure’ kind of 
Frenchness and belonging, expressed through interference with Jewish cultural 
identity, regulation of marriage and family, and allegations of economic immorality.39  
Even further outside those margins were the French Arabs of the early 
nineteenth century. Essentially ghettoised in Marseille, a group of Egyptian refugees 
who had associated with Napoleon jostled issues of belonging and compatibility of 
Arab and French identity.40 After Napoleon’s defeat, a backlash resulted in massacre 
and burning of their dwellings in Marseille.41 The state employed no rhetoric of 
belonging whatsoever to Arabs and they did not gain collective religious or political 
rights.42 A considerable group of Arabs remained visibly different, navigating 
stereotypes of being ‘foreigners’, along with refugees from Spain and Italy, as well as 
being ‘coloured’, along with slaves and Arab Muslims.43 Schreier notes the difficulties 
of connotations of Arabs and Muslims with ‘intolerance’ and ‘despotism’ in the context 
of French political discourse.44 Coller argues that Egyptian presence remained 
contested, pointing out the tragedy of delocalisation and deterritorialization: they 
could neither return nor belong.45 After 1830, Arab life was pushed almost entirely 
underground.46 Coller frames the invisibility of Arab France as an expression of both 
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the inability and unwillingness of France ‘to negotiate the realities of diversity and 
difference on its soil’.47 
Programmatic and comprehensive Frenchification occurred in the Third 
Republic (1870-1940). Decades of flaring controversy between the 1880’s and the 1905 
Separation Act represent another crucial phase in negotiating identity in connection 
with the moderation of the public visibility of religion.48 Over this period public 
debates over public visibility and platform intensified, while the government 
promoted more general cultural ‘conformity’ to ‘democratic values’ as a source of 
public morality over against ecclesiastical voices.49 Borutta labels Catholicism as 
“modernity’s other”, referring to ‘symbolic exclusion of Catholicism from the 
hegemonial version of national culture’.50 French authorities started to lean toward 
laicisation in a context of deep social polarisation and antagonism, perhaps because of 
interests of political and social stability. This turn was not linear and still lacked a clear 
direction on behalf of the state. Moreover, authorities showed little interest in the 
radical separation of church and state for ideological reasons, for which only a small 
minority of radical freethinkers campaigned.51  
Policies of cultural convergence were expressed in the secularisation of a range 
of key functions in society, such as the institution of civil marriage, mandatory secular 
education, and the removal of clergy from social public functions from 1881.52 Such 
changes appeared in other European countries about the same time. Distinctive to 
France, however, was the revision of the governmental understanding of “public” in 
an attempt to reframe the position of religion. In 1880, the Ministry of Interior Affairs 
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declared that “public” simply referred to the public accessibility of church buildings, 
thus stripping worship itself from any material public significance.53 By implication, 
outside space was no longer understood as a ‘temporary space of worship’. 
Furthermore, the government interpreted the 1801 Concordat as a special act of 
“toleration” and simultaneously as a (monetary) “privilege” which had no constitutional 
justification nor substantiation.54 Though toleration and privilege usually do not go 
hand in hand, the observation that Napoleon’s arrangements were in tension with 
constitutionalism is itself accurate. However, polarised politics around diversity 
complicated the articulation of what it meant to coexist in a constitutional framework.  
Sociologist Émile Poulat located a shift in social attitudes from positive to 
negative laicity in this context of conflict and radicalisation; that is, an evolution from 
a separation of church and state with an inclusive public space to one that restricts the 
level of public inclusivity.55 In response, the Catholic church used clergy-led 
processions to increase its ‘visibility in the urban setting’ to underline and increase its 
public relevance and tangibility.56 These embodied bold claims of public space as 
temporary spaces of worship. On grounds varying from protection of equality of 
religion in the streets to unapologetic anti-clericalism, some mayors banned 
processions or imposed restrictions relating to the number and length of processions, 
their location, and the presence of clergy.57 Legal reasons included public nuisance of 
a procession, the threat to public order because of popular violence, its disguise as a 
political demonstration, or the idea that visibility of religion in public space was an 
imposition on all.58 Parallel parades mocking Catholic processions potentially 
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reinforced a process of ‘gradual radicalisation’.59 Instead of bolstering the public 
argument against Catholic presence, however, many mayors simply regulated both, 
recognising equal rights to the street.60  
Absolute separation of church and state was never intended nor enforced in the 
nineteenth century. Rather, French politicians concerned themselves with equal access 
to public space. Interests in limiting the role of the Catholic church in society, 
particularly in education, were shared among agnostics and atheists, as well as Jews 
and Protestants, whose political and societal consciousness gradually grew.61 
Protestants ended up participating actively in the legislative process establishing laïcité 
in 1905. Perhaps they validated laïcité as a means to greater religious freedom as well 
as a means to moderate Catholic influence on education.62 The eventual legislative 
process unfolded under the leadership of a parliamentary committee which 
represented an interesting mix of ideological and religious backgrounds and 
interests.63 Legal laïcité primarily pertained to a strict institutional separation, 
grounded in the liberty of religion and conscience, which was intended to function in 
conjunction with principles of equality, neutrality, and the political and civil liberties 
proclaimed in the Human Rights Declaration of 1789. 
 Though the Act regarded religious activity as a private matter, it employed an 
ambivalent distinction between public and private spaces.64 Churches were supposed 
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to operate as private associations and the Act ruled that religious gatherings must be 
public (e.g. publicly accessible) in order to enable monitoring by the police on behalf 
of the state in the interest of public order (Article 25). Political gatherings were not to 
be organised in places of worship (Article 26), which resembled the unity of space from 
the Napoleonic regulations but also put political and religious gatherings on par. It 
also distinguished places of worship from other buildings with regards to the 
permissibility of outward religious symbols (Article 28). The Separation Act thus 
framed space as mediator of identity. A crucial difference is that laïcité now offered an 
alternative, and essentially negative, approach to space. Practically, it effectively 
imposed an outward unity beyond religious and ideological diversity, fundamentally 
marginalising rivalling narratives of identity and belonging. 
Though laïcité was in many respects anti-Catholic in nature, it acquired a more 
generalised connotation through Article 1 of the French Constitution in 1958: ‘France 
shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic, and social Republic. It shall ensure the 
equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race, or religion. It 
shall respect all beliefs. (…)’.65 The prominent position of laïcité within the Constitution 
underlines how this notion had become to social and political order, as it were, moving 
between the constructive to the reflexive function of the law.66 But it also remained 
framed over against religion, while the religious and ideological landscape of French 
society had dramatically changed since 1905. This chapter argues that the centrality of 
laïcité as a principle of constitutional order has, at least, a potential to marginalise 
minority religions. Not so much because religious freedom would not be protected, 
but because belief is made out to be a personal characteristic alongside race and origin. 
As such, it is not part of the primary legal order, which is based on a centralistic 
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oneness of territory, citizens, and a set of French values that order the national interest. 
Laïcité is by no means amounts to constitutional atheism, yet it creates a legal basis for 
the state to instrumentalise ‘republican values’ to establish a bandwidth of good and 
evil to the othering of a range of minorities.67 
Laïcité has become sharper in response to Islam, specifically as the French state 
invokes this notion as a constitutional underpinning of dissimulating and othering 
policies. Historian and sociologist Jean Baubérot discerns different dimensions to 
laïcité: historical, political and democratic laïcité, which he sees as the original intent, 
and a new laïcité, which excludes religions from common frames of culture and 
identity.68 He warns that this new, more radical type of laïcité could be used in 
opposition to human rights, particularly in opposition to religious freedom. He goes 
as far as to call this laicity a falsified laicity.69 This section would provocatively suggest 
that laïcité perhaps has the capacity to function as a constitutionalised instance of 
toleration. Almost ironically, being invented to protect non-Catholic minorities, it may 
underwrite otherness with regards to race and religion, mediated through a nexus of 
land, people, teleology, all encapsulated in the notion of frenchness. 
This frenchness embodies an imagination of belonging, yet the flexibility of the 
concept of laïcité in junction with its constitutional status may obscure the intersection 
of constructive and reflexive functions of the law. Moreover, specific legal regulations 
concerning religion tend to include references to the legal principle public order. While 
a focus on public order is perhaps idiosyncratic to French legal and social history, this 
particular legal lens may unwittingly construct state responses to social conflict over 
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the bandwidth of belonging.70 And finally, the question of what happens with the 
integrity of individual and collective religiosity remains. Constitutional concepts of 
religion, laicity, and functional separation of church and state that grew from explicit 
institutional polarisation throughout the nineteenth century, might not by definition 
provide helpful lenses into the question of diversity in France today – as the next 
chapter will discuss.  
 
4.2 Accommodation of religious difference in Germany 
At the start of the nineteenth century, it seemed unlikely that a notion of one German 
nation would arise over the poly-ethnic fabric of German states and towns.71 The idea 
of one nation – arguably rooted in the medieval period – certainly featured in 
Enlightenment literature yet found little traction among grassroots communities, not 
least because of relatively low levels of literacy.72 Regional differentiation was rooted 
in the Westphalian treaties, making churches dependent on the support of regional 
princes (Herrschaften). The notion of the nation would thence engender political 
integration, for example through the development of a public consciousness à la 
Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803) or through the unity of the will of the people 
à la Emmanuel Joseph Abbé Sieyès (1748-1836).73 Perhaps the idea of the German 
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nation is primarily grounded in territoriality, rather than primordial ethnic 
homogeneity.74 Thus, the relationship between ethnicity, homogeneity, and the idea of 
the nation in Germany remained in ambivalent tension.75 According to Tönnies, the 
formation of nationhood depended on the conceptual transformation of Gemeinschaft 
into Gesellschaft, which facilitated the idea of unity in diversity.76 Indeed, the idea of an 
ethnic nation would emerge amidst: 1) decreasing the relevance of religious and 
political differentiation; 2) the transformation of religious cleavages into subcultures 
of denominational christianities; and 3) the increasing nationalisation of expressions 
of regional culture.77  
 The Napoleonic invasion of 1806 and the consequent deliberate political 
engineering generated almost traumatic structural changes in relationships between 
German states.78 Napoleon replaced the imperial structure with the mostly military 
Confederation of the Rhine, re-ordering states and effectively giving three million 
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Germans a new identity.79 Similarly to French churches, Napoleon took control over 
the church and regulated outward representations of religion in Baden, Bavaria and 
Würtemberg.80 According to Laura Achtelstetter, these policies fuelled anti-
Napoleonic and anti-revolutionary sentiments, which found expression in religious 
conservatism, even framing political relationships with France as a struggle between 
good and evil.81 The Vienna Congress imposed yet another structure, that of the 
German Confederation (Verein).82 This confederation was designed as an international 
association, led by the Prince. Although it explicitly affirmed regional independence, 
it effectively weakened the political independence of many regions.83 
 Intersecting political and economic changes soon engendered new vigour with 
regard to local identity and romanticising homeliness. At the heart of Biedermeier (1815-
1848) was suspicion and concern over state power, economic strategy, citizenship, and 
the common good.84 The cultural focus on homeliness symbolised the foundation of 
‘permanence and stability’ and protection of one’s proper identity, much to the 
detriment of nationalist visions.85 Grassroots responses galvanised regional historical 
and cultural capital to emphasise regional distinctiveness.86 This regional 
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distinctiveness was multi-layered: historian Siegfried Weichlein argues that some 
states developed a cooperative federalism in affirmation of regional political 
structures, while sub-state regionalism sometimes identified with the supra-regional 
political structure in defence against the regional state.87 The combination of cultural 
distinctiveness and political stratification perpetuated a measure of regional 
autonomy. Political stratification rendered an overarching unity or identity difficult to 
imagine, other than perhaps represented ‘through the person of a prince’.88 The idea 
of a nation remained a notion of ‘abstract’ integration and, although it filled an ‘empty 
space’, it remained a mostly imagined and constructed community.89  
Around the same time, regional princes attempted to exert a greater influence 
on the churches through the regulation of outward matters of religion, such as 
processions, and brought some ecclesiastical functions under the curatorship of the 
regional authorities.90 The Roman Catholic Church declared itself independent from 
the state towards 1848 in order to reaffirm ecclesiastical autonomy and transnational 
unity.91 In 1849, an elitist parliamentary assembly gathered at the Frankfurter 
Paulskirche to discuss constitutionalisation civil rights as well as the abolition of state 
churches.92 Though its proposed constitution failed, some states pursued de-
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establishment independently. This de-establishment was grounded in concepts of 
independence, indifference, equality, impartiality; however, there was not yet any 
concept of neutrality.93 The tension between elite conceptions of the nation and the 
grassroots’ orientation on localism and regionalism were of course prevalent in the 
background. The convention had indeed intended to address ‘the needs of a 
fragmented people’ and desired to unite the nation in response to regionalism, 
localism, and weak moorings of national identity.94  
 A clear understanding of what one German nation would become remained 
absent. Only a strong German consciousness in reaction to the Franco-Prussian war 
(1870-1871) would lay stronger foundations for political unification. Under Otto von 
Bismarck, German states united under King Wilhelm IV as the first ‘German 
Emperor’95 – not the ‘Emperor of Germany’ because of its wider-ranging territorial 
connotations.96 Amidst political and economic unification, as well as a dramatic rise in 
national consciousness, regional distinctiveness critically transformed. Weichlein 
explains that the nation became understood in Old Testament terms, as ‘one people’ 
in ‘many tribes’, while the development of cultural nationhood was particularly 
supported by Protestants.97 The idea of many tribes would enable the inclusion of 
regional identity in a ‘specific German morality’ and consciousness, and reconcile 
regional diversity with national identity: ‘Germanness could encompass their 
 
93 Heinhard Steiger, ‘Neutralität’, in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, & Reinhart Koselleck (eds.) 
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: historisches Lexicon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, Band 4, 
Stuttgart: E. Klett 1978, p. 353. 
94 A.E. Dick Howard, ‘Willi Paul Adams and American constitutionalism’, in Andreas Etges & Ursula 
Lehmkuhl (eds.), Atlantic Passages. Constitution, immigration, Internationalization, Berlin: Lit Verlag 2006, 
p. 45. 
95 Contrasting with aspirations towards a greater unification which would include Austria. 
96 Otto von Bismarck had supported a smaller Germany, to appease Austrian and Southern princes. 
See William Dawson, History of the German Empire 1867-1914, first published in 1919, republished 
Plano: Merkaba Press 2017, p. 355. 




diversity’.98 This did not necessarily include Jewish communities, despite the 
suggestion of a trans-regional Jewish “tribe”.99 The extreme consequence of this 
exclusion is found in Karl Marx’ work ‘On the Jewish Question’, in which he suggests 
that ‘the social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of society from Judaism’.100 
Religious differences remained important and indeed became the focal point of 
contestation in the context of the Kulturkampf of 1871-1878.101 Southern and Catholic 
regionalism remained suspicious of Bismarck’s liberal and Protestant allegiances and 
military strategies. Moreover, Bismarck attempted to incorporate important societal 
functions in the mandate of the state at the cost of the role of religious institutions. Like 
in France and the Netherlands, such policies were important to processes of nation-
building. The civil registration laws conferred the right to the state to register marriage, 
births and deaths, all of which had belonged to regional ecclesiastical bodies before. 
Like in the Netherlands, education regulations established state oversight, sparking 
great controversy, especially since the Christian school had become the medium for 
the transmission of religious identity.102  
It would be a mistake to place the churches simply against the state, since their 
relationship is better described as ambivalent rather than antagonistic. Churches did 
not simply oppose nationalism, and reversely, religious culture became co-constitutive 
to nationhood. Some churches worked pragmatically with nationalist and regionalist 
movements, and functioned between both types of imagined communities without 
principally being embedded in either of them.103 At once, the sectarian social structures 
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remained so important that even Berliner Atheists organised themselves in the Berlin 
Free Religious Congregation.104 However, German society still saw atheists as 
dissidents, and racial others like Jewry and traveller populations remained on the 
margins.105 Yet the Kulturkampf could be seen as a ‘symbolic exclusion of Catholicism 
from the hegemonial version of national culture’.106 Some secular regulations support 
this perspective. Borutta documents a prohibition to preach on political matters in such 
a way that disturbed ‘the public peace’, residency-restrictions to ultra-montane Jesuits 
and a prohibition of the appointment of foreign clergy.107 The state confiscated 
ecclesiastical estates and imprisoned dissenting members of the clergy. This dimension 
of the Kulturkampf appears to be an intensification of anticlerical tensions that existed 
before the Unification as well as beyond the German Empire. One might argue that 
this anticlericalism was reinvigorated through popular religious revival, ecclesiastical 
suspicion, Catholic regionalism, topped with the proclamation of papal infallibility in 
1870.108 
In response, the Catholic church tried to develop as a more homogenous 
minority, perhaps similar to Catholic and Protestant minorities in the Netherlands. 
Churches sought to raise awareness and rally political resistance through investing in 
public visibility, which materialised in ‘processions, pilgrimages, and outdoor 
masses’.109 The state came down on such visible expressions of religion in public space, 
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for these expressions embodied rival narratives of identity associated with 
establishment as well as with the Vatican.110 Interestingly, Catholics in states with 
Catholic neighbours reverted to practices of Auslauf and travelled to worship in the 
church of choice.111 In the heat of the culture war, some liberals in parliament 
considered a potential ‘exclusion of religion from the public space’, coerced if needed, 
in addition to the institutional separation of church and state.112 This, if anything, 
agitated religious consciousness and actually increased religious civic engagement.113 
In the middle of this cultural conflict, religious actors founded the Christian Deutsche 
Zentrumpartei, which represented interests of religious minorities in Parliament and 
which would become quite powerful into the twentieth century.114  
The constitution of Weimar of 1919 conferred independence to the churches in 
internal matters as well as corporate privileges through series of Concordats between 
the länder and the churches.115 The Weimar constitution thus departed from the 
Augburger Herrschaftsrecht; Hans Dreier observes that it also and importantly marks 
the moral independence of political order from the church.116 However, the cultural 
underpinnings of the nation remained culturally Christian in nature both with respect 
to its search for unity and with respect to mechanisms of exclusion. Ambivalently, 
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Christianity theology and culture both provided the foundation for German 
nationhood as well as criticised its secularisation.117 At the same time, German identity 
was multifocally stratified. Certain dimensions of regional identity became more 
nationalised (e.g. music, choirs, theatre) and cultural christianities slowly became 
‘neutral phenomena’.118 Yet regional culture was not fully subsumed in national 
identity; it rather remained co-constitutive to it.  
The secularised nature of cultural Christianity in Germany perhaps created a 
modular homogeneity that reinforced several exclusions along the lines of non-
Christian religion.119 Such exclusions are, of course, not exclusively religious and are 
profoundly interlinked with the racialisation of German nationhood in the early 
twentieth century. The combination of racialisation and sacralisation of German 
nationhood rendered the social margins extremely thin; the focal point of which is the 
jarring trauma of Auschwitz.120 This racialisation was indeed extreme under national-
socialism, however, this racialisation does not fall outside the parameters of the nation 
state as a nexus of territory, people, and teleology. Nandita Sharma rightly 
understands ‘the national form of state power as one that inherently organizes human 
“society” as a racialized community, one in which citizenship operates to create a positively 
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racialized “nation” and a negatively racialized other’.121 The next chapter will pick up on 
this idea of inherent racialization of nationhood. 
Post-war West-Germany is characterised by a rejection of nationalism, critical 
self-reflection, constitutionalism, acceptation of secularity and neutrality of the state, 
as well as cooperation with the churches.122 East-German communism, however, 
regarded Nazism as an aspect of fascism and was less inclined to internalise a sense of 
guilt while the idea of the (secular) German nation remained the reference frame.123 
After the war, the Grundgesetz (GG) for the Bundesrepublik Deutschland opened with the 
recognition of human dignity, Menschenwürde. From thence, this notion of human 
dignity entailed the foundational norm of legal order.124 This idea of human dignity is 
enshrined both as a concept and as a series of civil and political rights and freedoms. 
The constitution also includes both the individual freedom of religion (Articles 4:1, 4:2 
GG) and the freedom of religious communities, Religionsgemeinschaften (Articles 9, 140 
GG).125 This freedom may be further protected through the European Convention of 
Human Rights.126 It is relevant that the constitution regards religious communities as 
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gemeinschaften, which perhaps amounts to an ecclesiastical bias compared to less 
institutionalised religious communities.127  
The Reunification of 1990 marks several important dimensions to the 
relationship between religion, state, and nation. Spohn observes that a greater 
congruence of state and nation evolved after the unification, yet that this process was 
highly complex because of the intersection of intra-German normalisation of the idea 
of the nation with international immigration and European integration.128 Religious 
communities had changed too. Ruff writes that the crumbling of religious communal 
life engendered significant societal effects because of the close relationships to both 
state and society. And reflexively, the further differentiation of political and religious 
life perhaps meant that confessional subcultures had ceased to be coherent religious 
communities.129 Religion nonetheless remained the constant factor in the imagination 
of state, nation, and society, not least because of its reflection in law which privileged 
the participation and visibility of some religious communities over others. 
After the Reunification, the Grundgesetz and constitutionalism formed the 
bedrock of German law. Reflecting on Geertz, Reuter suggests that the law itself could 
be a form of imagining social life.130 Frick even regards constitutionalism as a 
“sacralisation” of the law.131 Tine Stein writes that religion remained a constant factor 
in the constitutional state, for example through its focus on freedom, responsibility, 
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equality and solidarity, human dignity, and the separation of church and state.132 At 
once, the cooperative model of the relationship between church and state carried over 
after the Reunification. Religious freedom remained grounded in a combination of 
individual and institutional freedoms as well as the principles of neutrality and human 
dignity.133 However, the cooperative model is vulnerable to the criticism that it might 
not be sufficiently open to diversity and multiculturality.134 Moreover, as Augsberg 
notes, the bifurcation of individual and institutional freedoms may not be sufficiently 
flexible to account for the complexity identity formation.135 Given the growing role of 
the law in politics of religious diversity, the nature and goal of neutrality must be 
monitored, and as Frick argues, the justification of legal arguments as well as the limits 
of the law need to be precisely described and scrutinised.136 
  
4.3 Pragmatic accommodation: the Netherlands 
Relative pragmatism characterises much of Dutch constitutional arrangements around 
the protection of minorities. Its constitutional outlook is in some ways a hybrid of 
French and German intuitions as it is partly accommodative and segregationist, and 
partly laicised. Dutch constitutional thought has been heavily influenced by German 
and French philosophy, though Dutch constitutional philosophy never developed a 
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fully-fledged or native concept of the separation of church and state on the basis of 
which particular issues could be regulated. Instead, particular arrangements emerged 
from specific historical contingencies. The Netherlands developed as a unitary state 
from its constitution in 1814-1815, appropriating some of the policies regarding unity 
and centralism that Napoleon imposed on the Dutch Kingdom from 1804. It consisted 
of a number of provinces which had historically cooperated while holding on to 
cultural, linguistic, and religious identities, particularly regarding Protestant and 
Catholic affinities. For this reason, from 1814 onwards, the future of the United 
Kingdom of the Netherlands would be shaped by its ability to accommodate a level of 
decentral autonomy and, in particular, its ability to foster a national identity beyond 
religious and other cultural differences.  
 King William I, who reigned from 1813-1840, attempted to overcome sharp 
religious division by encouraging religious moderation, social and economic 
convergence, and political centralisation.137 He employed and supported moderate 
Protestantism to these very ends, while he restricted the freedom of both orthodox 
Protestants and Roman-Catholics. His policies led to the short-lived establishment of 
the Dutch Reformed Church, as well as state departments for Catholic and Reformed 
worship, which could regulate and investigate into ecclesiastical practices.138 He 
prohibited the initiation of new Catholic or confessional Reformed schools, sanctioned 
through criminal law.139 Many in religious leadership feared that education would be 
used towards shaping citizens in support of the state at the expense of confessional 
education, e.g. religious identity. The King also, and particularly, regulated Catholic 
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processions. Soon after his inauguration, he restricted the number of public 
processions to two a year.140 Popular discontent rose and illegal processions were 
organised throughout the country – both Catholic processions and Protestant protest-
processions.141 In 1821, the King prohibited all processions in the province of North-
Brabant, which was predominantly Catholic, and allowed processions to continue in 
other provinces only if these had continually existed throughout the French 
occupation.142 Incongruent with the Dutch reputation of tolerance, these restrictions 
existed until 1983. 
The King’s religious and national politics disquieted both Catholic and 
orthodox Reformed communities in the Netherlands. These large and distinct 
communities, though theoretically having a similar interest in religious freedom, 
lacked political clout as a result of limited suffrage as well as profound mutual 
mistrust. The southern, predominantly Catholic, provinces revolted and founded the 
Kingdom of Belgium in 1830. This secession was largely popularly led, especially as 
Catholic leadership had not intended a violent revolt.143 King William I sent his army 
in vain and soon the secession was a fact. According to Knippenberg and De Pater, this 
implied that the Northern Netherlands needed to readjust and limit its ideas about the 
nation to a smaller contingent of people and territory.144 In 1834, a major schism also 
occurred within the Dutch Reformed church, emerging from conservative discontent. 
The King prohibited worship other than in small groups (up to twenty) and enforced 
this restriction through criminal law and other repressive measures, such as 
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billeting.145 In response, some groups met in attics and farmhouses in the countryside; 
these practices are strange reminders of practices of dissent worship from the early 
modern period, such as Auslauf and dissimulation of places of worship.146 
 A major constitutional change was initiated by liberal parliamentarians in 1848. 
Its intention was to loosen the relationship between the state and religion and, 
consistent with this vision, it facilitated a greater measure of religious freedom. This 
freedom of religion was based on a fuller separation of church and state, which went 
further than the separation of church and state in France around the same time.147 This 
constitutional move provided Catholic communities within the Netherlands, as well 
as orthodox reformed communities, the freedom to organise themselves and found 
new educational institutions, albeit entirely at their own expense. Roman-Catholics 
and Jews thus gained unprecedented freedom in the Netherlands compared with other 
countries.148 This freedom perhaps perpetuated the religious segregations of the time, 
yet it also marked the beginning of explicit, organised, and mass supported civil 
engagement of these communities through the establishment of schools, newspapers, 
associations, and charities. 
Expressions of these differences outside church buildings were still regulated 
and the 1848 Constitution explicitly restricted processions in the Netherlands, 
obviously targeting Catholic processions. It enshrined an ambivalent attitude towards 
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public worship, perhaps similar to the one the French Ministry of the Interior adopted 
in the 1880’s.149 It permitted public worship within ‘buildings and closed places’, but 
encapsulated the possibility of regulation in the interest of ‘public order and peace’. It 
also permitted public worship outside those buildings and closed places, but only if 
these entailed historically standing practices. All other acts of public worship 
remained outlawed. Clark argues that this prohibition was inspired by Protestant anti-
Catholicism rather than by secular voices.150 However, given that Parliament was 
liberal in majority, this could have been inspired by a concern over public order as well 
as general suspicion of Catholic loyalties. Yet Dutch national identity and 
consciousness was shaped by explicit and deeply rooted anti-Catholic sentiments, 
which rendered the reconciliation of Catholic and national identity complex matter 
throughout the nineteenth century.151 
Another consequence of the freedom to organise religious communities freely 
was the papal reinstitution of ecclesiastical hierarchy in 1853, somewhat anticipated 
by a 1827 Concordat between the Dutch King William I and the Pope.152 Strong anti-
Catholic sentiments invigorated mass protests on behalf of orthodox Protestants, or 
the April-movement.153 The Catholic minority lived predominantly in the southern 
parts of the Netherlands. Therefore, this anxiety and mistrust over Catholic intentions 
appears a matter of what one imagines the nation to be. Although orthodox Protestants 
also formed a minority, their ideas about Protestant nationalism and the imagination 
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of the state as historically and teleologically Protestant were quite strong. So strong, in 
fact, that many of them protested against state-facilitated Catholic emancipation. This 
might explain why these protests are sometimes understood as an expression of 
discontent with liberal political domination, who, as an imagined ‘they’, had enabled 
this “ultramontane” institution.154 
The fostering of a shared national identity remained a sensitive matter 
throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. Social and political divisions 
became deeper because of the explosive growth of religious and rising socialist mass 
movements. Social segregation and distrust characterised divisions at the grassroots 
level, feeding into a climate of polarisation. On an individual level, however, such 
divisions were not as clear cut; for example, some Christians leaned towards liberal or 
socialist circles, sometimes at the expense of their reputation in Christian circles, and 
vice versa. Thus the Netherlands was all but a cultural unity and, while a middle-class 
gained suffrage, lack of consensus threatened effective political decision-making. Most 
famous debates arose over the place of religion in schools, particularly as these spaces 
represented much that a country could hope to be in the future: liberals saw education 
as a vehicle to mitigate the sharp (religious) divisions, while religious communities 
generally regarded education as the vehicle to protect, transmit and strengthen 
communal identity. 155 
Under the leadership of the protestant pastor and politician Abraham Kuyper, 
poor, Protestant, and largely disenfranchised masses became involved in political 
decision-making through protests and mass petitions. While building civil institutions 
to represent the reformed community as a minority-community, Kuyper firmly 
rejected the imagination of a Protestant or even Christian nation, thus explicitly letting 
 
154 Buwalda, ‘Voor godsdienst, vaderland en Oranje: het verzet van Utrechtse protestanten tegen de 
liberale staatsinrichting en het herstel van de bisschoppelijke hiërarchie (1840-1853)’, p. 104. 
155 Ph.J. Idenburg, Schets van het Nederlandse schoolwezen, Groningen: Wolters 1960, p. 79; A.B. Lam, 
Openbaar of bijzonder onderwijs? De visie van mr. J.J.L. van der Brugghen op het school-vraagstuk in Nederland, 




go of the ideal of teleological unity.156 The Catholic priest and politician Herman 
Schaepman (1844-1903) tried to foster a similar sense of Catholic consciousness by 
establishing a political party similarly to Kuyper; he too harboured little aspiration to 
shaping a Catholic national identity.157 Pilgrimages and processions gradually revived 
in the 1870’s and explicit connections were made with Dutch saints and religiously 
significant places in order to underline a Catholic as well as Dutch identity.158 Raedts 
argues that some of these were intended symbolically, especially since some of the 
processions were performed in silence so as to not disturb others.159 Catholic civil 
society would develop strongly in the early twentieth century and it successfully 
pursued political ambitions beyond just protecting Catholic identity, actually very 
similarly to Catholics in Germany.160 
This sustained political vacuum would eventually lead to mutual constitutional 
recognition, following from the 1917 Pacification agreement. A constitutional 
amendment (Article 23) then entitled all schools to equal funding and ordered the state 
to provide for public education on the basis of subsidiarity. This included Roman-
Catholic and Jewish schools and later included Islamic and other types of schools as 
well. This constitutional change was highly symbolic: it was a legal recognition of 
wider social, political, and economic religious divisions along lines of religious and 
ideological identity.161 But as much as it affirmed division, it also facilitated civil 
institutionalisation of division, known as “pillarization”. This division went beyond 
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religious organisations and institutions of civil society. On a popular level, this was 
reflected in the choice of business partners, relatively low levels of intermarriage, and 
the division of political and social associations. It amounted to a compartmentalisation 
of public space, while the bandwidth of unity was moderated by the reality of 
difference. 
The Netherlands thus developed an idiosyncratic practice of accommodation 
within the narrative of the separation of church and state or neutrality of the state as 
the state was mandated to treat religious and non-religious communities and 
institutions equally. The result is a somewhat modified separation of state and church 
compared to the 1848 constitution; a modification that seems somewhat akin to the 
German principle of accommodation. As the constitutional perspective on the 
separation of church and state changed, the function of the civil realm was changing 
as well. The intention of liberals was to encourage the development of a more 
homogenous civil realm, based on constitutional values rather than ideological and 
religious differentiation. This type of unity was never really achieved and it appears 
that the function of the civil realm became another force that challenged governmental 
identity politics. At the same time, however, civil society became the focus of civic 
engagement, relatively strengthening the democratic capital. 
Throughout the twentieth century, religious freedom and neutrality became 
gradually associated. These two conceptual heritages came from Germany and France, 
respectively, and their association would have looked unlikely in the early stages of 
the Dutch nation state. Neutrality tends to be based on Article 1 of the Dutch 
Constitution, which entails a right to equal treatment and prohibits unjustified 
discrimination on a set of specific grounds, including religion.162 Though this phrasing 
 
162 Article 1 of the Dutch Constitution: ‘Allen die zich in Nederland bevinden hebben in gelijke 
gevallen gelijk behandeld. Discriminatie wegens godsdienst, levensovertuiging, politieke gezindheid, 
ras, geslacht of op welke grond dan ook, is niet toegestaan.’, 




might occur alike in French and German constitutional documents, the context and 
content of the list of human rights reflects historically relevant concerns. Religious 
freedom is by no means absolute and it can be limited on the basis of interests of health, 
traffic, and the prevention and neutralisation of public disorder. However, the rights 
and freedoms catalogue is understood both qualify the relationship between state and 
individuals, primarily, and, to some extent, between citizens.163  
  Religious freedom moved between the ends of the spectrum, ranging from 
serious restriction and intolerance to unprecedented freedom and even financial 
support. It appears that the focus on human rights and equality has eventually led to 
a type of accommodation in which minorities receive their share of public funding – 
which moreover is often perceived as a normative right. This inclusivity has led to high 
degrees of visibility of religious and ideological difference in the public domain 
through civil and political representation. This implies an approach to religious 
minorities that is relatively accommodating, while hands-off with regard to content. It 
limits the constitutional warrant for the state to legitimately intervene in a reality of 
social divisions, particularly as its tools for intervention are attached to explicit conflict 
in public spaces, such as concerns of public order or the protection of the rights of 
others. 
Compared to the negotiation of regional diversity in Germany, the long 
persisting smaller scale diversity in the Netherlands probed a necessity to incorporate 
a variety of others in the public domain. However, the extreme parity epitomised in 
pillarization might be stronger than the parity Kaplan analysed in the context of early 
modern toleration. To Kaplan, parity was an advanced mode of coexistence within the 
early modern context. One could look at Dutch pillarization in different ways. On the 
one hand, extreme pillarization might show a failure to develop a sense of community 
and social coherence. On the other hand, pillarization could be seen as a mode of 
peaceful coexistence, the basis of a culture oriented towards compromise, and 
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developing a relatively accommodative variation of the separation of church and state. 
Everyone had to tolerate a range of others and concede on the matter of funding, even 
if begrudgingly. That is, almost everyone: as in Germany, Jews and Catholics needed 
to prove they belonged and, outside the European mainland (e.g. the Dutch population 




In each of the three countries that are discussed, the transition from toleration-based 
coexistence to rights-based coexistence was intertwined with social and political 
change, e.g. constitutionalisation, the development of national identity, and the 
articulation of national interests. However, the nation state rested on the political 
imaginary of the corpus christianum insofar as it re-enacted a unity of territory, people, 
and common destiny. The national scale of the political community changed dynamics 
of inclusion and exclusion on a regional and local level, however, in its reliance on the 
idea of the nation, it created new categories of inclusion and exclusion. National 
exclusivism touched upon origin (territory), race (people), or religiosity (teleology) 
and thus created a continuum of othering that rendered religious as well as racial 
minorities vulnerable, albeit for slightly different reasons. Religious communities were 
not unequivocally optimistic about nationhood, even as many communities adapted 
themselves to changing social realities. Controversy about the compatibility of 
religious identity and national identity thus engendered intra-national othering, as 
liberal elites tended to understand religiously conservative challenges as a threat to 
the project of the nation.  
During these controversies, sensibilities of toleration resurfaced and even 
transformed in the context of emerging constitutionalism. Crucially, many 
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controversies over intra-national difference concerned their manifestation and 
visibility in public space, as they had done in the context of toleration. Restrictions on 
Catholic processions are quite symbolic of this anxiety over the use of public space as 
well as the character of the nation. It is telling that communities in Germany and the 
Netherlands reverted to Auslauf and other early modern practices of dissimulation. 
The contestation of public space necessarily becomes the contestation of national 
identity, and vice versa, and this obstructs the development of inclusive 
understandings of diversity. Moreover, the attachment of public space to national 
identity is perhaps implied in the unitarian character of the nation state, yet is 
assumed, and one that makes the nation state receptive to sensibilities of toleration.  
At once, controversy over the meaning of public space and national identity indicates 
that neither the meaning of public space nor the notion of national identity were on a 
pre-determined trajectory. Mediated through these controversies, common frames of 
reference to toleration transformed in the context of emerging constitutionalism. 
Notions of public order, unity, and loyalty gained particular traction, even if the 
expressions thereof differed between France, Germany, and the Netherlands. 
Historical experiences, often contingencies, shaped the transformation of common 
frames of reference to toleration in constitutionalism, and created a lingering legacy of 




5. Lingering legacies of toleration in the nation state: 
integration, secularisation, and privatisation of religion 
 
Legacies of toleration thrive in contemporary scholarly discourses about integration, 
secularisation, and privatisation of religion. This chapter analyses these discourses 
through the lens of the common frames of reference to toleration, and in particular 
from the perspective of oneness and unity. The political imaginary of the nation 
implied racism as well as religious intolerance and mediated its limits in public space. 
Constitutionalisation of the new political order arguably redirected the meaning of 
oneness and unity in the modern state. This is sometimes referred to in the conceptual 
distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft: a political community is no longer 
primarily oriented at its oneness despite its differentiations, but is able to negotiate the 
character of its oneness on the basis of its inner differentiations.1 However, 
constitutionalisation also transformed and exacerbated social tensions about identity 
and difference. As Hafez puts it, the new political order was based on a series of 
normative presumptions which hinder the acceptance of multiculturality and 
diversity.2 Walter puts it in the words of unity and diversity with the following 
conundrum: How much cultural divergence might a democratic constitutional state 
tolerate, and how much convergence should it demand?3 Forst reiterates the question 
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more normatively: Which normative content is necessary for the society to be a unity, 
and which differences should be recognised for this unity to be justified?4 
This chapter argues that the connection between national identity (oneness) and 
the nature of public space (unity) still burdens discourses over identity and belonging. 
First, the notion of the oneness of the nation charges discourses over immigration, 
integration, and social norms. Second, this connection between oneness and unity 
hinders the accommodation of diversity in public space.5 This connection inhabits a 
potential to intolerance, and, suggests that processes of cultural formation can be self-
contained. Through structural as well as incidental exclusions from public space, for 
example because of a normative privatisation of religion or because of voluntary 
dissimulation, religious minorities cannot fully participate in processes of cultural 
formation. Furthermore, the racialisation of national identity implies that neither 
integration nor outward conformity actually address the nature of belonging. Thus, 
the disintegration of post-modern societies under the influences of secularisation, 
immigration, and privatisation, raises questions about the relationship between 
national identity and public space, as well as about the structural inequalities that arise 
from it.  
 
5.1 Oneness and otherness: re-enacting a nexus of territory, people, and teleology 
The modern state re-enacts the nexus of territory, people, and teleology in its 
integration of state, nation, and cultural formation. It is this ‘closely knit unity’ of 
‘politics, law, and society’, that today allegedly raise questions about the compatibility 
of Islam with the democratic state.6 The previous chapter discussed similar contentions 
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over the compatibility of Catholicism and Protestantism with the project of the modern 
state. It is only in the course of the nineteenth-century that state and nation associated 
as a result of the ‘mutual permeation of state and society’.7 However, this development 
is not only contingent on processes in the nineteenth century. This chapter argues that 
this mutual permeation is inherent to the genealogy of the modern state, in particular 
its kinship to the corpus christianum.8 This corpus provided a sense of identity which 
provided legitimacy to the conditioning of the presence of others on the basis of 
relative outward conformity, loyalty, truth, public order, and the more mundane 
concern of economic benefit. The Westphalian treaties provided an early imaginary of 
the modern state.9 However, the treaties also presumed political communities to 
operate as ‘one body’ (unum corpus). 
The modern state is, however, not a mere continuation nor an inevitable 
successor of this corpus; instead, the modern state offered a unique opportunity to 
overcome the binaries of dominance and marginalisation on religious grounds. 
Indeed, as Gianfranco Poggi analyses, constitutionalisation became part of a longer 
process of unravelling common identity from religious dominance.10 Nonetheless, the 
integration of state, nation, and cultural formation entangles the nation state in a 
political imaginary of oneness that echoes the imaginary of the corpus christianum.11 Or, 
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as the French constitution puts this oneness: ‘indivisible, laïque, démocratique et 
sociale’.12 Not only does the state therein assume a sense of oneness akin to the 
foundation of the corpus christianum, but it must also substantiate this new imaginary 
of belonging over and against the religious, social, and political fragmentation that it 
inherited from the old world. The legal notion of the nation emerged in this context 
and had the exceptional capacity to transcend religious and regional identities.  
Membership in the nation in the modern state is primarily determined by birth, 
and may depend on genealogy or place of birth (ius sanguinis and ius soli), as well as 
residency and matrimonial status.13 Although naturalisation amounts to “adoption” 
into the natural body of citizens, the understanding of this body of citizens is not 
exclusively racial.14 It appears that the ius soli gained priority over the ius sanguinis. 
Contemporary terminology of “autochthonous” and “allochthonous” continue to 
signify the biological and territorial difference, meaning “native to the land” and 
“other to the land”. As Patrick Weil shows convincingly, naturalisation in the modern 
state functioned as a ‘legal technique’ to confer rights to certain migrants and to 
exclude undesired migrants.15 He also demonstrates that neither Germany nor France 
can be stereotyped along the principles of the ius sanguinis or the ius soli, with the 
exception of the racialised laws of naturalisation in Nazi-Germany and Vichy-France.16  
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In contrast with Weil, Adrian Hastings argues that the Christian world derived 
its ideas about nationhood and the status of nations from biblical imaginaries as early 
as in the post-medieval world, particularly in reference to the Old Testament.17 He 
defines the nation as an ethnic community with a dynamic yet strong self-
consciousness around a shared culture and liturgical language.18 Indeed, this 
relationship between ethnic understandings of the nation and cultural liturgy is found 
in the work of Samuel Salzborn.19 This liturgical language also finds a new expression 
today, both in reference to the nation and in reference to the position of churches in 
the nation; for example in the Cultural liturgies trilogy by James K.A. Smith. Examples 
of this could be the national anthem, a flag, a national sports team, fortified by a 
cultural reverence for these symbols that express loyalty and emotional attachment to 
the nation.20 Hastings’ argument entails a connection between nation and shared 
values and it is a powerful argument insofar as there is an expectation that one would 
marry within the group, which is something that Kaplan also alluded to (Chapter 
Two).21  
A combination of Weil’s and Hasting’s understanding of nationhood provides 
an interesting angle to the relationship between the nation state and the corpus 
christianum. Marriage and reproduction may thus reinforce conceptions about 
belonging based on a combination of place, genealogy, and culture. If shared culture 
and birth indeed align in the notion of the nation which otherwise prospered from the 
nineteenth century onwards, it cuts right into present day conversations about 
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immigration and integration. Importantly, it indicates that there are several different 
types of othering possible within the concept of the nation state. For the nation state 
provides the political mechanism for inclusion and exclusion on account of 
immigration, genealogy, race, religion, social norms, cultural values, or any 
combination of these. For example, it frames the assumption that the foreigner would 
need to assimilate in order to belong, and also that certain foreigners need to work 
harder than others to satisfy the demands of integration. Perhaps for some it is nearly 
impossible, for example where it is said that a woman who wears a hijab cannot be 
German.22 However, this connection of territory, people, and teleology also has a 
capacity to turn inward, towards “others” within the nation. 
The previous chapter already discussed the fact that nineteenth-century nation 
building involved a measure of centralisation as well as the encouragement of cultural 
convergence and diminishing of the political significance of particular religious 
identities. The developing permeation of state and society thus laid the foundation for 
the junction of state and nation. This means that the state may struggle to accept the 
idea that certain citizens might prioritise their religious teleological claims. In the 
middle of the Dutch culture wars, Dutch Prime Minister Jan Kappeyne van de Copello 
(1877-1879) compared conservative Christian minorities with a ‘fly that spoils the 
whole ointment’, saying they had ‘no right of existence in this society’.23 It stood in 
stark contrast with the maxim of his opponent Abraham Kuyper: ‘there is not a square 
inch in the whole domain of human existence over which Christ, who is Sovereign of 
all, does not cry, Mine’.24 Related to this are the territorial claims of Catholic, Lutheran, 
and Reformed churches, expressed in the parish system and the ‘physical frames of 
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reference that church buildings provide.25 Luttikhuis notes that the perpetuation of the 
parish system in Protestant circles emerged from a failure to reimagine the meaning of 
territoriality to the church during the Reformation.26 This is a quite relevant detail as 
the churches maintained rivalling nexuses of territory, people, and teleology – in some 
places epitomised in aspirations for the whole nation to be Christian.27  
More importantly, not all instances of othering are the same and demands of 
assimilation do change over time. The plight of Judaism makes this dismally clear: 
cultural conformity and outward conversion to Christianity would not necessarily 
lead to acceptance in the nineteenth century. Under national-socialist influence, the 
Nazi regime actually denaturalised Jewish citizens without any regard to cultural 
conformity. But national-socialism was not exceptional about the racialisation of 
nationhood; for racism and religious intolerance are entwined with the concept of the 
nation. Cycles of anti-Semitism reappeared after WWII and continuing (legal) 
pressures on certain practices, like Sjechita and circumcision, as well as popular 
intolerance to orthodox Jewish communities, shows that the othering of Jewish 
identities may be a structural part of the political imaginary of the nation state. This is 
quite different from othering of Catholics, for example, whose belonging could be 
engineered by expressions of allegiance to the state, introduction of national aspects to 
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their spirituality, and limitation of public visibility.28 As it were, anti-Catholic othering 
did not concern unalterable characteristics.  
Islamophobic othering, which appears most vigorously but not exclusively on 
the political ‘right’, is yet different from the othering of Christianity and Judaism. 
Strømmen and Schmiedel argue that Muslim citizens are often assumed to have been 
born elsewhere, to belong to another nation, and to be culturally or religiously 
different.29 They understand Islamophobia as ‘new racism’, even as this 
‘essentialization of the other’ might happen along the lines of religion as well as race.30 
However, racial or religious dimensions are not interchangeable on the continuum of 
othering that the political imaginary of the nation embodies. Islamophobia indicates 
an othering towards all the constitutive elements of the nation state: territory, people, 
as well as teleology. Moreover, Islam is made out to be ‘opposed to Christianity’, as 
well as loaded with suspicion about political allegiance, insurmountable cultural 
differences, and foreignness.31 This presumed opposition implies a gradually different 
type of othering compared to anti-Semitism, based on this presumed antagonism to 
Christianity.  
Of course neither Islam, Judaism, nor Christianity function as closely knit 
communities within the nation, particularly since these communities are highly 
diverse themselves. However, the law sometimes forces religious communities in a 
paradigm of internal unity, for example through the designation of 
Religionsgemeinschaften or Kerkgenootschappen. Whereas this might have been true for 
many churches about a century ago, today, identity formation is more stratified and 
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complex. Religious identity could be seen as a network of dispositions, mediated 
through both individual and collective aspects to identity formation, but not 
necessarily tied to identifiable groups.32 This is of course akin to Geertz’s and 
Foroutan’s understanding of cultural hybridity, in which local and transnational 
cultures have an impact on the national identity, an identity which is in fact bound to 
a certain territory and people.33 This means that it is difficult to concretise a coherent 
understanding of culture.34 Käßmann rightly raises the issue that societies need to find 
a balance between identities, without dividing society between a Leitkultur and its 
others, facilitating mere multiculturality, or indeed creating the existence of parallel 
societies.35 Moreover, an overemphasis on normative othering in processes of identity 
formation shapes identity primarily negatively.36  
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5.2 Oneness and unity 
Given the stratification of individual and collective identities, the question arises how 
ideas regarding the oneness of the nation relate to the outward expression thereof in 
public space? How are potentially incompatible dimensions of othered identity 
accommodated in public space; or, how much conformity is demanded from religious 
and other minorities? Public space matters to the formation of social identity, since this 
is the space in which many identities meet, interact, and clash. The structures of public 
space play a tremendous role in the process of socialisation or, as Pierre Bourdieu calls 
it, a social “habitus”, or the embodiment of social identity.37 Though communication 
of difference may potentially be very broad, in the context of this dissertation unity 
concerns those religious behaviours and expressions that are in direct dialogue with 
oneness, including symbols, actions, speech, and sound.38 And their inclusion or 
exclusion in public space condition their participation in the formation of the common 
“habitus”. Reinhold Niebuhr argues that unity is not only functionally maintained but 
also ‘created by the ability of a dominant group to impose its will’.39 The distinction 
between oneness and unity is not simply semantic and, its conflation can in fact have 
disastrous consequences for minorities.  
This conformity may not encompass every visibility of religion. Expressions 
with political connotations or expressing rivalling claims of identity receive most 
political attention, as discussed in chapter four and chapter seven. Designation as 
“political” was at the heart of burkini bans in France in 2016, as mayors framed 
burkinis as symbols of terrorism, misogyny, and deviancy from French republican 
values. French and Dutch lawmakers made similar comments about the full face veil, 
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as an expression of the rejection of culture and a decision to not belong. Germany also 
issued a limited full face ban, but only for state officials on the ground of open 
communication, as elaborated upon in chapter seven. However, states makes different 
choices about religious symbols in public spaces; for example, Scotland and Canada 
have introduced a formal optional hijab for police uniforms in order to increase the 
level of representation, whilst such an addition to the uniform remains out of question 
in France and the Netherlands.40 The question is, therefore: who has the right to 
determine which symbols carry which political connotations, what their weight is, and 
what the right kind of unity entails? 
 Unity in public space is not only functionally attached to national identity, it is 
also not a mere expression of this identity; it actively reinforces processes of cultural 
transcendences that shape this identity.41 The significance of this transcendence 
historically derives from the old unitas christiana in which unity and oneness were 
grounded in the transcendental unity of God.42 Unity is about more than optics of 
difference, because this unity concerns that which the optics allude to, namely a reality 
of teleological differentiation. Oneness and unity are in constant dialogue. For 
example, positive and negative dimensions to unity negotiate a bandwidth of diversity 
within dynamic narratives of oneness. Unity is more than a set of positive affirmations, 
it also needs a negative dimension; for example, excluding certain types of otherness 
in affirmation and defence of narratives of oneness. One could argue that negative 
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unity could be seen as incorporation by marginalisation, as Bejczy observed in the 
context of toleration. However, the difference is that nation states could not 
legitimately expel their own citizens and thus needed to balance tensions between 
different religious communities within their space and territory. Nonetheless several 
countries did employ persecution, pogroms, as well as economic measures to 
undermine the presence of minorities, most dramatically in Nazi-Germany as well as 
Nazi-collaborators in France and the Netherlands in the period 1940-1945. 
 Historically, states have commonly determined the bandwidth of outward 
unity, including action or inaction, speech or silence, the manifestation or 
dissimulation of othered identity. Explicit as well as implicit incentives to behavioural 
conformity presented by the state may provoke a sense of inequality or even second 
class citizenship. Several scholars are worried about the conformity that liberal or 
secular societies demand from their religious minorities: Shachar, Nussbaum, and 
Shakman Hurd warn against the universalising tendencies of secular liberalism and 
criticise its demand of unilateral assimilation of “newcomers”.43 Khomyakov openly 
accuses traditional liberal toleration of silencing difference, ‘making it invisible (…) to 
the exclusion of minority groups from larger society’.44 He reconsiders the ideal of 
equal access and representation in public space as he argues that ‘silencing and 
privatisation of the different is not justifiable anymore’.45 Though visibility of religious 
minorities is much at the heart of diversity debates, I disagree with Khomyakov’s on 
the characterisation of liberalism. Rather, it is inherited from Christianity and roots in 
narratives of being the one body of Christ. 
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The problematic nature of the connection of national identity and public space 
underlines Tariq Modood’s suggestion that a moderation of secularism might take 
some pressure off minorities.46 Similarly, John Inazu argues that recognition of ‘deep 
differences’ must lead to ‘modest unity’.47 However, the question is: what forms the 
basis of unity, even when its remit was more modest? One of the crucial questions is 
whether unity moderates differences because of discomfort with the public expression 
of otherness or because of tangible effects in society that require regulation? The 
requirement of rational decision-making accompanies the very notion of the 
constitution, since the constitution protects citizens, including religious minorities, 
from arbitrary interference. The law only allows particular interventions on the basis 
of a carefully described set of criteria, such as public order, public health, and security. 
Even when these criteria are fulfilled, an intervention must be in accordance with 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. The next chapter elaborates upon the 
tension between arguments pertaining to social norms and rational conceptualisations 
of public order. 
5.3 Publicness, public space, and liberal secularism 
The idea that a common identity is foundational to political unity perhaps grounds in 
this conceptual integration of state, nation, and cultural formation.48 Exclusive 
perspectives on public-private divides have historically sustained marginalisation of 
minorities. I would be inclined to go one step further. Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe 
characterises the public-private distinction as a Renaissance reconceptualization of 
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society.49 Toleration ordered the inclusion and exclusion of those who did not belong 
to the official church, thus privileging the official church, or what would now perhaps 
be called a Leitkultur. This means that public-private divides are not only imbued with 
the problem of marginalisation of minorities, but equally with the dominant 
representation of the official church. Scholars like Salvatore notice a similar issue today 
around the connection between secularity and public space; this connection is rightly 
questioned where it again facilitates the exclusion of minorities.50  
Thomas Luckmann’s understanding of secularisation as a process of 
particularisation and privatisation might suggest a regression of religious freedom: 
after all, religious minorities end up in carefully curated private spaces.51 When public 
space is regarded as a space of free expression and mediation of normative action, 
Quéré and Taylor rightly anticipate that minorities may simply lose a measure of their 
standing to the shadow of privatisation.52 They are also relatively excluded from 
cultural capital, contribution to a shared identity, and the common good. Catarina 
Kinnvall writes that such othering is relatively more likely to occur when a society 
goes through significant, perhaps even ‘traumatic’ change. Othering – even the 
demonization of the other – becomes part of ‘collective identity formation’.53 Many 
minorities have fallen victim to this negative identity formation, including Jews, 
Muslims, other religious minorities, people of colour, women, sexual minorities.54 Thus 
 
49 Lucian Hölscher, ‘Öffentlichkeit’, Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, Band 4, pp. 413-467, p. 427. 
50 Armando Salvatore, The Public Sphere. Liberal Modernity, Catholicism, Islam, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan 2007, pp. 256-258. 
51 David Novak, In defense of religious liberty, Wilmington: Intercollegiate studies institute 2009, p. 6; 
Thomas Luckmann, The Invisible Religion: the problem of religion in modern society, New York: Macmillan 
1967.  
52 Louis Quéré, ‘l’Espace public: de la théorie politique à la métathéorie sociologique’, (1992), Quaderni, 
Vol. 18, pp. 75-92, p. 77. 
53 Catarina Kinnvall,  Globalisation and religious nationalism: self, identity, and the search for 
ontological security’, (2004), Political Psychology, Vol 25, No. 5, pp. 741-767, pp. 753-754. 




privatisation of otherness hinders cultural participation and diminishes the potential 
to inform cultural transcendences. Moreover, the emancipation of the othered was 
always marked by public recognition and visibility in public space. Hence, the 
contestation of the visibility of Islam today, which Hallaq understands as a negotiation 
of Islamic identity in society, is by no means new.55 
Nonetheless, not every instance of privatisation is by equally problematic. 
Casanova views privatisation as an expression of secularisation and argues that 
privatisation becomes problematic once it becomes normative.56 Louis Quéré and 
Erving Goffman observe that copresence (la coprésence corporelle) does not guarantee 
genuine interaction but could equally contribute to a process of mutual estrangement 
(estrangement réciproque).57 They refer to physical presence of different identities in a 
shared space at the same time, embodied through either humans or the symbols, 
sounds, and conversations that express distinct identities. Copresence could occur in 
many different private and public spaces, but they have in mind the presence of 
different identities in public space. Estrangement might further be unidirectional. 
Perhaps genuine interaction and estrangement are not mutually exclusive. It is, 
however, plausible that encounters in public space could potentially be more difficult 
the more significant or incompatible those differences are perceived to be. Yet several 
matters convolute: the ability of a society to handle diversity, the ability of individuals 
to cope with others that allegedly behave morally objectionably, the inclusion of 
minorities in normative action, the legitimacy of dissimulation, and the mediation of 
difference in public space after a period of dissimulation. 
 A different lens to Luckmann’s secularisation as privatisation and Casanova’s 
privatisation as secularisation is privatisation as differentiation. First introduced by 
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Karl Marx, this is an important observation from the perspective of toleration: 
exclusion from shared space of non-Catholic dissent emerged from Catholic cultural 
hegemony.58 In the early modern context, toleration in private could only be an 
instance of secularisation insofar as the home was considered to be part of the corpus 
christianum. This means that privatisation had a double-facing character; perhaps, 
depending on its context, privatisation meant both secularisation and (private) 
differentiation. Interestingly, several Protestant traditions developed varying degrees 
of investment in cultural formation and governmental endorsement. Some minorities, 
like Anabaptists and Socinians developed little interest in cultural or indeed political 
influence. Yet it is not easy to discern a general principle: Protestants that gained 
cultural or political dominance or relied on the notion of the corpus christianum have 
tended to lean towards a positive obligation on behalf of the state. This is reflected in 
confessional documents, which may understand the state as a potential threat to the 
church, or indeed as its helper and defender.59  
 Thus, secularisation and privatisation need contextualisation. It appears 
plausible that, to some extent, secularisation is a taking of ‘possession of that which 
had been associated with the ecclesiastical’, as Shakman Hurd says.60 This is true when 
it comes to particular societal functions that have historically been carried out by 
churches, such as rites of passage, education, and charity work. In reality, the picture 
is more complicated than that, for a host of minority churches and groups have never 
possessed such societal functions. The matter is thus not one of secularisation from 
religion in general, but secularisation from a particular ecclesiastical community that 
historically dominated culture in general. Historically, secularisation as a derivative of 
‘saeculum’ has emerged from the perspective of the religious, and in distinction from 
eternal concerns. Yet, post-Christendom secularisation appeared within a framework 
that still assumed Christian culture and morality (chapter three), in which framework 
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secularisation accommodated differentiation. However, societies and their normative 
constituencies have fundamentally changed: the profound normative fragmentation, 
de-confessionalisation, and comparatively lesser social importance of ecclesiastical 
institutions imply that secularisation and privatisation may not naturally coincide 
today.  
 Hurd’s observation that ‘secularism arrogates itself the right to define the role 
of religion in politics’ may not account for post-Westphalian practices where states 
already dictated the meaning of religion in public space.61 However, her criticism that 
secularism ‘operates unaware of the contingency of its assumptions and the 
consequences of its universalising tendencies’ entails a crucial observation. Chapter 
Four discussed how nineteenth century liberal constitutionalism mirrored several 
features of toleration, including a sense of the need for cultural convergence, moral 
supremacy, a universalist outlook, and restrictions of religious rivalry in public space. 
Under different cultural circumstances, secularisation and privatisation of religions 
may not have an identical meaning in comparison with the collapse of the corpus 
christianum. Within liberal constitutionalism, a process of secularisation could 
potentially mean the reverse: making space again for religious communities. In a post-
Christendom context, containing religious diversity in private may at best perpetuate 
an outward appearance of cultural secularity. Reversely, it may deepen divisions, if 
not polarisation. The question is how societies might find a balance between these 
diversities while simultaneously containing potential conflicts.  
Secularisation certainly has a different ring today. The question is whether 
individuals actually recognise religious symbolism in physical and mental spaces: 
several scholars argue that this recognition depends on self-relevance.62 Others argue 
that symbols are learned and transmitted culturally, but that their influence depends 
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individual validation.63 Doria Pezzoli-Olgiati argues that religious symbolism is 
culturally ubiquitous, but that reception of religious symbolism is dependent on a 
person and a specific recognition of a symbol as religious. As a result, meaning-making 
becomes a matter of multiplicity.64 Max Weisbuch-Remington (et al) argue that 
‘religious symbols can have a substantial and nonconscious influence on coping 
processes’ with regards to motivational performance. They indicated a difference 
between those who were and were not religious themselves.65 Similarly, Michal 
Bilewicz and Jaroslaw Klebaniuk argue that the meaning of symbols largely depend 
on self-relevance.66 The idea that meaning-making is stratified and relies on self-
relevance is helpful: the ways in which people perceive the nature of national culture 
and the meaning of religion in public space are incredibly complex and diverse.  
5.4 Complex public space and integrity of spaces and personae 
Questions about outward unity assume the possibility and acceptance of a separation 
between what one believes and what one does, as well a separation of spaces in which 
one ought to conform and where not. In other words: discourses on outward unity are 
imbued with dichotomisations of space and personae. These dichotomisations can be 
traced back to early modern discourses on diversity. We have seen in chapter two that 
some mode of dichotomisation existed within the notion of the corpus christianum, 
allowing a bandwidth of beliefs and practices within the narrative of the one body of 
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Christ.67 Chapters Two and Three have shown that toleration treaties, as well as early 
modern philosophy, addressed public-private distinctions. I argue this distinction was 
by no means new, but within the context of the corpus christianum, developed a specific 
meaning: the individual could not find salvation outside this body of Christ. 
Relegation of difference to private space as well as dissimulation only foreshadowed 
the imminent judgment and protected the integrity of the one body. In fashion, many 
early modern philosophers upheld a broad conception of the non-private, or common 
space. Today, one would say they held a broad conception of publicness.  
 This conception of publicness benefitted the dominant religion: it was inherent 
to the social and political order that the two overlapped and that minority religion 
remained on the margins. This amounts to significant asymmetry: only religious 
minorities (including atheists) felt the daily constraints of demands of conformity and 
the consequences of playing different roles between public and private personae in 
those spaces. Conceptually, outward conformity became a condition for belonging. 
Conformity and dissimulation could allow individuals, and in some spaces whole 
communities (e.g. Jewish assimilants), to take on specific economic roles or work in 
specific spaces, particularly where the overall structure of economic participation and 
citizenship was defined on the basis of the dominant religion.68 In other words, there 
was a relative clarity of expectations. It must be recognised, however, that the public-
private divide carries strong white, male, Protestant overtones from a time when 
home, towns, states looked rather different to the complexities of contemporary 
societies: gender, class, religious community, and economic associations were to some 
extent spatialised and demarcated as well.  
Today, spaces, roles, and identities have become even more complex. Perhaps 
it helps to recognise that the public-private dualization grew from spatialised 
institutions, particularly when observing how this dichotomy impacts individual 
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integrity.69 Salvatore points out that ‘frequency and intensity of encounters among 
strangers’ renders specific ‘role games’ attached to specific spaces problematic.70 Not 
only does the public-private dichotomy still disadvantage religious minorities in 
general, it affects women in particular who may not be able to hide religious attire, or 
in the case of men – Sikhs.71 Even as public space is in reality of course not unified, 
nuances within public as well as private spaces (complex spatialization) might create 
as many problems as they solve.72 Rapid cultural change under the influence of 
migration, secularisation, regionalisation, internationalisation, and not least 
digitalisation, does warrant more complex theorisation of space. Complex 
spatialization may still not relieve asymmetry of disadvantage as long as public-
private distinctions revolve around institutions more than around citizens. This is 
what John Dunn might mean with ‘tolerance’ as complex democracy that builds on 
intersectionality.73 Perhaps Stephan’s recommendation of the protection of ‘minimal 
boundaries of freedom’ might perhaps extend into more complex spatialization.74 
 Galeotti argues that individual rights do not suffice and that minorities need 
public recognition of their group identity.75 Although the protection of minority 
interests is a condition of liberal constitutionalism, it also perpetuates the idea, along 
with democratic majoritarianism, that society is divided between a majority and 
 
69 Paul Bou-Habib, ‘A theory of religious accommodation’, (2006), Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 23, 
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70 Salvatore, The Public Sphere, p. 226. 
71 Netherlands Institute of Human Rights, Annual Report 2017, p. 147. 
72 Salvatore, The Public Sphere, p. 258. 
73 John Dunn, ‘Postface: The grounds for toleration and the capacity to tolerate’, p. 9, 
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minorities. For legal purposes, it is quite challenging to articulate definitions and 
boundaries for every group identity, beyond structures to accommodate cooperation 
between individual citizens and other legal entities in civil society. Not least, group 
identities, even when hyphenated, ignore internal nuances and differentiations within 
world religions like Islam, Christianity, Judaism and others.76 Moreover, as 
Wiktorowicz shows in the context of terrorism in name of Islam, public debates tend 
to gloss over internal differences and disagreements, impacting negatively on 
moderate Islamic communities.77 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
What does it mean to be one? And how does outward unity relate to projections of 
oneness? Who has the right to determine what the right kind of oneness or shared civil 
identity is?78 This chapter argued that the nation state re-enacts a nexus of territory, 
people, and teleology in its unity of state, nation, and social norms. For this reason, the 
nation state is liable to the exclusionary political mechanisms of the corpus christianum. 
The modern state, however, has been able to shape society so as to foster a sense of 
national identity beyond the social and religious fragmentation that the state inherited 
from the early modern period. At the same time migration, secularisation, and 
individualisation have put pressure on the idea of oneness that the nation state 
embodies, and bring out new tensions pertaining to social identity. Moreover, 
conflation of oneness and outward unity puts religious expressions and religious 
symbols in public space once again at the heart of debates over belonging, integration, 
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and secularisation. This chapter argues that the idea of privatisation of religion is 
deeply problematic from the perspective of the genealogy of toleration and religious 
freedom. And crucially, where oneness and outward unity are conflated, one 
overlooks that integration and outward conformity perhaps may never satisfy the 
demands of belonging.  
Whilst some level of othering is inevitable to any articulation of identity, I 
suggest that the absence of a unified sense of identity perhaps causes a fixation on 
“others”. This political othering is not only damaging to society, it but also tests the 
reliability of constitutional safeguards vis-à-vis religious as well as racial and ethnic 
minorities.79 The constitution theoretically provides protection to minorities through 
the prohibition of discrimination as well as the freedom of religion.80 These 
constitutional protections of (religious) minorities aim to ward off arbitrary 
interferences on behalf of the state. In this way, the constitution creates space not only 
for ordinary differences, but also for “deep” or even “deviant” differences, as John 
Inazu and David Little argue.81 But does it and will it continue to do so? Admittedly, 
it is possible that the state can legitimately restrict the public visibility of its religious 
and other minorities. Such restrictions must be based on rational arguments and satisfy 
the requirements of public order and neutrality towards denominational truth-claims. 
Moreover, they must respect the integrity of every individual. The next chapter 
elaborates on these requirements of public order and neutrality before it circles back 
to the question of outward unity. Restrictions of expression of (religious) difference in 
public space may certainly be outcomes of incidental policies, general arguments 
pertaining to the oneness of state, nation, and social norms cannot intrinsically lay 
down the law concerning co-existence and religious diversity. 
 
79 Wydra, Politics and the Sacred, p. 45. 
80 Taylor, ‘Why we need a radical redefinition of secularism’, pp. 45-46. 
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6. Public order, state neutrality and striving after the common 
good  
 
Public order is at the heart of constitutionalism. Early modern authorities 
instrumentalised the notion of public order against religious minorities, who 
embodied ‘the extraordinary’ to the political imaginary of the corpus christianum which 
provided the foundation for public order.1 This extraordinariness did not place the 
othered outside the framework of public order, but in the context of toleration, 
extraordinariness entailed an incorporation through marginalisation.2 Public order 
referred to the stability and security of social structures, which would  the protection 
of matrimony, taking oaths, or certain religious practices; and incidental dimensions, 
like outbursts of popular violence or the occasional refusal to conform. 
Constitutionalisation of civil and political rights legally extended ‘the ordinary’ to the 
previously marginalised, and charged the state to protect public order in the name of 
the sovereignty of the nation.3 This public order faces two ways: states have the 
responsibility to protect public order, and, states have a relative discretion in defining 
public order as well as a duty to justify its operationalisation. The effectiveness of the 
notion of public order hinges on the relative independence of public order from social 
or cultural norms, e.g. Bourdieu’s habitus, which stem from the relatively privileged 
contingent of the nation.4 
 
1 “Extraordinary” as in Harald Wydra, Politics and the Sacred, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2015, p. 23. 
2 István P. Bejczy, ‘Tolerantia: a medieval concept’, Journal of the History of Ideas (1997), Vol. 91, No. 4, 
pp. 365-384, p. 375.  
3 Saba Mahmood, ‘Secularism, sovereignty, and religious difference: a global genealogy?’, (2017), 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 197-209, pp. 198, 202. 
4 Bourdieu quoted in Dietmar Rothermund, ‘Religiöse Praxis und die Artikulation sozialer Identität’, 




 This chapter engages the relationship between social norms and public order in 
the specific context of religious diversity. It theorises the relationship between social 
norms and the legal notion of public order and problematises a reliance on social 
norms alone to substantiate an appeal to public order. This then proceeds to question 
how a reliance on social norms affects the imperative of state neutrality. It further 
examines how the notions of publicness and “secularisation as privatisation” impede 
the imperative of neutrality as well as render articulations of the common good less 
inclusive. How does public order account for deep diversity and the complex nature 
of social roles and spaces? Is it possible to accommodate complex common goods? This 
chapter contends that a robust notion of a complex common good is crucial to the 
notion of public order. This complex common good might include intersecting and 
potentially conflicting interests. A recognition of the complexity of the common good 
may be part of developing a more positive understanding of diversity and facilitate 
peaceful coexistence in the face of further social fragmentation.5  
 
6.1 Public order 
The framing of “public order” in constitutional and human rights documents varies 
between France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Moreover, European, national, 
regional and local dimensions to public order further differentiate its meaning and its 
application. This differentiation notwithstanding, neither the contextual nature of 
public order nor the absence of one common formula implies the absence of coherent 
 
5 Realities of diversity eventually broke the narrative of unity and thus challenged social order, even 
violently in the context of early modernity; see William T. Cavanaugh, ‘”A fire strong enough to 
consume the house”: wars of religion and the rise of the state’, (1995), Modern Theology, Vol. 11, No. 4, 
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violence in international relations’, (2015), Journal of International Political Theory, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 61-
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meaning.6 Rather, the fluidity of public order is bound up with the specific legal 
context and the role that the principle of public order fulfils in that context.7 This 
section connects both legal and political perspectives on public order in order to draw 
distinctions between: 1) legal frameworks and social norms; 2) structural and 
individual arguments; and 3) legitimate and illegitimate arguments of public order. I 
problematise the increasing significance of social norms on public order arguments. 
This is important because constitutional democracy as well as the interest of legal 
certainty form the bedrock of non-arbitrary decision-making that constitutionalism is 
believed to underwrite. Legal certainly exists in the clarity and accessibility of the law, 
as well as in the predictability of its application, and aims at the protection of one’s 
physical, spiritual, and economic security. 
 Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights reads: ‘Freedom to 
manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as prescribed 
by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for 
the protection of public order, health, or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others’.8 Article 10 of the French declaration of human rights states that 
the manifestation of religion may not disturb public order: ‘pourvu que leur 
manifestation ne trouble pas l'ordre public établi par la Loi’.9 Article 6 and 9 of the Dutch 
Constitution as well as Article 2 Wet Openbare Manifestaties include a reference to the 
prevention of disorder outside of religious buildings and private spaces: ‘…ter 
 
6 Gerhart Husserl, ‘Public policy and ordre public’, (1938), Virginia Law Review, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 37-
67, pp. 41-43. 
7 Marie-Caroline Vincent-Legoux, L’Ordre Public. Étude de droit comparé interne, Thesis Université de 
Bourgogne, Dijon, 20 December 1996, p. 10. 
8 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as 
amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5,  
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b04.html (consulted 8 May 2019). 
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bescherming van de gezondheid, in het belang van het verkeer en ter bestrijding of voorkoming 
van wanordelijkheden’.10 German Basic Law omits a direct reference to public order, but 
Article 5 Abs. 2 includes references to generally applicable law – including other 
human rights – as well as the protection of young persons and personal honour: ‘Diese 
Rechte finden ihre Schranken in den Vorschriften der allgemeinen Gesetze, den gesetzlichen 
Bestimmungen zum Schutze der Jugend und in dem Recht der persönlichen Ehre’.11 
The difference between these framings of public order is not merely semantic 
and partly resides in how the state relates to diversity in society, including religious 
diversity. These differences stem from divergent trajectories of identity as well as 
political philosophy that reimagines political order independent from religious 
ontological claims. Chapter Four concluded that many regional and religious identities 
coalesced in Germanness, though it rendered the margins of belonging narrower in 
comparison with France. János Weiss explains in his lengthy work on German 
constitutional philosophy that the German state is based on a non-hierarchical, conflict 
neutralising, organisational nature (Zentralnervensystem).12 This organisational nature 
assumes diversity whilst Weiss rejects a presupposition of ante-institutional unity.13  In 
contrast with the federal character of Germany, the nature of the French and Dutch 
states has been (moderately) unitary: the territorial dimensions to religious diversity 
conflicted more directly with the notion of the unitary state, whereas a federal state 
left more space for regional autonomy as well as differentiation. Furthermore, as this 
 
10 Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden van 24 augustus 1815 (Dutch Constitution), 
https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0001840/2018-12-21, current from 21 December 2018 (consulted 8 
May 2019), Wet van 20 april 1988, houdende bepalingen betreffende de uitoefening van de vrijheid 
van godsdienst en levensovertuiging en van het recht tot vergadering en betoging (Wet openbare 
manifestaties), https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0004318/2010-10-10 (consulted 22 January 2021). 
11 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 23 Mai 1949, (German Basic Law), 
https://www.bundestag.de/parlament/aufgaben/rechtsgrundlagen/grundgesetz/gg_01-245122, 
(consulted 8 May 2019).  
12 János Weiss, Die Konstitution des Staates, Frankfurt: Peter Lang 2006, pp. 363-397. 




organisational nature transcends civil discourses and institutional diversity, it fosters 
a process of deliberation and seeks to build consensus without assuming the highest 
authority.14 
The organisational nature of the German state instructs a first distinction 
between public order as social norms and public order as the sum of legal 
arrangements within a jurisdiction (Vorschriften der allgemeinen Gesetze). German 
constitutional law distinguishes between öffentliche Ordnung and öffentliche Sicherheit: 
The former refers to unwritten social norms, whereas the latter entails positive legal 
arrangements that guarantee civil security.15 Legal scholar Jan Brouwer explains that 
the Dutch Supreme Court associated public order with the German concept of 
öffentliche Ordnung in the late twentieth century: though linguistically close, the Court 
overlooked the difference between öffentliche Ordnung and öffentliche Sicherheit.16 
Brouwer points out that this mistake has been rectified since, and observes that any 
inclusion of ethical norms into the concept of public order would have enormous 
consequences.17 This could include specific ideas about gender equality; for example, 
the idea that a headscarf is an expression of gender inequality. Such content weakens 
the legal certainty of minorities and makes them vulnerable to arbitrary interference 
on behalf of the state. Brouwer helpfully explains that an alternative exists; namely, 
that many potential concerns of public order are already protected in particular and 
more concrete regulations, for example in provisions of criminal law. He argues that 
these particular provisions must prevail over a more generalised principle of public 
order, which is part of legal reasoning under the principle of the lex specialis.18 These 
 
14 Ibidem, pp. 369, 380, 387. 
15 Ibidem, p. 2165. 
16 Jan Brouwer, ‘Wat is openbare orde? Bevoegdheden van de burgemeester niet onbegrensd’, (2016), 
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specific laws create a boundary between social (or indeed ethical) norms that have 
found a positive expression in law and those which have not.19 
Though it might be tempting to interpret this distinction between öffentliche 
Ordnung and öffentliche Sicherheit as a German particularity, French law makes a 
similar distinction regarding the concept of l’ordre public. Article 6 of the Code Civil 
distinguishes l’ordre public from les bonnes moeurs.20 Jacques Robert notes that the 1789 
text of the Declaration referred to public security (sûreté publique) and the rights of 
others.21 This distinction seems close to the concept of öffentliche Sicherheit. Former 
member and president of the Conseil Constitutionnel Pierre Mazeaud argues that the 
Conseil Constitutionnel never defined the concept of public order as such, but the Court 
follows the instincts of administrative law: in this context, public order refers to order, 
security, public health, and public tranquility.22 Mazeaud argues that the Conseil 
Constitutionnel and the European Court of Human Rights both emphasise the security 
dimension of public order. Also, both require a concrete and real threat to public order 
for a public order argument to be valid.23 Vincent-Legoux argues that les bonnes moeurs 
coincide with moralité publique; including moral norms that are necessary to public life 
in a particular jurisdiction.24 However, she distinguishes both bonnes moeurs and public 
morality from social morality, because a pluralistic society should not privilege one 
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social morality over the other.25 Though public morality thus becomes part of the 
public order discourse, according to the Code Civil, they are distinct.  
The principle of public order is also a principle of action for the state.26 This 
means that the state has the authority and the duty to protect public order through 
retributive as well as preventative coercion.27 Similarly to the principle of toleration, 
public order orders the protection of citizens but may also legitimise coercion and even 
the use of violence against them. The use of force is equally moderated by the principle 
of public order. Vincent-Legoux argues that French law substantiates this dimension 
of public order through necessity and proportionality.28 The principle of necessity is 
more or less synonymous with subsidiarity in other human rights documents, 
including the European Convention of Human Rights. This means that legitimate 
goals and the weight of measures to be taken must be balanced: the law prefers the 
relatively least restrictive measure (subsidiarity) and requires a fair balancing of 
interests (proportionality). Failure to apply force on behalf of the state could therefore 
be a violation of public order itself.  
Applicability of criminal law as a lex specialis in principle implies a claim of 
public order; such is the logic of the constitution. Yet criminal law is not the exclusive 
source to public order: the principle of public order functions also in private and in 
administrative law.29 However, more could be said about the relationship between 
positive legal arrangements and unwritten social norms. This very distinction between 
positive law and social norms has made legal scholars nervous about the endorsement 
of the French concept vivre ensemble (living together) by the European Court of Human 
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Rights when it did not find fault with the French face veil ban in 2014.30 Legal scholar 
Illias Trispiotis questions its potential to demanding ‘conformity’ to majoritarian 
preferences.31 Another legal scholar, Myriam Hunter-Henin, evaluates the doctrine as 
‘unconvincing’ and potentially conflicting with the principle of proportionality.32  
Ethical concerns that have not been codified thus lack the legal basis for direct 
application, save in exceptional cases. The exclusion of extra-legal ethical norms not 
only reinforces the principle of legal certainty but their very exclusion undergird the 
security of ethical diversity within the state. This exclusion limits the potential to 
arbitrary decision-making in incidental cases and circumscribes the otherwise likely 
fragmentation of the concept of public order. Jan Brouwer and Jon Schilder already 
identified several problems to local uses of public order arguments, including 
terminological inconsistency by mayors and local governments, insufficient definition 
of theoretical aspects to public order, as well as insufficient specificity of the criteria 
for application.33 Such differentiation may be inherent to the logic of decentralised and 
casuistic decision making in states like the Netherlands and Germany; however, the 
casuistic nature of the facts of a case and the objectification of criteria for decision-
making should not be conflated. Perhaps the question is not per se whether the public 
order concept is applied differently, for it is, but the question is rather at what point 
fragmentation erodes a coherent meaning and predictable application, and thus, legal 
certainty.  
 
30 Art. 2 of Loi no. 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace 
public; Santions in Code pénal, Article 225-4-10. Similar prohibition applicable in Belgium. ECtHR 1 
July 2014, 43835/11 (S.A.S. v. France), in conjunction with ECtHR, 11 July 2017, 4619/12 (Dakir v. 
Belgium); ECtHR 11 July 2017, 37798/13 (Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium). 
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Second, I argue that public order distinguishes between structural and 
individual dimensions. Areas that historically entailed structural dimensions to public 
order included family life, rites of passage, and trade conventions. Specifically in the 
context of toleration, undermining such conventions could be seen as a threat to public 
order. Not all structural dimensions have become part of positive law. Individual 
dimensions concern specific issues that the state might try to regulate, like an 
individual matter, or even restricting the freedom of one specific individual. The law 
does not permit this. Individual dimensions are different from the above mentioned 
incidental dimension to public order, since violence and disturbance of public order 
are regulated through criminal and administrative law. Moreover, structural and 
individual dimensions may not overlap with positive law and unwritten social norms. 
However, I argue that an intersection of unwritten social norms and structural 
arguments in the context of public order might render religious minorities particularly 
vulnerable. This vulnerability resides in potential compulsion to cultural conformity 
beyond what is constitutionally required from citizens, akin to what Trispiotis noted 
in the context of vivre ensemble.  
The vulnerability of religious minorities, stemming from the potential 
intersection of structural arguments and unwritten social norms, affirms the 
importance of law in defining and limiting the scope of public order. It deserves 
recommendation that structural arguments of public order be established in law, 
insofar as this is possible, legitimate, and desirable within a constitutional democracy. 
This works differently for individual arguments. Typically, constitutional law 
prohibits the use of individual norms to limit constitutional rights, unless its specific 
particularity warrants an individual norm.34 This means that the regulation of 
particular issues may only be grounded in generalisable norms. This rule functions as 
an important layer of protection against direct discrimination against minorities. 
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However, the next chapter will show that national legislatures have fairly 
conspicuously tweaked argumentation between individual and generalisable norms 
in attempts to regulate Islamic attire in public spaces.  
Third, arguments on public order may entail legitimate and illegitimate 
dimensions. Not all arguments to public order are legally permissible. First of all, most 
courts require that public order is based on a tangible rather than a perceived threat. 
As the next chapter shall demonstrate, courts have generally ruled out feelings of 
insecurity or discomfort as a sufficient basis for a public order argument. As John 
Dunn argues, arguments of public order must be rationally grounded, that is, on the 
basis of a set of defined characteristics and sound epistemology.35 Historically, 
unsound appeals to public order have served to compromise the standing of 
minorities. Avant-garde fake news, like popular tales told about Jews, French 
Protestants, and Dutch Catholics, shed a complex light over histories of toleration. 
Some tales persisted long into the nineteenth century.36 Such tales alleged subversive 
inclinations or moral deficiencies within minority communities, either to take over 
secular power, to offend God, or to engage with occult practices. And whether or not 
such tales were grounded in any kind of reality, these have often become guises for 
intolerance. 
 The legal and political boundary between permissible and impermissible 
arguments of public order could be rather thin, particularly with regard to recent 
waves of terrorism in France and Germany, as the next chapter discusses. Higher 
courts require evidence of a tangible threat to public order, and typically declare 
arguments which fail to meet that standard illegal. The number of cases suggests that 
the boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable arguments are frequently tested. 
Indeed, contemporary cases on religious freedom may include arguments that are 
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questionable from the perspective of law and rationality. Such border cases are 
interesting because the public order argument is the only legal and salient connection 
between early modern practices of toleration and constitutional religious freedom. 
Chapter Two has shown that early modern arguments of public order were often 
grounded in tangible disruptions of public order and were not always completely 
arbitrary. One could therefore question whether rationality and legality are sufficient 
to understand differences between early modern and contemporary arguments of 
public order in the context of religious difference – an issue that will be raised again in 
the next chapter. 
Finally, public order may practically interrupt the integrity of individual 
citizens. A level of differentiation in concepts of public order between national, 
regional, local, and even institutional contexts might be necessary because of distinct 
spheres of autonomy as well as the casuistic nature of incidental decision-making. 
Differentiation could spill over in fragmentation, and therefore in diffusion and 
unpredictability. Moreover, fragmentation may impact the integrity of individual and 
communal life. A disproportionate variety in regulations, dress codes, and 
expectations impede legal certainty: where are religious individuals permitted to 
display a religious expression and where not, and where may religious and non-
religious “others” expect to not be confronted with such religious expression? Matthias 
König would add thereto that the notion of public order also features in the context of 
the European Union, which might sever the contextuality of public order that is bound 
up with national sovereignty and even national identity.37 He argues that the use of 
public order in the context of the European Union might, in practice, bolster equality 
and non-discrimination. 
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Realistically, it is not feasible to legislate exhaustively on religious diversity 
other than, in general, a principle of non-interference applies. This principle of non-
interference is grounded in the constitutional protection of religious freedom, on the 
basis of which the state is not allowed to intervene unless it meets specific 
requirements of legality, proportionality and subsidiarity. In many instances, 
coexistence comes down to everyday attitudes of tolerance and intolerance at a 
grassroots level. It must be recognised that legal fragmentation could also result from 
fragmented negotiation of such tolerance levels at the grassroots level. Furthermore, 
while individuals could chose to dissimulate certain religious symbols, for example 
caps or hats worn over a kippah or a cross that may be put behind attire, some religious 
symbols cannot be dissimulated, for example different types of head covering worn 
by Catholic, Orthodox Jewish, and Muslim women. The Netherlands Institute for 
Human Rights has observed that women can be particularly disadvantaged by 
restrictions on religious symbols.38  
 Thus it is vital to distinguish between legal frameworks and social norms, 
between structural and individual dimensions, and between legitimate and 
illegitimate substantiations of public order. This is crucial for the protection of legal 
certainty and the rights of minority citizens, which is inherent to constitutionalism as 
an answer to the arbitrariness and lack of protection legislatures associate with the 
ancient regime. Moreover, there is a need for consistency and mitigation of 
fragmentation of public order arguments across local, regional, and national levels of 
government. This is particularly important as decentralised authorities weigh into 
discussions on diversity and, on the basis of public order, may have significant 
competencies to restrict religious and other freedoms, such as mayors. Development 
of consistency, as Brouwer suggests, in central concepts and criteria towards 
application, may also limit the scope for political tweaking of public order arguments. 
The clarification of the notion of public order from the perspective of constitutional 
 




law is urgent and therefore, national legislatures, who express the national sovereignty 
in law, should take initiative to this clarification.  
   
6.2 Public order, social norms and neutrality 
The notion of neutrality conditions the relationship between public order and social 
norms and yet is perhaps not as much a key to diversity questions as it might appear 
to be. The concept of neutrality was not originally part of the nineteenth century 
constitutional language. Nineteenth century constitutionalists proposed a moderated 
version of religion, intolerant to fundamentalism and assertion of power on behalf of 
religious institutions. Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe describes how neutrality in early 
modern language referred to impartiality as well as fair and equal treatment of 
rivalling parties.39 Another connotation is independence from partisan communities or 
churches without implying anticlericalism or anti-religious sentiments.40 Or, neutrality 
is absence of judgement or support vis-à-vis religious and non-religious worldviews, 
both culturally and institutionally.41 Carl Schmitt argued that neutrality would be an 
expression of parity and would uphold both the principle of non-intervention and of 
equal opportunity.42 What these perspectives have in common is that neutrality 
prohibits the state from instrumentalising a normative framework to the disadvantage 
of individuals and communities, particularly regarding social norms. Neutrality is 
thus in fundamental contrasts with toleration and its grounding in one particular 
“orthodoxy”.  
This neutrality is not a neutrality of disposition: neither state nor society are 
void of normative frameworks; nor can either truly avoid the problem of normative 
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disproval.43 The paradox between neutrality and the inevitability that states rely on a 
normative framework is abundantly criticised in literature. Political philosopher John 
Dunn puts it as a ‘beguiling conception of liberals’ to equate the undoing of toleration 
with equal respect of individual autonomy – for this is difficult to combine with vivid 
disapproval.44 Gavin d’Costa argues that neutrality in itself is impossible because one 
always has a ‘tradition-specific starting point’.45 Similarly, Mahmood writes that law is 
‘encoded with an entire set of cultural and epistemological presuppositions’ that are 
not independent from traditions and adds this is particularly the case with public 
order.46 Others, like Lorenzo Zucca, affirm the importance of normativity, even truth, 
in law.47 However, not all expressions of neutrality may be equally affected by 
normative biases. Claudia Haupt maps out five different types of neutrality: non-
consideration, positive neutrality (as in minimal interference), equality, separation, 
and neutrality as an interpretative guide.48 What these types of neutrality have in 
common is that they reflect a concern not so much about disposition, but about action. 
 A distinction between a neutrality of disposition and a neutrality of action 
might yet not render the question of “orthodoxy”, taken as dominant normative 
narratives within a state, superfluous; the nation state is deeply informed by an 
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emphasis on relative homogeneity.49 This is important to note, because early modern 
toleration hinged on a connection between orthodoxy and social norms, often at the 
expense of minorities. Legacies of toleration are not only imbued with a positive 
substantiation of an “orthodoxy”, but also entailed normative otherings. The same is 
said by Peña-Ruiz and Shakman-Hurd about universalising aspects to secular 
“orthodoxy”.50 Secularism, rather than secularity, would indeed be problematic when 
invoked by states at the expense of “other” normative frameworks of minorities.51 Or 
when it appears to ‘replace the religious foundations for peaceful coexistence with an 
all-encompassing secular philosophical conception’ when its underlying views are not 
equally shared.52 As Wendy Brown boldly states, secularism can be as intolerant as 
religious law.53  
As accurate as these conceptual arguments might be, these renderings of 
secularism are perhaps insufficiently flexible to the idea that secularism, like religious 
normativities, does not represent a coherent system of beliefs and practice. The 
normative disintegration that France, Germany, and the Netherlands face might mean 
that “orthodoxy” could, if anything, be based on a potentially large range of 
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intersecting otherings. For example, even if “post-modern” or “post-truth” tendencies 
in a society would perhaps preclude a positive articulation of truth, normativity can 
also be found in the form of strong disproval. This is not only relevant from the 
perspective of neutrality, either as a disposition or a principle of action, but also from 
the perspective of toleration. Toleration usually concerned behaviours which 
authorities deemed to be wrong as well as threatening the social order. What is 
interesting about contemporary iterations of normative disproval is that the 
connection between social norms and public order has the capacity to render a 
normative othering to be a threat to public order. In the face of deepening diversity, 
this possible shift, from a focus on concrete behaviour to normative disagreement, 
could erode the very foundations of the political protection of religious and other 
minorities. 
The pivotal question therefore is: who has the authority to determine the nature 
of public order and the scope of its inclusion of social norms? Or, as Gavin d’Costa 
rhetorically asks, ‘whose objectivity, which neutrality?’54 Orthodoxy in relation to 
political power is ironically normativity-blind: religious and non-religious 
frameworks are equally capable of dominating political normativity. Early modern 
strategies to share political power, to distinguish fundamentals from indifferent 
matters through epistemic humility, or to narrow the political normative frames to a 
lower common denominator did not avail against the rapid social, religious, and 
political disintegration. Some of these strategies have made reappearances, like in 
Basinger’s suggestions to revert again to epistemic humility in contemporary 
normative debates.55 Or in scholarly debate on a commonly acceptable political 
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procedure, like Rawls and Habermas. However, irrespective of how narrow a common 
frame of normativity could possibly be, the state has no right to “conversion” or the 
“conformity” of minorities; rather, it has a duty to protect them. 
 
6.3 Seeking the common good 
The notion of the common good is bound up with the notions of public order, social 
norms, and neutrality. At a first glance, the common good might seem to coincide with 
the notion of the national interest. But this is not quite the case. As Bruce Douglass 
notes, the idea of the national interest emerged over and against the interest of the 
absolutist monarch and is thus distinct from the common good.56 The idea of the 
common good would be more positive as well as oriented on the future. The notion of 
the common good perhaps first refers to the good of a political community as a whole. 
Conceptually, the notion of the common good does assume a bifurcation of the private 
and the common. This bifurcation might work inherently against minorities, 
particularly where secularisation refers to the privatisation of religious or indeed non-
religious normativities. However, in order to protect the good of the community, the 
common good needs to also subsume private interests, however diversified these are. 
Given the somewhat insecure moorings of the notion of a unified common good today, 
the question is how the common good could facilitate to the complexity of social and 
political life.  
 In The Empty Throne, Sophie van Bijsterveld explains that the common good 
exists in a vacuum as ‘the natural orientation towards the common good has lost both 
its obviousness and its visibility’.57 She points out that tensions between ‘functional’ 
and ‘integrated’ policy making, micro-and macro-justice, and centralised and 
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decentralised ethics contribute to a decentralisation of the common good.58 This 
analysis seems appropriate, as it implies that fragmented iterations of the common 
good might be based on intersecting interests which may be at odds with other such 
iterations. This fragmentation of the common good then leaves law as a mediator of 
difference, while the law has no intrinsic capacity to generate order or to provide 
content on justice, the common good, or indeed belonging.59 Moreover, the deep 
fragmentation of society means that even the function of the law diminishes as a 
mediator of ethical content. In theory, this fragmentation might surrender the law, and 
thereby the political mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, into the hands of 
democratic majorities.  
 ‘Government must be neutral on what might be called the question of the good 
life’, Dworkin summarised as the crux to the debate on the relationship between 
normativity and the common good in the 1980’s.60 However plausible this statement 
appears, it has also become deeply problematic. Not only is neutrality itself 
normatively contingent, normative contingency of decision-making which is blind to 
its own biases can negatively affect equal dignity. In other words, neutrality is not a 
goal in itself, but is an instrument that serves the protection and affirmation of citizen’s 
dignity and the standing of communities in society. Moreover, when the imperative of 
neutrality leads to an unwillingness or inability to engage with religious diversity in 
decision making, it may impair a sense of the common good and reinforce social 
divides. A report on religious freedom in the United Kingdom called for investment 
in mutual understanding, politically as well as socially, warning that decision-making 
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risks being ‘insensitive and inadequate’, thus harming ‘the public good’.61 It is this 
insensitivity which is so greatly concerning. 
As Taylor and Habermas agree, states cannot avoid normative frameworks 
altogether, whether these are religious or not.62 What they perhaps disagree on is the 
extent to which dominancy of any bandwidth of normativity is problematic. Most 
scholars would agree, in principle, that commonality exists in a concern for the 
wellbeing and equal dignity of the members of the political community. Most scholars 
would also accept basic liberal constitutional values, labelling this as a relatively 
thinner conception of the good. Even here, however, it seems hard to escape the echoes 
of universality and exclusivity. In his work Constitutional theocracy, Ran Hirschl 
contended that the universalising tendencies of liberal values, within the framework 
of constitutionality, resulted into secularising effects within constitutional law.63 And 
as Peter Byrne observed that ‘soteriological exclusivism’ appears to be ‘the potential 
enemy of tolerance’, so is the exclusivism that is associated with liberal constitutional 
values.64 Yet the problem of universalisation is not intrinsic to constitutional liberalism 
alone. For a long time, scholars like Rawls and Habermas sought to imagine solutions 
to normative diversity through focusing on a fair procedure instead.  
 In Political Liberalism, Rawls distinguishes between man’s comprehensive view 
and man’s political view, concluding that comprehensive views are related to different 
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and sometimes incompatible conceptions of the good.65 He concludes that publicness 
involves politics foremost; therefore he argues that contributions be limited to the 
political aspects of man’s comprehensive view.66 In a theoretical experiment, he 
suggested focussing on political procedure. In theorising diversity, he suggested the 
idea of reasonable pluralism as a modus vivendi, which, in his words, aims at society’s 
‘unity and stability’.67 He thus disjoins the bond between man’s inner convictions 
about life and man’s political convictions, loosening religious metaphysical and 
epistemological doctrines in particular.68 This approach resembles the creedal 
minimalism we encountered in early modern philosophical debates over faith and 
reason in Chapter Three. Rawls argues that society could benefit from developing an 
overlapping consensus; a consensus that should be sought based on rational 
arguments to persuade each other and form political majorities.69 Interestingly, Rawls 
does not dismiss other than rational arguments as irrational, but rather classifies these 
as non-rational, not meaning that these non-rational arguments would necessarily be 
untrue.70  
Rawls suggests that political institutions should adhere to procedural rules or 
guidelines which are not specific to any confession.71 Rawls explains that this modus 
vivendi is not necessarily sceptical about truth,72 but still embodies a liberal principle 
of justice stemming from liberalism. In his theory, he expects members of the political 
community to accept the principles of a liberal constitution, which is yet another 
instance of expected conformity. This conformity assumes that liberal principle, as an 
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instance of the public good, is paramount to normative diversity and capable of 
providing “unity and stability”. Habermas, Rawls’ contemporary, concludes that this 
modus vivendi does not comprise a claim to truth, but would be considered as exerting 
neutrality towards conflicting worldviews.73 Habermas sees the heart of publicness in 
public debate, communication, as well as public opinion making. Habermas calls for 
more neutrality and objectification in the political public sphere, arguing for the 
strength of communicative action based on the language of reason. On a conceptual 
level, Habermas argues that consensus about the acceptability and rationality of 
reasons help frame public debates and overcome controversies. This approach implies 
that certain types of language and arguments could potentially be excluded for the 
public debate, especially if there would be a majority consensus about it. Although 
Habermas could be read in this way, discursive inclusivity is still possible when actors 
already agree on a rational basis would recognize other instances of language and 
argumentation and engage with it in a meaningful way.  
Another important feature of Habermas’ theory of communicative action is his 
understanding of unity in relation to truth. While Habermas assumes a level of unity 
in the public debate, he is not looking for cultural convergence necessarily.74 His theory 
attempts to undergird the protection of individual identity and freedom while also 
shaping a political public sphere which is effective: a political public sphere which is 
able to objectify subjective validity claims on the basis of consensus.75 The search for 
truth through public debate, like philosophers as Kant and Hegel advocated, is not key 
for Habermas.76 He further argues that ‘the concept of legal norm itself is positivistic 
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and stripped from the marks of universality and truth’.77 Nancy Fraser argues that the 
consensus that may arise from this type of deliberation may express a popular 
understanding of the ‘common good’.78 However, Rawls’ and Habermas’ 
interpretations offer a relatively closed concept of the common good because of the a 
priori restriction of faith-based arguments. 
Rawls himself argued that the effectiveness of his approach relied on a degree 
of unity and cohesion in society and warned that deep conflicts would possibly arise 
in its absence.79 Both Rawls and Habermas respond to post-war and post-modern 
concerns about the question of morality in law, yet the ongoing diversification of 
society makes it hard to imagine procedural correctness as a long-term solution to the 
crisis of the common good. Moreover, this approach is so deeply rooted in rationality 
that it does not seem to allow for the deepening polarisation and decline in mutual 
trust within society. To be clear, neither Rawls or Habermas seem to have argued for 
exclusion of religion, but rather an objectification of political procedure. However, the 
cultural and political processes of developing a sense of the common good rely on 
basic willingness to dialogue and encounter in order to overcome processes of 
estrangement and fragmentation.  
The past two chapters have alluded to the necessity of again making room for 
religion in public space. Secularity rightly removed religious dominance from political 
institutions; however, it would be a philosophical assumption to hold that religion 
should be removed from public space altogether. Moreover, the idea that religion is a 
private affair overlooks the social relevance of religious organisations in and beyond 
places of worship, as well as the interconnectedness and intersection of identities and 
the making of meaning in society. This is in addition to the idea that secularisation as 
privatisation limits religions’ potential to cultural transcendences roots in a latent 
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assumption that private religion is not actually part of the common good. This is an 
intuition that squares with toleration more than with religious freedom, and with 
Gemeinschaft more than with Gesellschaft. From a conceptual perspective, making room 
for religion in public space therefore also means to make room for religion in the 
common good. 
When the common good primarily emerges out of values and ideas, one could 
look for a conception of the common good which is perhaps less robust or exclusively 
detailed in its particulars and more robust in including religious as well as non-
religious traditions. Perhaps the meaning of the common good erodes when it 
continues to be based on a lowest common denominator. Perhaps the idea of the 
common good could hold conflicting philosophical understandings of the good, yet 
explicitly affirming that such understandings are vital to the meaning of the common 
good.80 Yet even when the common good would become more complex in this regard, 
it might not provide a positive understanding of diversity, but only attempt at 
containing it. Similarly, creedal minimalism could not contain the diversity that 
exploded in the early modern period. Rather, the common good might need to recover 
the idea of relationality, based on being more than on conviction and philosophical or 
religious exclusivity.  
This focus on “being” would base the normativity of the common good 
primarily on relationships and relationality. This would mean to focus less on social 
roles that individuals or groups may have, and more on the recognition of the dignity 
of every individual in relation to their roles and responsibilities in communities, 
networks, and their membership of the society. This of course does not erode conflict 
about values, but these conflicts are only secondary to the common good. Normative 
conflicts might be contained, in that the dignity of the other prohibits the self from 
ostracising the other on account of normative differences. The recognition of the other 
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has become part of the recognition of the self, like the recognition of a minority is part 
of what it means to hold something in common. This means that a healthy common 
good caters to the needs of minorities; not as an afterthought, but as essential property 
of “the common”. When a society loses sight of this relationality, some values might 
become more equal, and some people might be more equal than others, and this makes 
a society liable to intolerance. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
Constitutionalisation has transformed the notion of public order. Declaring the unity 
of the notion of the people, it theoretically erased legal inequalities that stemmed from 
toleration and included the previously marginalised in its notion of the people. The 
protection of individual citizens against arbitrary decision-making as well as the 
principle of legal certainty improved the legal standing of the previously marginalised, 
however, as chapter four contended, not automatically so. In the constitutional 
context, public order warrants several distinctions to live up to the legal expectation 
of individual protection: 1) between social norms and legal norms; 2) between 
structural and individual arguments; and 3) between legitimate and illegitimate 
arguments of public order. Public order might legitimise action on behalf of the state, 
as long as such action meets the requirements of subsidiarity or necessity, as well as 
proportionality. However, the above distinctions mean that the state ought not to use 
a socially dominant normativity to the restriction of freedom of its religious minorities. 
As the next chapter will discuss, conflicts about the protection of public order as well 
as proportionality make for the bulk of legal discussions about restrictions on the face 
veil, the burkini, and the headscarf, in addition to  other religious symbols in public 
space.   
This chapter also argues that neutrality has become relatively exclusive and 
that, alongside the notion of secularisation as privatisation, this comes at a cost: the 
cost that minorities cannot fully participate in cultural as well as political 




wake of profound fragmentation under influences of secularisation, immigration, and 
privatisation of religion, a society might become more liable to the possibility that 
social norms, be they secular or not, dictate the parameters of publicness in the name 
of ‘living together’.81 It is therefore crucial to the project of the modern state to develop 
new techniques of public inclusion, or what Wibren van der Burg calls ‘inclusive 
neutrality’.82 This implies no priority of distributive publicness over communal 
publicness. Rather, I contend that commonality can grow through inclusivity to the 
particular, admitting complexity to space, deliberation, and the common good.  
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7. Regulating conformity: law, politics, and religious symbols 
in public space 
 
Politicians from left to right stress the importance of integration of Muslim members 
of the political community, both allochthonous and autochthonous. Despite the fact 
that many Muslims in France, Germany, and the Netherlands hold formal citizenship 
or are eligible for citizenship, political decisions about the manifestation of Islamic 
attire suggests that belonging is primarily a matter of outward conformity. This 
chapter examines political decisions, motivations, as well as institutional scrutiny 
thereof, regarding the face veil, such as the niqab and the burqa, the jilbab or “burkini” 
in France, as well as headscarves, like the hijab in France, Germany, and the 
Netherlands. These decisions impact on the religious freedom that constitutions, aided 
by the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and other European and 
international human rights documents, confer on all citizens. Many provisions on 
religious freedom include particular requirements that states must meet in order to 
legitimately intervene with religious freedom. A legal and legitimate interventions is 
prescribed in law (legal certainty), must serve specific and circumscribed legitimate 
interests (legitimate aim), must be as least restrictive as possible (subsidiarity), and 
must be the result of fair balancing of interests (proportionality). This chapter contends 
that political decisions about religious attire, and their motivations, barely meet the 
constitutional threshold on account of the requirement to substantiate an appeal to 
public order.  
 Constitutions protect the religious freedom of individuals and, occasionally, of 
minority communities as well. Post-revolutionary elites reimagined order against the 
whims of absolutism and lacunae in the protection of basic rights of life, liberty, and 
property. Constitutions put limitations on the possibilities for the state to rely on the 
law when the state discriminates against its minorities. The concept of public order is 




confine the space for the state to rely on insufficiently substantiated as well as plainly 
biased arguments of public order. As with toleration, the state negotiates the space 
between dogmatic ideas about politics and lived practice through laws and 
regulations. Today, this is done by national legislatures, Ministers, and regional and 
local political leadership, all of which have the authority to impose restrictive 
regulations on the basis of public order. This chapter shows that mayors in particular 
enjoy wide competences to intervene into religious freedom, yet that disparate 
argumentation of public order is problematic. Although the majority of this chapter 
discusses the wanderings of public order arguments, the arguments toward the end 
contend that legality and rationality are insufficient categories for understanding 
debates over religious symbols in public space.  
 
7.1 Restrictions of the face veil: burqa and niqab 
French, German, and Dutch legislatures have issued restrictions on the face veil, 
known as “burqa bans”, yet legislative choices differ. France (as well as Belgium) 
introduced a full prohibition of the use of face veils in 2011 and, following years of 
litigation, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) affirmed the laws based on 
its marginal scrutiny. However, proliferation of burqa bans across Western Europe 
followed the ECtHR’s affirmation in 2014. Germany issued a partial ban in 2017 which 
addressed only state officials in specific public locations, as a blanket ban would 
contravene its Basic Law. In 2018, and after years of legal and political procedures, the 
Dutch Parliament voted in favour of a burqa ban in specific public spaces including 
court houses, public transport, hospitals, and schools. Despite the fact that various 
right-wing groups promote such restrictions, none of these laws technically came from 
amongst their ranks. This section looks at the argumentation that the eventual laws 
feature in each of the countries. It also discusses structural changes in legislative 
proposals in the Netherlands, for the reason that the burqa ban went through 
numerous unsuccessful legislative cycles. These cycles dynamically illustrate that 




by the Council of State. This is not simply an archival task; layers of argumentation 
show how seemingly neutral political and legal language explicitly obscures intolerant 
attitudes.  
 France issued burqa restrictions with regard to the general open and public 
space in (2010-2011). The letter of the law does not mention the burqa, the niqab, or 
even Islam by name. Article 1 employs seemingly neutral language when it says that 
no one is allowed to wear clothes that are designed to cover the face in the public 
space.1 Article 2 further defines the public space as all spaces that are open to the 
general public as well as spaces that fulfil specific public functions.2 The same article 
acknowledges exceptions for professional purposes, sports gear, and festive garments. 
Enforcement of the law rests in various provisions of criminal law, including ordinary 
fines of maximum €150.3 However, the law sanctions domestic and social pressure to 
cover one’s face on account of their sex with one year imprisonment and a maximum 
of €30,000 in fines; increased to two years and €60,000 if the subject is a child.4 The law 
initially did not exclude places of worship from the concept of public space, and the 
Conseil constitutionnel ordered the law to be amended accordingly.5  
 The motivation of the law explicitly targeted the Islamic face veil and decried it 
as ‘symbolic and dehumanising violence’ and a rejection of the values that bind the 
nation together.6 It stated that the interest of vivre ensemble or ‘living together’ renders 
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state inaction unacceptable for reasons of gender equality, protection of republican 
values, and the social contract. Moreover, the motivation suggests that the notion of 
public order includes these dimensions: ‘La défense de l'ordre public ne se limite pas à la 
préservation de la tranquillité, de la salubrité ou de la sécurité. Elle permet également de 
prohiber des comportements qui iraient directement à l'encontre de règles essentielles au 
contrat social républicain, qui fonde notre société’.7 Chapter six discusses the article on 
public order by former president of the Conseil constitutionnel (1998-2007) Pierre 
Mazeaud who argued that public order refers to order, security, public health, and 
public tranquillity, in line with the decisions of the ECtHR. The Conseil constitutionnel, 
however, did not refer to this understanding of public order in its decision. Rather, it 
included an observation that the principle of public order prohibits the use of rights to 
harm others and that women have equal rights to men.8 Neither the legislature nor the 
Conseil constitutionnel made much effort to obscure the focus of the law on Muslim 
women who wear a face veil, despite the fact that the text of the law is religiously 
neutral and without reference to the female sex.  
 After several women were fined for transgressing the burqa ban, they brought 
their case to the attention of the ECtHR, known as the S.A.S. v. France case.9 It seems 
that the Court may have struggled with its verdict on the matter. The Court 
painstakingly argued that a wide Margin of Appreciation applied, which gives space 
to European countries to pursue their own policies in the absence of sufficient legal 
convergence or harmonisation. It should be noted that the Margin of Appreciation 
 
symbolique et déshumanisante (…)’, 
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7 Ibidem. 
8 Décision No. 2010-613 DC du 7 octobre 2010 Loi interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace 
public, consideration 3. 
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applies with regard to the European Convention and the European Court, and that it 
is separate from the requirements that emerge internally from French law. 
Furthermore, the Court affirmed the notion of ‘living together’, as advanced by the 
French legislature. Although this notion of ‘living together’ appears to be idiosyncratic 
to the S.A.S. case, it has attracted critical appraisal. Legal scholar Illias Trispiotis 
questions its fairly wide potential to demanding ‘conformity’ of minorities to 
majoritarian preferences.10 Myriam Hunter-Henin finds the doctrine ‘unconvincing’ 
and suggests simply employing the existing proportionality-test, which is part of the 
formal legal structure.11 Trispiotis’ argument about conformity is particularly 
interesting from the perspective of toleration; the issue of conformity is further 
discussed below.  
The position of the European Court is particularly interesting because its verdict 
followed only months after the Bayerischer Verwaltungsgericht issued a thorough 
verdict on the niqab in the context of vocational education.12 In 2013-2014, a vocational 
school in Regensburg revoked the admission of a student who refused to remove her 
niqab in the school, in accordance with the regional law. Her application included a 
photo in which she wore a hijab; however in the meantime she had begun wearing the 
niqab. The Court held that the state could prohibit the face veil in the particular context 
of public education according to Article 7:1 Basic Law.13 It dismissed the applicant’s 
argument that open communication would not be hindered by the face veil. The Court 
affirmed the importance of non-verbal communication like mimicry and gestures to 
open communication.14 Moreover, the Court noted that, in this case, the student had 
 
10 Ilias Trispiotis, ‘Two interpretations of “living together” in European human rights law’, (2016), 
Cambridge Law Journal, Vol. 75, No. 3, pp. 580-607, p 606-607. 
11 Myriam C. Hunter-Henin, ‘Living together in an age of religious diversity. Lessons from Baby Lou 
pand SAS’, (2015), Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, Vol 4, No.1, pp. 94-118, p. 118. 
12 Bayerischer Verwaltungsgericht, 22 April 2014 – 7 CS 13.2592 (followed by the Verwaltungsgericht 
Osnabrück, 19 August 2016 – 1 B 81/16). 
13 Ibidem, §18-20. 




alternatives available to her, such as self-study and external exams, concluding she 
had no duty to attend school anymore.15 Though this case offers a concrete approach 
to the importance of open communication, the European Court might have regarded 
the context as too different from the S.A.S. case, since it did not mention the German 
case at all. However, the choice to affirm the concept of ‘living together’ is not obvious, 
particularly because it leaves ample space to generalise social norms to the effect of 
public order. The openness of this concept could easily have problematic effects on 
consecutive cases, as the section on the French burkini cases demonstrates. 
In 2018, the Netherlands issued a partial burqa ban with regards to schools, 
transport, hospitals, town houses, appealing to the importance of transparent 
communication. To this point, organisations could lay down rules in incidental codes 
of conduct. After Geert Wilders mentioned a possible general face veil ban in 2005, an 
advisory committee of legal experts under the leadership of professor Ben Vermeulen 
advised that a generalised partial ban required a foundation in law; that is, a law 
enacted through the national Parliament. In absence of this legal foundation, other 
regulations of face-dissimulating attire could enter into conflict with provisions 
regarding religious freedom in both the constitution and the European Convention.16 
At face value, the 2018 law provides the mandatory legal foundation for a partial 
prohibition. A narrow focus on the law as such would obscure alterations made to the 
formal motivation over a long period of time. Such dynamics are crucial to 
understanding of this law in its proper context, particularly because the prohibition 
was first designed as a criminal law.  
In 2006-2007, Geert Wilders and Sietse Fritsma (Partij voor Vrijheid en Democratie) 
issued a first proposal to prohibit the burqa and niqab in public space through the 
 
15 Ibidem, §23. 
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system of criminal law.17 As a matter of interpretative technique, they did not qualify 
the burqa or niqab, nor the public space, other than that both must be interpreted in 
their broadest sense.18 The proposal breathes negative sentiments towards Muslims in 
the Schilderswijk, a well-known migrant neighbourhood in The Hague.19 The formal 
motivation listed three main reasons for the proposal, as follows: 1) the idea that burqa 
and niqab are diametrically opposed to modernity, as they express a rejection of 
Western core values, including equality of men and women; 2) the burqa and niqab 
hinder emancipation and integration of women in the Dutch society; 3) the allegation 
of safety risks, such as sentiments of unsafety that citizens might associate with the 
burqa or niqab and, secondarily, the fear that the use of the burqa in the 2005 London 
attacks would set a precedent.20 Secondary arguments included that the law would 
discourage social pressure to wear a face veil, as well as the assertion that ‘the 
problems’ with regard to interpersonal communication would be solved.21 For these 
reasons, Wilders and Fritsma asserted that the use of the burqa and niqab is 
‘completely undesirable’.22  
The proposal failed, in part because of a unconventionally critical report on 
behalf of the Netherlands Council of State.23 The Council of State observed that the 
assertion of the oppression of women was ill-founded and emphasised that, insofar as 
concrete problems existed, this law would not be an effective means of addressing 
these problems. Though the Council agreed on the importance and, to some extent, 
the legitimacy of open communication and safety requirements, the Council advised 
that the motivation was insufficient when compared with the fundamental 
interference with religious freedom that the law would cause. Moreover, the Council 
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emphasised that the definition of public space was too casual.24 In its reasoning, the 
Council largely followed the report by Vermeulen et alia from 2006. This report made 
two key observations: 1) that the limitation of constitutional religious freedom 
required a formal law (e.g. established through a Parliamentary process) and that 
delegation to decentralised bodies was only permitted with regard to the legitimate 
aims of public health, traffic, and public order;25 2) that the public order argument 
needed proper substantiation, including evidence of a concrete problem of public 
order besides reflections on the principles of proportionality and non-discrimination.26 
The report also judged the association of the burqa and the niqab with the oppression 
of women ‘ill-founded’.27 
In the following year 2007-2008 Kamp (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie), a 
liberal Member of Parliament, proposed a law similar to the proposal of Wilders and 
Fritsma, but in this instance regarding public buildings and open spaces.28 Kamp 
cleansed the proposal from apparent discriminatory language, nevertheless he came 
up with essentially the same provision. Based on the Refah Partisi case, he argued that 
the Netherlands would have a wide Margin of Appreciation. He argued that the face 
veil hindered objective standards of safety, such as identification, surveillance, and 
facilitated robbery and even terrorism. In the context of criminality, he referred to the 
2005 attacks in London and the  “native example” of Willem Holleeder, a well-known 
criminal who allegedly covered his face in certain meetings to avoid identification.29 
Kamp secondarily argued that the principle of the separation of church and state 
would uphold the face veil, and even mis-cited the above Vermeulen report, alleging 
 
24 This concern led to an amendment in the proposal, see Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 31 108, no. 5. 
25 Vermeulen, Loof & Wegeling, ‘Overwegingen bij een boerka verbod’, pp. 3, 37. 
26 Ibidem, pp. 6, 45, attachment no. IV. 
27 Ibidem, p. 15. 





that the face veil amounted to a “great social problem”.30 Its footnote leads to a section 
in the Vermeulen report saying that the social consternation about the face veil 
amounted to a ‘problem of some size’, but that no statistics are available to assess the 
number of women who veil their faces.31 The compulsory report of the Council of State 
in response to Kamp’s proposal has never been made public, which is probably 
indicative of its level of criticism.  
In June 2012, demissionary Minister of Interior Affairs, Liesbeth Spies, sent a 
new legislative proposal to Parliament which the Council of State again met with 
significant criticism.32 This new proposal argued that the face veil symbolised 
inequality.33 It argued that the face veil prevented full social participation on behalf of 
women and that the state needed to intervene to protect public order; the actual 
balancing of interests consisted of weighing open communication against individual 
freedom.34 Perhaps inspired by the French burqa ban, the motivation defined public 
space broadly and was inclusive of ordinary streets as well as specific functions of 
public life, such as train stations and shopping malls. The Council of State was highly 
critical of most of these arguments, either because they were insufficiently supported 
with evidence, a consequence of their conceptual impermissibility, or because they 
were of limited significance.35 The Council reiterated that a generic prohibition is 
impermissible and that incidental and specific restrictions should be grounded in 
legally sound motivations.36 The then Minister of Interior Affairs, Ronald Plasterk 
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advice in Kamerstukken II 2011-2012, 33 165, no. 4. 
33 Kamerstukken II 2011-2012, 33 165, no. 3. 
34 Ibidem. 





(Labour), retracted the proposal in December 2015, but only after issuing a new one in 
November 2015.37 
This new proposal made it through both houses of Parliament, with the Senate 
voting in favour in June 2018.38 The full opposition on the left voted against, including 
Plasterk’s own Labour party. This new proposal entailed a partial prohibition and 
referred to particular public functions, such as public traffic, education, and healthcare. 
The motivation unsurprisingly invoked the argument of open communication. Of 
more interest is the Minister’s tweak of argumentation regarding the notion of ‘living 
together’, as per the S.A.S. case. The Minister held that the pluralistic nature of Dutch 
society could only function if ‘everyone’ (iedereen) would participate and if everyone 
would share ‘the basic principles’ (de basisprincipes).39 The Minister, however, did not 
substantiate what these ‘basic principles’ would precisely entail, relying instead on the 
argument of open communication. The Minister argued that the limited 
understanding of public space amounted to a fair balancing of interests. Moreover, the 
proposal would not be discriminatory because of the use of neutral language.40 
The tweaks did not convince the Council of State. The Council observed that the 
‘neutral’ wording would not obscure the fact that the burqa and the niqab had been 
the explicit and direct reason to design the legislation.41 The Council reiterated the 
absence of evidence of a concrete problem and noted that only few women actually 
wear the face veil. The Council observed that internal Codes of Conduct by civil 
institutions already enabled partial regulations so that a general prohibition pertaining 
to particular public functions would be unnecessary, if not symbolic. The Council 
dismissed any argument of harmonisation of existing codes, since no problems had 
been reported with the existing codes. Ironically, the Council included a note on the 
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necessity of communication in dealing with diversity, hinting that incidental dialogue 
and internal Codes of Conduct addressed the matter of the face veil better than a 
generalised partial prohibition. Finally, the Council reiterated that, even though the 
European Court would consider the Margin of Appreciation to be wide, national 
legislation needed to be justified on the basis of national law as well as careful 
motivation.  
 The German government (Bundesregierung) issued a partial face veil ban in 2017, 
but only with regard to state officials in particular public spaces, such as national 
defence, police, and court houses.42 The law followed only eleven days after the 2016 
terrorist attack at the Berlin Christmas market.43 The proposal appealed to the 
foundation of a relationship of trust and open communication between state officials 
and citizens, thus amounting to the proper functioning of the state.44 The proposal 
secondarily invoked the imperative of religious and ideological neutrality on behalf of 
the state, which assumes neutrality would be compromised if an official covered their 
face.45 Similar arguments occurred in later documents of the Bundestag.46 In comparison 
with debates in the Dutch Parliament, it is significant that again parties on the ‘left’ 
were not supportive of this law. Opposition from Die Linke called the proposal blatant 
symbolic politics (reine Symbolpolitik), in addition to warning for social sentiments 
against the Muslim population in Germany.47 The Bündnis 90/Die Grünen argued that 
the problem which this restriction targeted did not factually exist. They also accused 
the Christian democratic CDU/CSU/SPD government of issuing this regulation out of 
fear for populism.  
 
42 Gesetz Jahrgang 2017, Teil I, No. 36, Bonn 14 June 2017. 
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 Indeed, in February 2018, the right-wing populist movement and now political 
party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) published a proposal for a general prohibition 
of the face veil in a broadly defined public space.48 The motivation invoked the 
freedom of Muslim women and their right of self-determination, an argument that 
could sway either way. More significantly, the AfD asserted that Islam would be a 
discriminating ideology, contrary to the principle of Menschenwürde and defiant of 
European culture and its ‘enlightened-democratic values’.49 The motivation frames the 
burqa and niqab as the ‘uniform’ of both Salafism and Islamism and completely 
ignores any nuance of fundamental differences between the two. Similarly to the 
Dutch and French debates, they imported the idea of living together (gesellschaftlichen 
Zusammenlebens), which is again an explicit reference to the S.A.S. case from 2017. 
Other reasons include safety concerns, the matter of swift identification, and the 
effectiveness of video-surveillance, as in the Netherlands. To date, this proposal has 
not progressed further. 
Legislative proposals about the face veil in France, the Netherlands, and 
Germany show that the national legal systems have an integrity of their own and that 
internal quality standards must be met. However, the echoes of the living together 
teleology spread widely, even as politicians and Ministers craft argumentation to fit 
the requirements of the law. Legislation on the face veil shows that popular sentiments 
about Muslim presence translate in tangible restrictions that are problematic for a 
number of reasons. First, because the state advances arguments about otherness, 
incompatibility of values, and gender equality that are poorly - if at all - based on 
evidence. It should not go unnoticed that clear political value-judgments are made 
(truth), concerns about visible otherness are expressed (visibility), an outward 
conformity is demanded (outward unity). Moreover, the thinly substantiated appeals 
to public order show that constitutional protection of minorities do not always protect 
 





minorities from state intervention with their freedoms. The wanderings of the Dutch 
burqa ban show this in particular, because Parliament established the law without 
satisfying the requirements laid out in a handful of especially critical reports of the 
Council of State. Lastly, the implications of the othering and discriminatory arguments 
ring beyond the question of the face veil. Othering rhetoric is not limited to alleged 
‘extremities’ of Islam, such as the burqa and niqab. As we will see below, similar 
arguments occur to the more mundane matter of headscarves and the so-called 
burkini. 
 
7.2 Preventing terrorism on the beach: the French burkini cases50 
In the wake of the Nice attack in the Summer of 2016, over thirty French mayors issued 
burkini bans with regard to public beaches.51 Seemingly general and neutral language 
veiled rather blatant prejudice towards a group of Muslim women wearing modest 
swimwear known as the “burkini”. Mayors have the authority to issue such 
restrictions on grounds of public order; however, these occur in local settings and 
perhaps unsurprisingly feature varying motivations. This section uses the Cannes and 
Villeneuve-Loubet decisions (arrêtés) as a starting point, because a group of human 
rights activists challenged this decision all the way up to the Conseil d’État. The mayor 
of Cannes forbade ‘ostentatious religious attire’, explicitly using the language of laïcité 
in the middle of the Summer.52 According to media outlets, he clarified this concerned 
the burkini and jilbab only as signs of religious extremism, and did not include other 
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religious expressions, such as the kippah or a cross.53 He further framed the decision 
in the context of good morality, laïcité, hygiene, and security rules.54 The mayor of 
Villeneuve-Loubet similarly appealed to the public order principle, further motivating 
the restriction in the context of ‘good morality’, laïcité, ‘hygiene’, and ‘security’.55 Other 
mayors modelled their arrêtés in similar vein. Such motivations show the truer side of 
these regulations, such as tweaking the public order argument and apparently ill-
founded appeals to public health and good morality.  
 Human rights activists unsuccessfully challenged the decisions at the tribunal 
administratif of Nice, and then appealed to the Conseil d’État, which actually suspended 
both decisions.56 Following the verdict of the Conseil, all but one prohibition were 
suspended.57 The Conseil d’État expressed profound concerns about the motivations 
behind these restrictions and called the Villeneuve-Loubet decision a grave and clearly 
illegal attack on fundamental liberties: ‘une atteinte grave et manifestement illégale aux 
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libertés fondamentales’.58 The Conseil observed that arguments of public order must be 
grounded in tangible threats to public order and clarified that mere fear was 
insufficient to a prohibition that gravely affects the fundamental freedoms of citizens.59 
The Conseil dismissed other concerns, such as hygiene and decency, as irrelevant as 
well as unconnected to the principle of public order.60 This verdict not only corrected 
local misapplication of the law, it also reproved the decision of the tribunal administratif 
of Nice, which had affirmed that the burkini was a sign of more than religion alone 
and that the burkini could pose a risk to public order.61  
The cases attracted mass media and provoked some high ranking politicians to 
speak out on the matter. Shortly after the decision of the Conseil d’État, Prime Minister 
Manual Valls posted a long note on his personal Facebook-page.62 This note exerted 
many of the arguments that the Conseil d’État had just ruled against. Valls argued that 
the burkini debates encompassed a ‘fight’ of cultural and political dimensions, 
maintaining that the burkini would be a political sign. He argued that it represented 
restrictions that would be imposed on certain Muslim women: ‘Il n’y a pas de liberté qui 
enferme les femmes!’. Moreover, he called for a modernisation of Islam and a political 
 
58 Conseil d’État, ordonnance, 26 août 2016, no. 402742, 402777, § 6.  
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Islam that would be compatible with republican values, in particular with laïcité.63 
President Hollande similarly expressed that the burkini was incompatible with French 
values, although he also warned against provocation and stigmatization of Muslim 
minorities.64 Such expressions could be understood as potentially undermining the 
decision of the Conseil d’État. This attitude was indeed mirrored in the desire of a 
number of local authorities to nevertheless enforce their measure, as well as in new 
attempts to issue the burkini bans veiled in slightly altered language. 
In 2013, before the burkini controversy in France, the highest German court 
explicitly affirmed use of ‘burkinis’ in the context of obligatory swimming lessons 
organised by public schools. The Court affirmed the accommodation of the burkini for 
reasons of integration and development of group processes.65 Since catering to minors 
is fundamentally different in schools, compared with the open space, and is typically 
adjudicated more strictly, this explicit affirmation is very significant. The European 
Court took a similar approach in the Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v. Switzerland case in 
2017.66 The Court affirmed the use of the burkini by Muslim schoolgirls and ruled that 
no exemption from sports classes needed to be granted on the basis of religious 
freedom. In these cases, the highest German Court and the European Court signalled 
a somewhat positive evaluation of the burkini; that is, the burkini can contribute to 
integration in certain settings. These judicial attitudes show that one-dimensional 
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interpretation of the burkini as a symbol of fundamentalism and alleged 
incompatibility with democratic values is, at least in law, unwarranted. 
Akin to the discussion about the burkini is the discussion about sports hijabs. 
In 2014, the Court of The Hague adjudicated a claim of discrimination after an 
interconfessional school prohibited the use of sports hijabs in Physical Exercise 
classes.67 The school in question had temporarily permitted the use of sports hijabs, 
but decided to prohibit these for safety-reasons. The school did not, however, base its 
safety argument on any evidence that the sports hijab was unsafe. Instead, the school 
argued that it was not in a position to judge the safety and had decided to prohibit all 
uses of the hijab in Physical Exercise classes. The Court ruled that a general prohibition 
was unsuitable to guarantee pupils’ safety and that the school should have explored 
alternatives. It is important to notice that the element of religious conviction was not 
necessarily part of the proceedings, but rather, the mere question of proportionality of 
aims and means. Several Dutch and German cases actually focus on this question of 
proportionality in relation to religious freedom; indeed, German and Dutch courts 
indicate that general prohibitions are difficult to justify and that they will scrutinise 
proportionality related content in particular.  
 
7.3 Regulating the ordinary: hijabs and other religious attire 
A similar logic on proportionality features in labour cases, such as incidental 
prohibitions of the hijab and other religious attire. In 2017, the Verwaltungsgericht 
Frankfurt am Main adjudicated a case involving a law clerk of the Landgericht Frankfurt 
am Main (Rechtsrefendar) who declined to remove her covering from her hair and 
neck.68 Her employer sent her a notice about dress restrictions, which specifically 
mentioned that a headscarf was not permitted because of the imperative of outward 
neutrality of the Court. The Court held that a restriction of religious freedom needed 
to be grounded in a formal law; moreover, it stated that a law clerk is not actually 
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bound by the same abstract requirement of neutrality as judges are. The Court decided 
that in the absence of tangible problems, the prohibition was not proportionate. In 
2015, the Bezirksamt Neukölln von Berlin ruled that the conflict of the neutrality principle 
and personal freedom required case-specific solutions to satisfy the requirement of 
proportionality.69 The verdict included the observation that a headscarf could be 
permitted to a law clerk; in this case, someone who was temporarily detached in the 
context of judicial training. The Court ruled that the women involved would not carry 
out any tasks with direct external effect.  
A similar case occurred in 2016 in the Netherlands. The Court of Rotterdam and 
an external law clerk entered into conflict over the permissibility of the headscarf. The 
Court held that the headscarf itself was not the issue, but that its symbolisation of Islam 
was: the Court argued that such a ‘visible and recognisable sign of personal conviction’ 
was incompatible with clerking.70 The Court appealed to its neutrality code, as well as 
to a letter of the Minister of Justice to Parliament. The College voor de Rechten van de 
Mens, the Dutch national Human Rights Committee which issues authoritative, yet 
non-binding decisions, held that an external law clerk was not actually part of the 
judicial branch of the state. As a result, the requirement of impartiality and 
independence applied differently, compared to the role of judges. The College advised 
that the motivation of the decision to prohibit the headscarf was insufficient and that 
it excluded a large group of scarf-wearing Muslim women from training and working 
with the Court.  
The question of impartiality was at stake in a case over head covering and the 
Dutch police in 2017. In contrast to Canada and Scotland, where specially designed 
hijabs were introduced and integrated with the required police uniform, Dutch and 
French authorities were dismissive of the very idea. In 2017, the College voor de Rechten 
van de Mens dealt with a complaint by a female police officer who wished to wear a 
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hijab at work.71 Her work involved administrative duties without face-to-face contact 
with external clients. The internal dress code expected police officers to remove all 
symbols of religious or political conviction in order to guarantee a neutral, impersonal, 
and uniform appearance of the police. This rule applied to officers both in uniform and 
in civilian attire. The College judged that this dress code amounted to indirect and 
unjustified discrimination. It found fault with the application of the principle of 
subsidiarity as well as proportionality, because the woman worked in an 
administrative capacity, did not issue decisions, and did not encounter external people 
in her work. The college thus considered risk of a partial appearance minimal. 
A slightly more ambiguous case concerned the dress code of an Amsterdam-
based transport company in 2009-2010.72 The company allows the hijab and includes 
an optional hijab with the uniform. A Christian employee raised a complaint because 
he wanted to display a cross, resting on his chest, over his uniform. A change in dress 
code forbade necklaces of any kind over a uniform and the company suggested rings 
or bracelets instead. The regional court of Amsterdam concluded that this code 
entailed indirect discrimination, but that the aim of professional appearance was 
justified. Moreover, the Court held that the company did not need to assess the 
religious meaning of necklaces. Sometimes courts do require a greater effort on behalf 
of employers. In 2014 a woman, who received help from the municipality of 
Roosendaal to find appropriate work, could not take up a particular position because 
the company dress code demanded trousers.73 The woman in question always wore 
skirts for religious reasons (this is fairly common in some regions in the Netherlands) 
and had done similar work in a skirt before. On allegation of non-cooperation, the 
municipality lowered her benefits. However, the court faulted the local authorities for 
not documenting the facts of the case as well as failing to enter into a discussion about 
the kind of work that would be suitable for this woman. 
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In a 2017, a hospital employee complained about a code that forbade her from 
wearing long sleeves, which she wanted to do for religious reasons. Though the 
hospital legitimately seeks to guarantee hygiene standards, the Dutch court judged 
that the proportionality principle requires the employer to make accommodations.74 
The Court found that the board should investigate in other solutions to accommodate 
the employee’s religious claim. A German case concerning an employee of a 
confessional hospital fared differently, where a hospital overseen by the Evangelische 
Kirche was allowed to forbid its employees from wearing a headscarf.75 The difference 
between these cases is, in part, warranted by the fact that the Dutch hospital technically 
is part of the civil service, whereas the German hospital concerned a confessional 
institution. 
A decision by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) of 2017 clarified that it would 
not unreservedly affirm blanket bans on religious attire and that national courts 
should investigate whether or not a restriction is grounded in a specific professional 
requirement. The ECJ delivered guidance in the much anticipated ruling G4S Secure 
Solutions and Bougnauoi in March 2017. The Court ruled that restrictions of headscarves 
could potentially be justified, but it prescribed a systematic and contextual approach 
regarding existing law. Although it dismissed the argument of direct discrimination 
in this case, it agreed that occupational requirements could discriminate indirectly, 
particularly regarding Muslim employees.76 Such indirect discrimination might be 
justified if answerable to legitimate aims, such as relationships with clients and/or 
neutrality. Importantly, mere unease of clients was dismissed as a legally permissible 
argument; moreover, the Court prescribed a case to case review to determine the 
necessity and proportionality of imposed restrictions.  
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Though these cases are different in many respects, some common threads can be 
discerned. Whereas the normative bias was perhaps not difficult to detect in the case 
of the niqab, burqa, and burkini, prejudice can sometimes occur in more seemingly 
neutral ways and can affect the quality with which the various interests are balanced. 
It would also be a mistake to understand arguments about the niqab, burqa, burkini, 
or headscarf as idiosyncratic to Islam. The way in which politicians and even 
governments frame Islam as other, disloyal, threatening to the social order, at least in 
this chapter, can affect any religion that offers an alternative narrative of the 
relationship between territory, people, and common destiny. The cases presented here 
give a strong indication that the question of visibility is pertinent to debates over 
religious freedom. The closing paragraphs revisit the legal requirements to an 
intervention with religious freedom and discuss them from the perspective of 
toleration and constitutionalisation of basic liberties. The main questions are thus: 1) 
is there a concrete problem? and, if so, does the problem amount to a pressing need to 
regulate?; 2) if a regulation exists, does it directly or indirectly affect religious 
freedom?; 3) is there a legitimate aim?; 4) is the proposed solution the only possible or 
satisfying solution?; and 5) is the proposed regulation proportionate? 
First, is there a problem and if so, does this problem amount to a pressing need 
to regulate? The definition of a problem ought not to be a matter of political tweaking. 
The cases on the face veil indicate that problems are sometimes ‘found’ after the 
suggestion of a regulation has been made and that problems tend to be exaggerated. 
However, the legal requirement of a tangible problem is foundational to the 
constitutional and democratic order. It seems that mere unease does not cover the 
ground of a problem; neither does an ‘immaterial dimension’ to the notion of a 
problem. The above cases on the face veil show that bias and reliance on value-
judgments shaped the perception of a deemed problem. This is at the least suspicious, 




dimensions to toleration of truth and common good. For the state, casting others as 
existing in conflict with the democratic perception the good life, and categorising their 
values as clearly wrong, is an instance of toleration pur sang.  
A second question arises as to whether a regulation actually restricts with a 
religious freedom. Not all allegations of an interference with religious freedom are 
justified. An example is the recent litigation in the Netherlands about the Pastafarian 
or Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster conviction. Intended as a parody on religion, 
some of its adherents like to wear a colander on their heads. In 2018, the Dutch Council 
of State judged that, according to ‘the current state of affairs’, the request to use a photo 
with the colander on a national identity card and driver’s license fell outside the scope 
of religious freedom.77 The Council judged that according to ‘the current state of 
affairs’ this was not the case for a lack of seriousness and cohesion. In line with German 
jurisprudence it quoted in its decision, it pointed out that the freedom of opinion and 
expression thereof was more appropriate for this case.78 The decision did not preclude, 
however, future inclusion of Pastafarianism. It is not substantially contested that official 
evaluation of the scope of the definition of religion has its problematic sides, 
particularly when the state is both adjudicator of the definition of religion and the 
regulator of religious freedom at the same time.  
Once the threshold of religion is taken, not every expression thereof is 
automatically covered under the religious freedom provisions of the law. When an 
expression is indeed covered under the law, courts evaluate whether there is a direct 
or indirect impact on this freedom. For some, this distinction might appear to be a legal 
technicality, but it is this very distinction that often hides behind seemingly neutral 
language. When a state regulation discriminates directly, it explicitly targets a specific 
religion or expression thereof and this is typically fiercely scrutinised by courts. 
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Indirect discrimination occurs when a seemingly neutral regulation has an undue 
impact on a specific minority, which could be a religious community, or groups or 
individuals within religious communities. This type of discrimination is also strictly 
scrutinised as it is fundamentally no less problematic. There are many border cases, of 
which the burkini debate is a good example: the legal documents employ generalised 
language, whereas state officials declare to explicitly target particular expressions of 
religion.  
Third, the language of toleration is perhaps most likely to appear in 
justifications of an intervention with religious freedom. The justification is part of a 
threefold test: legitimate aim, subsidiarity, and proportionality. With regards to a 
legitimate aim, it is important to stress that these are included in the human rights 
provisions in national constitutions, as well as European and international human 
rights documents. These aims are formally scripted, such as public hygiene, safety, 
and/or traffic, to the exclusion of other aims. Particularly worrying is the influence of 
the concept ‘living together’. This concept is a French legal concept and does not 
constitute a legitimate aim in Germany, the Netherlands, or many other European 
countries. The implications of this concept could be significant, particularly since it 
practically marries social norms into the public order argument. That is not 
permissible in either Germany or the Netherlands, and question is to what extent shall 
it uphold French policies towards Muslim minorities in the future. The scrutiny of 
public order arguments tends to be strict. The above cases give the impression that the 
French Conseil d’État, the Dutch Council of State, and the German and Dutch courts 
take this scrutiny seriously. The ECtHR earlier affirmed a strict scrutiny of public order 
arguments, considering a general prohibition of religious symbols illegitimate in the 
absence of a concrete threat to public order.79 It is clear that any alleged threat to public 
order needs to be tangible and concrete.  
Fourth is the question of subsidiarity. This principle demands that a regulation 
is weighed against other alternatives that might have a lesser impact on religious 
 




freedom. Reasonable alternatives are sometimes available. The Dutch debate on the 
partial restriction of the face veil shows that incidental Codes of Conduct could do 
more justice to the situation at a grassroots level than generic national legislation 
would. In this case, it appears that national legislation was the result of a particular 
political strategy, rather than an effective measure against a tangible problem. Another 
example is the discussion on the hijab and the uniform or the sports hijab. In both cases 
there is a legitimate interest in a certain appearance, be it appropriate in the police 
force or in a gymnastics hall. It is interesting that sports hijabs and police hijabs are 
introduced in some countries, whereas others declare it completely unacceptable. It 
raises the question of political will more than anything else to accommodate a 
particular individual need.  
Fifth is the principle of proportionality, which requires a considerate balancing 
of interests involved. To use the example of the police uniform and the hijab: in the 
case of the Dutch police administrator, the arguments advanced with regards to her 
function turned out to be mostly irrelevant. Similar questions raised with regards to 
law clerks show that courts differentiate between the type of impartiality and 
neutrality demanded from different types of state officials. The latter implies that not 
one and equal neutrality and impartiality is indeed demanded from state officials en 
bloc, but that regulations must be appropriate within their particular context. This is 
an important lesson from these cases, particularly because so many debates do not 
move beyond generalised statements about church and state, or about the role of 
religion in society. Moreover, the aforementioned cases almost unequivocally state the 
casuistic nature of restrictions of religious freedom. In most cases, a general restriction 
based on a conceptual notion of neutrality is dismissed in favour of the protection of 
the needs of an individual or simply the demands of a specific job description, such as 
in the G4S case.  
In conclusion, the law provides a scripted rationale for the protection of the 
manifestation of religion in open, public space. This rationale applies not only to 




motivation for legislation that restricts the visibility of religious symbols in public 
space. It is encouraging to see that courts take a strict approach to the scrutiny of 
political motivations to restrictions of religious freedom; however, a wide Margin of 
Appreciation on behalf of the European Convention incidentally encourages 
politicians to seize the discretionary freedom towards political opportunism, such as 
in the case of the Dutch burqa ban. However, the legal protections really offer a 
bottom-line of protection. Given the gravity of interference with religious freedom in 
several of the above cases, it is of concern that legislatures struggle to meet those 
minimum requirements and that criticism of advisory bodies, and sometimes even 
correction by courts, are not taken seriously enough in the legislative procedure.  
 
 
8. Conclusion  
 
The visibility of religion in public space is crucial to both toleration and religious 
freedom. Toleration emerged in conjugation with the political imaginary of the corpus 
christianum, which expressed a oneness of territory, people, and teleology, and which 
justified the marginalisation of normatively othered religious minorities in a period of 
rapid social, political, and religious disintegration. The nation state, with its 
integration of state, nation, and cultural formation, operates as a counterpart of the 
corpus christianum. Its political imaginary rests on the idea of the nation, and 
transformed religious othering into a continuum of othering with regards to religion, 
origin, and race. This othering is expressed in contemporary contention over the 
meaning and use of public space. In France, Germany, and the Netherlands, political 
and legal conflict over religious diversity, in particular the expression of Muslim 
identities, concentrates on the visibility of otherness in public space. The 
instrumentalization of constitutional law in these politics of diversity demonstrates 
that the law is not immune to othering and intolerance. The notion of public order in 
particular, which functions as a gatekeeper of religious freedom, is vulnerable to the 
inclusion of social norms, and may thus obstruct the effective protection of the 
religious freedom of minorities.  
 This conclusion reflects on four implications of this study: 1) the relationship 
between religious diversity and public space; 2) the relationship between public space 
and the political imaginary of the nation; 3) the vulnerability of the notion of public 
order to political intolerance; and 4) the imperative and impossibility of neutrality.  
 
8.1 The relationship between religious diversity and public space 
The notion of a neutral public space is not natural to French, German, or Dutch 
formations of toleration and religious freedom. France only developed laïcité from the 




space, but only to impartiality and independence of certain public institutions from 
the Roman Catholic Church. Processes of constitutionalisation in the Netherlands and 
Germany do not demonstrate a commitment to a neutral public space either. Instead, 
they also imposed a range of restrictions on Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish 
communities, much in the image of toleration. In the Netherlands, restrictions on 
Catholic processions remained in place until 1983. Several religious communities met 
these restrictions with spiritual revival, deliberate expression of religion in public 
space, as well as political activism. Germany and the Netherlands both developed 
more accommodative political and legal approaches to religious diversity in direct 
conversation with these social tensions.  
 From the mid-twentieth century, the idea of secularisation as privatisation 
gained traction over secularisation as differentiation. This traction was entwined with 
the secularisation thesis, e.g. the anticipation of the decline of religious in public and 
personal life. This secularisation as privatisation is colloquially synonymous with the 
separation of church and state, and in this capacity, it gives rise to the idea that it 
justifies the mitigation of visibility of religious diversity in public space. This is ironical 
historically, because visibility in public space expressed toleration, and exclusion from 
this space signified the most restrictive form of toleration before violent repression. 
Moreover, common frames of reference to toleration appear in relation to this 
neutralisation of public space – especially outward unity, public order, and trust. This 
normative understanding of the privatisation of religion is of course not synonymous 
to the separation of church and state; moreover, privatisation does not rest on a 
rational justification, and the separation of church and state primarily refers to the 
mutual independence of state and ecclesiastcal institutions.  
 The idea of privatisation of religion with reference to public space is thus 
historically profoundly problematic. However, this is not only the case with religious 
diversity. It is no coincidence that the emancipation of women, people of colour, and 
sexual minorities materialised through participation in public space as well as 




otherness creates space that is crucial to encounter of differences and to cultural 
transcendences. Exclusion from the public space, on the other hand, historically 
symbolises normative othering. Its elimination from cultural transcendences signifies 
judgment, namely, that this otherness takes no part in the future of the political 
community, and is only “tolerated” for the purposes of eventual integration. Current 
political tensions over the visibility of religious diversity might not fully assume these 
connotations of toleration; however, the relationship between public space and the 
political imaginary of the nation equally hinges on othering that in the context of 
nationalism functions normatively.  
  
8.2 The relationship between public space and the political imaginary of the nation  
The concept of public space shapes and depends on the political imaginary of the 
nation. The notion of the nation emerged over against religious as well as social and 
political fragmentation and symbolised a unity of the political community in early 
constitutions. However, the integration of state, nation, and culture – foreshadowed in 
the Peace of Westphalia – transformed religious otherness into a continuum of 
otherness with reference to religion, race, and origin. This continuum implies 
differentiation in minoritisation to the extent that the experience of minority Catholics, 
Jews, and Muslims should not be generalised on account of religion or race only, or 
even origin. Although citizenship has become dependent on naturalisation and 
integration, the construction of this otherness for political purposes is much more fluid 
and adaptable to particular issues. Moreover, where this othering with respect to 
religion, race, and origin becomes normative, it constructs not only various types of 
othering, on the flipside, it also constructs various types of superiority.  
 This continuum of religion, race, and origin implies that a focus on integration 
and outward conformity ultimately fails to address the question of belonging. 
Standardisation of language, moderation of religious distinctives, and participation in 
cultural traditions of the nation may facilitate assimilation of newcomers, it does not 




century Arabs went underground, and many Jews dissimulated their identity and 
adopted Christian practices, which effectuated a measure of outward conformity. 
However, none of this could actually undo the barrier to belonging that nationhood 
created. Today, allochthonous religious communities still face this insurmountable 
othering, especially as this othering is amplified in the context of conservative and 
right-wing politics. This provokes the question if it is possible to articulate a more 
inclusive notion of the nation, or “the people”, and can this be done without narrowing 
the fringes of belonging? 
   
8.3 Public order as the mediator of diversity 
The integration of state, nation, and cultural formation impacts on the concept of 
public order and makes it vulnerable to the inclusion of social norms to the 
disadvantage of religious minorities. The principle of public order is an important 
mediator of diversity because it protects the religious freedom as well as other 
constitutional rights of minorities as well as legitimises state intervention with these 
rights and freedoms. The legal notion of public order is diffuse, however, key aspects 
include security, safety, legal certainty, and public health. This thesis argues that three 
distinctions that are vital to the interest of the protection of minorities: the distinction 
between legal norms and social norms, the distinction between structural and 
individual dimensions to public order, and the difference between legitimate and 
illegitimate arguments of public order. The progressive inclusion of social norms into 
arguments of public order, especially mediated through the notion of “living together” 
makes constitutional law extremely vulnerable to intolerance, and because of that, 
forms a potential threat to religious freedom.  
The distinction between legal norms and social norms means that not all social 
norms can legitimately inform the concept of public order. French, German, and Dutch 
law do make this distinction, however, under the influence on the “living together” 
doctrine, this distinction has become less pronounced. Further, the distinction between 




the law. Legislation on the expression of Muslim identity in public space violated this 
principle. Overly-general language that obviously aims at Muslim identity, or, long 
lists of exceptions to the definition of face covering, testifies to this violation. Lastly, 
the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate arguments of public order refers to 
the substantiation of a concrete threat to public order. For example, the relatively low 
number of Muslim women who wear a face veil in these countries as well as the 
absence of a concrete threat to public order in its classical understanding, make these 
legal restrictions extremely problematic. This provokes further questions about the 
operationalisation of public order as a legal concept. Is this notion inherently 
obstructing the effective protection of minorities or does it only need a stricter 
definition?  
   
8.4 The imperative and impossibility of neutrality 
Constitutionalism did not engender neutrality. Rather, constitutionalisation 
recalibrated the legal frameworks in which social, political, and religious 
fragmentation needed to be contained. Constitutionalisation was not only a break-
away from absolutism and denominational dominance, it also preserved a concern 
over truth and a common good. However, constitutionalism still emerged from within 
a largely Christian framework and operated under the assumption that it was possible 
to reunite the Christian factions. Its structures continue to disadvantage non-Christian 
minorities compared to Christian minorities in the nation state. Constitutionalism 
technically never aimed at neutrality, but rather relied on a principle of impartiality 
and assumed that Members of Parliament would speak on behalf of the nation and not 
on behalf of partisan interests. Impartiality recognises relevant differences, but also 
assumes a relative measure of oneness which render these differences secondary. 
Neutrality is primarily ethical, impartiality is by definition relational. 
This is important to the concept of neutrality as non-consideration. This type of 
neutrality verges on secularisation as privatisation, also making religious differences 




privatisation of belief might thus reinforce cultural marginalisation as a result of 
privatisation, and it defies the importance of relationality. If toleration indeed 
expressed concern over the inclusion of minorities in public space, cultural formation, 
common identity, and articulations of the common good; perhaps conflicts over 
religious freedom ought not to negate those very dimensions of belonging. Today, the 
most significant threats to this inclusion arise from nationalism and the traction it has 
gained across the political spectrum. These threats materialise in law and have a real 
impact on the lives of minorities. Such threats are not incidental, and though legal 
scrutiny tends to focus on particular issues and cases, it is crucial to understand these 
against the backdrop of waves of intolerance and the legal and political structures that 
facilitate intolerance.  
 
Tolerance and intolerance are often hidden in concrete situations, historically and 
contemporarily, and sometimes they are clothed in constitutionalism. It is in this 
intersection of intolerance with constitutionalism that political and constitutional 
theory needs a stronger awareness of legacies of toleration. Political and constitutional 
theorists need to develop a robust notion of a complex common good which is 
primarily relational rather than ethical, and which gives an account of the complexity 
of contemporary society. The notion of public order similarly warrants reflections on 
the structures in the law that support racism, religious intolerance, gender inequality, 
and xenophobia; especially as the definition of public order has a direct impact on the 
possibilities to restrict religious freedom for other than classically permitted reasons. 
These conversations and reflections are equally not beholden to political and 
constitutional theorists only; these conversations will be enriched by a structural 
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